

# *Supplementa ad Scientia Militaria III 2009*

**Pursuing human security in Africa  
through Developmental Peace  
Missions: Ambitious construct or  
feasible ideal?**

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with  
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## PREFACE

*Pursuing human security through Developmental Peace Missions: Ambitious construct or feasible ideal?* appears at a time when the continent of Africa is wrought by conflict, internal unrest and not-so-civil war, compelling African leaders to grapple with the theory and reality of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in extremely difficult and challenging environments. Notions of Developmental Peace Missions (DPMs) emanated from both the political debate and the study of African peace missions by university-based and NGO-employed researchers. This volume examines DPMs and assesses the utility of the concept itself as a means to pursue sustainable levels of human security through a combination of peacekeeping interventions. DPMs, which envisage a model of concurrent developmental efforts and security actions to turn back destructive internal African conflicts, is a noteworthy South African contribution to this debate. The editorial staff of *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* are pleased to publish this third Supplementa, which is probably the most comprehensive work on DPMs to date and of immediate interest to the defence community.

*Pursuing human security* developed under the supervision of Prof Theo Neethling and Maj Benjamin Mokoena and was submitted by Lt Col Laetitia Olivier as a thesis, presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Science (MMil) in Security and Africa Studies at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. It has been editorially altered and revised for this publication. The valuable inputs made by Prof DJ Kotze of Unisa as external examiner, as well as those proffered by the lecturing staff of the School for Security and Africa Studies during the initial research colloquium are acknowledged.

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## ABSTRACT

This study explores the feasibility of the concept *Developmental Peace Missions* (DPMs). It seeks to answer the question whether DPMs is an ambitious construct or a feasible ideal and whether DPMs could be effectively applied during peace missions. The study takes the form of a descriptive analysis of the theoretical underpinnings and philosophical points of departure of the concept of DPMs, and includes the analysis of various relevant case studies with a view to studying the application of the concept of DPMs.

The study explores the evolution that has taken place in terms of United Nations (UN) peace missions in that most modern peace missions include both peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. The study also illustrates the modern approach to peace missions, based on an integrated systems-thinking approach by means of which the activities of all relevant role-players are integrated and fused towards a common end state: that of sustained security and development. In order to analyse the concept of DPMs, the underpinnings of the concept human security, the security-development nexus and peacebuilding were researched in depth. These concepts were then coupled to the concept of DPMs in terms of their utility during recent and current complex peace missions, both internationally and on the African continent. In view of this, the concept of DPMs was studied in the context of contemporary peacekeeping in terms of three case studies, namely the peace missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC. Thus DPMs was applied to these case studies and analysed in terms of the extent to which the peace interventions in these countries were conducted in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings and philosophical points of departure of the concept.

The study concludes that DPMs is indeed a feasible ideal for peace missions, as it is based on and in line with the approved current UN and AU integrated planning processes. However, in terms of its practical utility in Africa, it currently remains an ambitious construct, given the limited capacity and resources of the AU and regional organisations. Therefore, DPMs should not be viewed as a short-term solution to, or panacea for, all intra-state wars. The study proposes that the UN, the AU, as well as relevant regional organisations will have to adjust and make changes in terms of their institutions, structures, funding and the provision of resources in order to operationalise the concept of DPMs successfully. This is especially true as far as the AU is concerned, as the AU currently experiences severe limitations in both logistics and human resources. However, the fact that both the UN and the AU have adopted the Integrated Mission Planning Process concept as planning tool for their respective missions is an indication that progress is being made towards the achievement of

establishing a more holistic and integrated approach to finding sustainable solutions to global conflict. Ultimately, the success of DPMs will be determined by the will and commitment of all the relevant role-players involved in finding a lasting solution to intra-state conflicts. The concept itself cannot provide sustainable peace and development.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDS:	African Chiefs of Defence Staff
AFDL:	Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
CAGE:	Conflict and Governance Facility
CSIR:	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFA:	Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)
DPMs:	Developmental Peace Missions
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC:	European Commission
ECOMICI:	ECOWAS Mission to Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMOG:	Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EO:	Executive Outcomes
EU:	European Union
HIV/AIDS:	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HUMINT:	Human Intelligence
IFIs:	International Financial Institutions
IGAD:	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IGOs:	Intergovernmental Organisations
IMPP:	Integrated Mission Planning Process
KFOR:	Kosovo Force
KLA:	Kosovo Liberation Army
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC:	Movement de Liberation du Congo
MNCs:	Multi-National Corporations
MONUC:	Mission de la Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
MOOTW:	Military Operations Other than War
MOU:	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC:	Military Staff Committee
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD:	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organisations

OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
OSCE:	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PBC:	Peace Building Commission
PCRD:	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
PSO:	Peace Support Operation
RCD:	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RECs:	Regional Economic Communities
RSLAF:	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RUF:	Revolutionary United Front
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SANDF:	South African National Defence Force
SLA:	Sierra Leone Army
SRSg:	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
TRC:	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN:	United Nations
UNAMSIL:	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO:	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIOSIL:	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNMIK:	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOMSIL:	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UNSG:	United Nations Secretary-General

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Orientation

For a large part of the international community, the name ‘Africa’, conjures up two very distinct and different images. On the one hand, the name is reminiscent of an age-old ‘mother continent’, imbued with vast animal and mineral resources and a rich and multi-faceted cultural heritage. On the other hand, there is the Africa of intra-state wars, protracted conflict, poverty, famine, disease and infinite suffering – the potential abundance in stark juxtaposition to the severe shortages and limitations experienced by the majority of inhabitants of the African continent.

The consequences of the protracted conflict have seriously undermined Africa’s efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples (Annan, 1998:2). Although diverse reasons for ongoing conflicts have been noted and analysed, the conflicts have primarily been of an intra-state nature. Such conflicts have had considerable peacekeeping consequences for regional, as well as international role-players.

#### *Human security*

The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa was the primary point of discussion during a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 25 September 1997 (UNSC, 1997). Under the leadership of the then United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), Mr Kofi Annan, the promotion of peace on the African continent was considered, as African conflicts have been among the United Nation’s (UN) most important initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War. Mr Annan stressed the fact that, for the UN, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment, and no greater ambition, than preventing armed conflict (Annan, 1998:1). Importantly, it was emphasised that the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development, and that ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the UN. In this regard, the African continent has had a critical impact on defining the limits and possibilities of the post-Cold War order and the place of the UN in this framework (Neethling, 2003:87). In order to ensure human security on the continent, several initiatives have been initialised on the continent – most prominently the initiatives pertaining to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a continental economic recovery plan for Africa.

In addition to the UN Human Development Report of 1994, which refers to human security in Africa, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Policy is premised on the viewpoint that the causes of intra-state conflict necessitate an emphasis on human security, based not only on political values, but also on social and economic imperatives (Neethling, 2004:78). This implies an embracing of

human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities to life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation (AU, 2004:1).

#### *The security-development nexus*

The link between security and development is highlighted by the continued violent conflict in many of the world's poorest states – many on the continent of Africa. It has become widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflict. For some years, there has been a growing concern amongst scholars and relevant functionaries with a specific emphasis on the necessity of linking security and development to achieve meaningful peace, and pursuing this by means of special peacebuilding measures. It is to this end, that a range of reforms has been implemented throughout the international system to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours. These reforms have, inter alia, been encapsulated in the UN Development Reports of 1999, in which it was reported that, whilst underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, poor social, economic and environmental conditions and weak or ineffective political institutions, certainly diminish a society's capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner. For this reason, the UN has become involved in development assistance, which is geared towards building or rebuilding that capacity.

#### *Developmental Peace Missions*

The concept of Developmental Peace Missions (DPMs) was presented to the South African Parliament as a practical or functional South African concept to effectively address human security and development in Africa (Madlala-Routledge, 2004b). The concept has been developed since 2004, based on several initiatives and research conducted by the former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Ms Nosizwe Madlala-Routledge in conjunction with members of the Council for

Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). While the principle of bringing peacekeeping closer to peacebuilding is hardly new, there is still much to learn institutionally and operationally about how the two activities can best be applied in practice.

The concept of DPMs seems to be in line with the contemporary approach to UN Complex Peace Missions, which are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine security, political, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase. In this regard, the concept of DPMs was presented as a 'home-grown' South African concept that is based on the premise that security can only achieve permanent benefit if its vital peacebuilding activities are rolled out within a reasonable time. Under 'reasonable' is understood the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e., the one activity must be applied without losing sight of the other) (Gueli et al, 2006a:8). Gueli, a leading voice on the concept of DPMs, argues that the functional gap between military peacekeeping and civilian peacebuilding (or post-conflict reconstruction) "has received a lot of attention, because it remains a weakness in the policy framework of the UN conflict resolution repertoire, particularly in peace missions" (Gueli, 2007:29). To this effect, the South African concept of DPMs offers a practical approach to effecting peacebuilding and to ultimately set the stage for nation-building and sustainable security and development. DPMs call for a more timely effort to "bring security nearer to development – the two veritable pillars of all UN peace missions – in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term state-building efforts" (Gueli et al, 2006a:3).

The concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for civil-military operations that bridge the traditional gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention and resolution. After a military intervention, a peace support operation's host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position: not only must it reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it must also rebuild much of its basic infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict. This includes the rebuilding of roads, restoration of public utilities and removal of land mines. If these challenges are not effectively resolved, the chaotic situation could easily sustain the conditions and increase resentments that led to the conflict in the first place. In addition, military forces are often repeatedly deployed in peace operations, usually with a UN mandate, to put an end to hostilities, but are then retained in the theatre of operations

for an indeterminate period of time without a clear exit strategy and without a clear mandate to execute peace-operation tasks, other than that of providing security and stability (Williams, 2005:15). There is usually no well-established strategy for a quick transition from the military's peacemaking and peacekeeping mission to the longer-term peacebuilding mission of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

According to Gueli et al (2006c:6), peacebuilding efforts usually start during the post-conflict phase of a peace-mission that follows the signing of a cease-fire or comprehensive peace agreement. Moreover, many policy makers still insist that distinguishing between military and civilian activities in peace missions provides them with a clear distinction that delineates the specific roles and responsibilities during the respective stages of conflicts (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006a:1). This distinction in effect, emphasises a linear or sequential approach to solving conflict situations and is in accordance with traditional approaches to solving military problems. However, the UN's record over the past few decades has largely dispelled such traditional ideas and practices. Two enduring lessons that the UN has learnt through years of experience in responding to conflict is that speed and momentum do matter in peace missions, and that effective missions require integrated efforts rather than separate tracks that do not converge. Peacekeeping efforts in Africa, such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, have shown that military activities can be rendered ineffective if continued for too long, and if not complemented with real economic growth and social upliftment. Such lessons are especially relevant if one considers that a recent UN report estimated that roughly half of all peace missions have a chance at success after the signing of peace agreements, and that the chances appear to be even lower when warring parties fight for control over valuable resources (Gueli et al, 2006c:6). The former UNSG, Kofi Annan, noted in 1998 already that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be simultaneous activities used in combination, and as complements to one another. This is why it is essential to have a multi-lateral systems-approach towards solving conflict, which will contribute to more integrated and co-ordinated actions in establishing peace.

## **1.2. Problem statement**

The concept of DPMs is premised on the problem statement that many (traditional) peacekeeping interventions in the past were unable to work towards sustainable political and economic development. To this end, DPMs are aimed at providing a practical and feasible alternative that could be successfully implemented in the African context.

As far as this study is concerned, the problem statement is demarcated conceptually, geographically and temporally.

*Conceptual demarcation:* The analysis is confined to the inter-relationship between DPMs and the security-development nexus in terms of sustainable political and economic development.

*Geographic demarcation:* The research focuses on the intervention in Kosovo as an international case study, and the case studies of Sierra Leone and the DRC, respectively, in terms of peace intervention missions in Africa. The choice of the three case studies was based on the fact they represented the first few cases in which the notion of bringing peacekeeping closer to peacebuilding formed the basis of the approach to the deployment of peacekeepers.

*Temporal demarcation:* The analysis focuses primarily on current international and African peace missions, although previous peace missions and military interventions since 1990 are also taken into account to trace recent developments and trends. Historical factors are thus considered when these factors have a direct bearing on the concepts and the research problem.

### **1.3. Research question**

The research question that this study intends to answer, is: *Is the concept of DPMs practical and feasible in the African context?* This problem generates three subsidiary questions:

- how appropriate is the concept of DPMs specifically to the African context?
- are there generic or common elements that will be applicable to all peace missions in the international community in general and Africa in particular?
- can the implementation of DPMs provide innovative solutions to the challenges of human security, the security-development nexus and the need for peacebuilding on the continent?

In view of the above, the appropriateness of the concept of DPMs in the African context is addressed in this study and generic or common elements or prerequisites are identified in order to construct a synthesised framework.

#### **1.4. Aim of the study**

The concept of DPMs and the implementation of such missions have increasingly been in the centre of military and semi-military discussions pertaining to the failures and successes of peace missions in Africa. However, the concept has not yet been academically scrutinised and examined. In other words, the aim of this study will be to assess whether the concept of DPMs is indeed a useful construct to pursue sustainable levels of human security through a combination of intervention action, reconstruction and development initiatives, aimed at addressing armed conflicts constructively.

#### **1.5. Purpose and significance of the study**

Having realised the significance of and need for peace missions aimed at the achievement of sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions, the CSIR, in partnership with the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE) (a partnership project between the European Commission and the South African Department of National Treasury), have been involved in research with regard to the concept of Developmental Peace Missions since 2004 (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:125–131). The intention was to determine and define a solution to the development gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding in an attempt to prevent conflict-ridden countries from sliding back into a state of civil war and strife.

Lt Gen Solly Shoke, Chief of the SA Army, commissioned the SA Army Vision 2020 Team in 2004 to ensure that current and future army projects are aligned with the SA Army's long-term outcomes (Shoke, 2006:18). The concept of the SA Army's Vision was expounded in *Jane's Defence Weekly* in October 2006. Vision 2020 focuses on the SA Army's plans for preparation for current and future military challenges in its quest firstly, to fulfil its constitutional mandate with other South African National Defence Force (SANDF) arms of the services to defend and protect the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Africa and its people, and secondly to support the government's diplomatic initiatives to help eradicate conflicts in Africa. The South African Army Vision 2020 team subsequently requested post-graduate students at the Military Academy to embark on, inter alia, research pertaining to DPMs, as the concept is receiving increased attention in military circles, but has not yet been academically researched and examined in terms of its utility. This implies that, although the concept of DPMs has increasingly been promoted as a feasible paradigm to addressing conflict in Africa, the concept has not been subjected to rigorous academic scrutiny and analysis.



It should also be noted that the concept of DPMs is increasingly being addressed in training and doctrine of the SANDF. The background to this study is based on research that has been conducted for the development of the Joint Warfare and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) Modules as part of the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme (JSCSP) that is presented at the South African National War College to Operational Level Commanders and Staff Officers. The JSCSP is a yearlong course that is presented to senior officers (South African as well as international fellows) and is focused on military-strategic leadership across the diplomatic, military and economic sectors of national power. The proposed framework for DPMs is thus directly relevant to the curriculum of the course.

The findings of this research could assist government officials and military decision-makers to determine whether implementation of DPMs will indeed improve the chances of success with peace missions, as well as to explore the likelihood and feasibility of successfully implementing DPMs in Africa.

Furthermore, the research findings may highlight the critical success factors that need to be established in order to facilitate the successful implementation of DPMs. The research will also reflect upon the specific role of the military component in DPMs, with specific reference to, for instance, the African Standby Force (ASF), as well as highlight areas that require specific capacity development in terms of effectively implementing DPMs.

## **1.6. Research methodology**

This study is a historical-descriptive undertaking, based on a literature study and analysis of factual data sources. The concept and principles of DPM's, as presented by Gueli et al (2006c), are applied as departure points for the research. The components of the analytical framework are deductively linked and the information is dealt with in an inductive manner as a basis for the analysis. Peace missions in Africa that are relevant to the topic are analysed as part of the assessment. The primary unit of analysis relates to countries where peace missions have been conducted since 1990 and in which the mandates of the peace missions combined peacekeeping and peacbuilding initiatives. The level of analysis is thus predominantly state-centric, although other relevant international, continental and regional factors are also considered where applicable. The emphasis is on the analysis of secondary sources, although primary sources are utilised where applicable. Primary sources include official UN and AU documents, as well as relevant documents on the concept of DPMs as developed by the CSIR. The study

is not based on fieldwork or questionnaires. However, unstructured and informal interviews were conducted with the proponents of the concept of DPMs, as well as relevant military functionaries. This study furthermore consists of qualitative research and analysis, although quantitative data supports the analysis in some instances.

The study is aimed at providing possible answers to address the complex issues pertaining to peace missions in Africa. The research is also intended to be utilised to analyse the void between the political needs/demands and the military role and supply capacity, and to make recommendations and conclusions as to how DPMs can be utilised during peace missions to achieve desired objectives and end states in order to facilitate sustained development and security on the African continent. The peace interventions in recent years in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC have been selected as case studies to determine whether the concept of DPMs could be successfully implemented during peace missions to improve the chances of establishing lasting peace and development. These interventions are manifestations of peace missions where the 'new' approach of combining peacebuilding and peacekeeping mandates was followed.

It could be argued that the fact that the study is based on only three case studies poses some problems with regard to the making of generalised conclusions concerning the application of the concept of DPMs. However, this does not disqualify the merit of a study of this kind as the three case studies are indeed representative of some of the major multinational peacekeeping undertakings in recent years.

In the final analysis a proposed synthesised DPMs framework is applied to the security situation in Africa which includes a brief analysis of the feasibility of AU policies, as well as the role and function of the ASF in implementing these policies.

The research conducted incorporates the period January 1990 until May 2008.

### **1.7. Literature review**

The literature and data sources consulted for this research can be divided into five categories. The first deals with the background information on the concept of human security in general and in terms of its applicability to the African context in particular.

The second category refers to literature that addresses the security-development nexus in terms of its nature and applicability to peace missions internationally, as well as to its specific applicability to Africa.

The third category comprises of literature that deals with the development of the concept of DPMs and information and data on the South African model of DPMs and its component parts. The newly adopted UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is also analysed in terms of its interface with DMPs.

The fourth category consists of sources regarding international peace missions since the 1990s during which peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates have been combined. Literature on the North Atlantic treaty Organisation's (NATO) intervention in Kosovo is analysed in terms of the approach to the mission, as well as to identify some practical experiences in conflict management as it pertains to international programmes and organisations. The analysis also includes an investigation of new developments pertaining to the UN, NATO and the European Union (EU) and the relevance/applicability of the concept of DPMs in terms of the UN's contemporary approach to multi-functional peace missions.

The fifth category relates to literature on multi-functional peace missions in the African context since 1990, with specific reference to the peace missions in Sierra Leone and the DRC. The analysis seeks to uncover the underlying factors that link these interventions to the UN's current approach to multi-functional peace missions in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates are combined, as well as to analyse these case studies in terms of the applicability/relevance of the concept of DPMs to the African continent.

The literature and data sources consulted for this study include the following:

*Literature regarding human security.* Several reports from the UN (Human Development Plan, 1994) and the AU (Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004), as well as various articles and reports published by the Institute for Security Studies, including those by Solomon (1998), Hendricks (2006) and Lewis (2006) are of significance.

*Literature regarding the security-development nexus.* There are various sources relating to the security-development nexus, including works by Annan (1998), Boutros-Ghali (1992), McGowan and Nel (eds.) (2002), Tschirgi (2003) and Neethling (2005).

*Literature regarding Developmental Peace Missions.* The leading authors in this regard are Richard Gueli and Sybert Liebenberg. At the centre of these authors' work, are studies that were commissioned by the CSIR, in partnership with CAGE. See Gueli et al (2006a-c).

*Data sources regarding international peace missions since 1990, with specific reference to Kosovo.* Works by the following authors are especially relevant: Llamazares and Levy (2003), Mertus and Sajat (2005), Williams (2005) and Gourlay (2006).

*Data sources regarding African peace missions since 1990, with specific reference to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone.* Works by Cilliers and Mills (1999), Berman and Sams (2000), Maqueen (2002), as well as De Coning (2004, 2006) are of significance. UN reports on the UN missions in Sierra Leone and the DRC are furthermore significant in terms of the successes and lessons learned, and these include inter alia UNSC reports and resolutions. Various publications by the Institute for Security Studies are also useful, including works by Cilliers (1999b), Malan (2000), Malan et al (2002) and Hendricks (2006).

## **1.8. Structure of the research**

The study is structured in the conventional way, being divided into a theoretical framework, a main body and a concluding section containing an evaluation.

*Chapter One* is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction, identification and formulation of the research theme and problem statement. This chapter demarcates the study and provides the methodology adopted in the research. The literature review that forms part of this chapter provides an overview of some of the sources consulted to undertake the study.

*Chapter Two* provides definitions of all the key concepts that are relevant to an understanding of DPMs, such as the relation between the concepts of human security, the security-development nexus, peacebuilding, multi-dimensional peacekeeping and international conflict management.

*Chapter Three* focuses upon the concepts and principles of DPMs, i.e., the development of the concept and some practical applications.

*Chapter Four* addresses multi-functional peace missions in the international context, specifically the case of Kosovo. The content of this chapter focuses on an analysis

of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, as well as on obtaining an international perspective on peace missions. Specific attention is paid to contemporary developments pertaining to UN peace missions and the respective roles of the UN and regional organisations in complex peace operations. The research findings include an analysis of the relevance/applicability of the concept of DPMs in the case of Kosovo.

*Chapter Five* focuses on multi-functional peace missions in the African context. The focus of this chapter is on the deployments to Sierra Leone, as the interventions embodied the contemporary approach to UN complex peace missions that are in effect peacebuilding operations. The Sierra Leone case study is analysed to determine the applicability/relevance of the concept of DPMs to the African continent.

*Chapter Six* focuses on the peace mission to the DRC, and the feasibility and/or relevance of the concept of DPMs to such interventions, as the UN mandate to its mission in the DRC addressed and combined security, political, humanitarian, as well as development and human rights issues. The DRC case study is also analysed to determine the applicability/relevance of the concept of DPMs to the African continent.

*Chapter Seven* provides an evaluation and summary of key findings that addresses the research question posed in Chapter One. This includes an assessment of the utility of the concept of DPMs that will advance proposals for its future use, and culminates in a final conclusion.

## **1.9 Conclusions**

Peacekeeping on the African continent remains one of the greatest challenges to international, regional and local role-players. Many changes have taken place in terms of the global security environment since the end of the Cold War, and subsequently there have been significant changes to the ways in which conflict resolution strategies and methodologies have been applied. Furthermore, it has generally been accepted that human security cannot be improved and sustainable development cannot be achieved in an environment where there is no peace and security, and this realisation forms the basis of most new developments in terms of conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies. The quest for establishing lasting peace and finding workable solutions to improve on the current success rate of peace missions in Africa, resulted in the conceptualisation of DPMs as a framework that could possibly be successfully applied to ensure sustainable peace and development

in Africa. This study is an effort to determine whether the concept of DPMs does indeed offer a feasible solution or paradigm to effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the continent, or whether the concept essentially remains an ambitious scholarly construct.

## CHAPTER 2: KEY CONCEPTS UNDERLYING DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE MISSIONS

### 2.1 Introduction

Concepts, perspectives, paradigms and theories do not emerge from a vacuum. They gain currency because they are better able to account for existent realities and they enjoy legitimacy because they resonate with the dominant ideology. In terms of the current international security environment, concepts such as *peace*, *democracy* and *development* have emerged as the key pillars of the post-Cold War security framework. It is within this framework that concepts such as *human security*, the *security-development nexus*, and *peacebuilding* are currently being explored and defined. The evolving theory regarding DPMs should also be understood in terms of its inter-relationship with current security perspectives, theories and paradigms. From an analytical point of view, it is thus essential to have a clear understanding of the related and underpinning theories and concepts of DPMs, before any attempt should be made to determine whether the construct could effectively be applied to increase the potential of establishing lasting peace and sustainable development.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall raised expectations for global peace, but these expectations were soon thwarted as inter- and intra-state conflicts proliferated during the establishment of 'a new world order'. Following the collapse of empires in the former USSR and Yugoslavia and post-colonial Africa, violent ethnic divisions and nationalist claims for self-determination made a mockery of the liberal policies underpinning the 'new world order' (Spence, 2007:42). The result was social and economic dislocation on a massive scale. This, in turn, coincided with the emergence of a renewed and sustained emphasis on the need to assert, protect and enhance human rights wherever and whenever they were threatened (Spence, 2007:42). In answer to this dilemma, the UN and other IGOs were expected to intervene in these conflicts with the intention of finding lasting solutions to the causes of the respective conflicts (Neethling, 2005:34). However, due to the socio-economic decline that resulted from the protracted nature of these conflicts, the prospects of economic development were limited and progress in general was delayed. As a result, "scarce foreign assistance that could have supported sustainable (economic) development, was diverted to communities that were in urgent need, thus primarily addressing the humanitarian processes and short term needs, instead of focusing on long-term sustainable development" (Stremlau, 2002:1). The limited successes that were subsequently achieved with many of these interventions resulted in the re-evaluation of the fundamental peacekeeping principles that were adhered to during the time of the Cold War. This introspection

also prompted the expansion of what had traditionally been understood in terms of the concepts of human security and peacebuilding.

UN-mandated interventions, as well as interventions by regional organisations in intra-state wars clearly indicate that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflicts – thus linking the concepts *security* and *development*.

This chapter encloses an exploration of the various concepts that were used to develop and construct the framework of DPMs. To this effect, the underlying concepts and principles underpinning DPMs, specifically the expansion and broader understanding of the concepts *human security*, the *security-development nexus* and *peacebuilding*, will be explored in order to provide sufficient background to the concepts and principles of DPMs.

## **2.2. Human security**

The term human security was initially focused on development, but recent history has prompted a broader, more holistic understanding of the concept. Protracted intra-state conflicts that have plagued many countries in the developing world resulted in a shift in the focus in terms of human security. The current understanding of human security has shifted virtually exclusively to the human costs of violent conflict (Oche, 2000:43). The fact that violent conflicts make up the principal threat to human security means that issues relating to the management and resolution of conflicts will continue to be the primary focus of developmental and peacebuilding initiatives.

### **2.2.1. Theoretical analysis of the concept of human security**

The end of the Cold War witnessed an escalation of internal or intra-state conflicts that in the past were subsumed in terms of the East-West ideological overlay (Mutesa and Nchito, 2005:7). This phenomenon of protracted internal conflict that erupted globally after the end of the Cold War was utilised to serve as a confirmation of the lack of good governance and democracy as primary explanatory variable for conflict. Since the late 1980s, development perspectives had, therefore primarily blamed the lack of development on domestic governance policies and issues. Thus, the state was posited as instrumental in creating conflict and insecurity (Hendricks, 2006:1). For many people, the state has long since ceased to be the provider of security, whether physical or social. The global environment has also



been reconfigured in a number of ways in the past 20 years, and the whole landscape in which politics play out, has changed radically. “With globalisation, the concentration and centralisation of power has grown, and with it, the geographic spread and degree of insecurity” (Barnett, 2001:122).

The term *human security* can be traced to the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (Oche, 2000:39). The report was based on the contents of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and employed the phrase; ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear’. This phrase was intended to advocate a people-centred, rather than state-centred, approach to security, to link development to security, and to broaden both the identification of possible threats and the actors responsible for producing and resolving insecurity (Hendricks, 2006:1). In the report, it was stated that

(t)he concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression ... For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? (UN, 2004b:22).

The initial conception of human security was primarily focused on development, and covered seven aspects of security, namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UN, 2004b:22). However, as a result of its omnibus nature, this initial conception of human security failed to gain currency. Against this background, the general focus of human security has shifted and the current focus centres virtually exclusively on the human costs of violent conflict (Oche, 2000:40). Security of the individual is therefore no longer defined exclusively within the realms of states and national security and individuals, and communities are considered not only as bystanders and collateral victims of conflict, but as core participants in protection strategies and post-conflict peacebuilding (Aning et al, 2004:5).

The concept of human security encapsulates the intricate links that bind issues of development, cooperation and peace. In essence, human security implies safety for people from both violent, as well as non-violent threats. Human security is a condition or state of being that is characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or even their lives. It is an alternative way of seeing the

world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments. Oche argues that national security, just as other security concepts such as economic security and food security, is ultimately about protection. As a result, human security essentially entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimise risk, as well as taking remedial action where prevention fails (Oche, 2000:44). The Millennium Declaration by the world leaders in September 2000 and the subsequent establishment of the UN Security Commission are testimony that, indeed, a broader concept of security is imperative (Oche, 2000:44). According to Mutesa and Nchito (2005:7), the same spirit is currently evident in the thrust of the thinking of African leaders in security as embodied in the founding documents of the AU, NEPAD and other regional organisations.

The UNDP (UN, 2004b:23) asserts that human security can comprise two main aspects. Firstly, it means safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. Secondly, it implies protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities (UN, 2004b:23). This characterisation clearly implies that the traditional state-centric views of security that are based on territorial interests and foreign aggression, fall short of what is currently understood under the concept human security. “The concept of human security equates security with people, rather than territories – with development rather than arms” (UN, 2004b:24). The former UNSG, Kofi Annan poignantly stated that

... the impact of wars on civilians has worsened because internal wars, now the most frequent type of armed conflict, typically take a heavier toll on civilians than inter-state wars, and because combatants increasingly have made targeting civilians a strategic objective (Annan, 1999c:3).

This resulted in a situation where most of the international community is in agreement that the time has come to move beyond the state-centric view that has informed much of the contemporary discourse on security and that, in some instances, intervention might be required to protect the liberties of individuals – even if such intervention would impede on the sovereignty of an individual state or states. Many scholars are of the opinion that the current understanding of the word intervention includes various forms of non-consensual action that are often thought to challenge the principle of state sovereignty directly. In this regard, the broader concept of human security is applied in order to root out the causes of many conflicts, but it also possesses the potential to serve as an early warning mechanism

when it is used to influence policy actions and as basis for the development of constructs to address conflict effectively.

However, the focus on the security of individuals does not diminish the importance of national security, as expounded in the state-centric approaches. In fact, national security and human security are, in essence, mutually supportive. Despite the new approaches to the conception of the nation-state, the capacity to promote and protect the welfare of its people, remains a precondition for strengthening the legitimacy, stability and security of such a state's own existence. Therefore, security of the state is not an end in itself, but a means of security for its people. At the same time, Duffield (2001:7) warns against the notion of over-emphasising the role of the nation-state in providing security and simply blaming security problems on incipient and imperfect democratisation. Duffield goes further and relates the securitisation of development to the disappearance of the bi-polar world and to reconfigurations in global capitalism. Whilst violence and conflict were previously seen as occasionally justified indicators of social transformation in many developing countries, today's policy-makers and observers view violence as indicators of danger, social dysfunction and anomie. However, Duffield (2001:7) argues that inequality is no longer a sufficient reason for conflict. Rather, Duffield contends that inequality and the ensuing violence are dangers from which the wealthy part of the world must protect itself through increased surveillance and security intervention.

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report noted that human security is an integrative concept that stresses the security of people. It stresses the issue that the concept of security needs to be changed from one that exclusively focuses on national security to a concept that emphasises people's security instead – a shift from security through armament to that of security through sustainable human development (UN, 2004b:24). In essence, the human security approach seeks to fundamentally question and alter whom we protect and how that protection is afforded. According to Hendricks (2006:3), this approach that takes individuals, rather than states, as its referent, emphasises the need for a holistic, long-term view of security that includes the redress of structural inequities. It identifies different levels of security, including personal, community, national and international security and argues that interdependence of these securities implies that insecurity in one sphere has ramifications for other spheres. According to Hendricks (2006:3), the primary role of the state is to protect its citizens, but given past experiences, this cannot be left as the sole domain of the state. International and regional organisations have the responsibility to intervene and protect when human lives are imperilled, and any sustainable transformation has to involve civil society in the

formulation and execution of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction agendas.

The Commission for Human Security (2003:74) defines human security as

protecting the vital core of all human lives in the ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting the fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity.

The Commission has identified four priorities for policy action to promote human security, namely

- encouraging growth that reaches the extreme poor;
- supporting sustainable livelihoods and decent work;
- preventing and containing the effects of economic crises and natural disasters; and
- providing social protection for all situations.

In order to address the challenges that are related to human security effectively, an integrated approach, based on effective co-operation between various states, government departments and civil society organisations is required. The majority of new policy frameworks on the African continent recognise that this type of approach is essential, but in reality, the priorities of various agencies often differ, resulting in competing interests and ultimately in ineffective delivery. There is thus a growing appreciation of the linkages between security, co-operation and development as suggested by the human security paradigm. In this context, Mutesa and Nchito (2005:13) contend that the declaration to combat poverty by the members of the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 is one of the best-known shifts in the conception of security by a collective body of international leaders, which resulted in the drafting of the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000. It has become evident that policy-makers and non-state actors will be required to transcend the traditional state-centric approach to security with its narrow focus on territory and foreign policy interests as its main units of analysis. The challenge for most countries is to translate global views of human security into national programmes. It will take time and effort to alter this *modus operandi* as vested interests have already taken root. The next step is to identify the stumbling blocks that hinder co-operation. Hendricks (2006:4)

points out that methods of enhancing co-operation between relevant government departments will specifically have to be identified, and that effective facilitation of meaningful interaction between governments and civil society must be ensured.

The expansion of the concept of human security – by placing the emphasis on individual security and development, rather than myopically focusing on a state-centric approach – has had a profound influence on policy directions taken by regional and international organisations, not only in terms of their involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but also in terms of their foreign policy, national security and development programmes. In this regard, it is thus prudent to investigate the influence that the current expanded understanding of the conception of human security has had on International Relations as a field of scholarly enquiry and on the respective foreign policies of states.

### **2.2.2. Human security and International Relations**

Many scholars have proposed solutions to and reflected on appropriate human security definitions and conceptualisations with regard to the new millennium and contemporary developments in the international political arena. The concept of human security should also be understood in terms of current approaches pertaining to International Relations. International Relations theorists, strategic studies scholars and peace researchers alike have had to come to terms with a global paradigm shift in how security, peace, conflict, war and politics are viewed in the post-Cold War era.

Realists and Neo-Realists have been criticised for their fragmented and narrow preoccupation with the sovereign state, state power and national security as the primary referents of security; and Idealists, though claiming to have taken a far more holistic view of the subject, have yet to come up with a widely acceptable alternative to the state-centric international system (Hudson, 1998:2).

According to Naidoo (2001:2), there are two main contemporary theoretical points of departure in the field of International Relations. At the one end of the continuum is an approach that is based on a neo-realist theoretical framework, which maintains a continued emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of (human) security. This approach is often referred to as the ‘new security thinking’ (Naidoo, 2001:2). On the other end of the continuum is the post-modernist or critical human security approach that is vested in the pluralist theory of international politics. This approach is based on a set of assumptions that

essentially attempts to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, while placing greater emphasis on the interdependency and trans-nationalisation of non-state actors (Naidoo, 2001:2).

The neo-realist approach to human security has been advocated by scholars such as Barry Buzan in his seminal work *People, States and Fear* (Buzan, 1992:431–451). Buzan argues that the militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse during the Cold War was simple-minded and that it had resulted in the underdevelopment of the concept. He broadened the concept to include political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are purely militaristic (Buzan, 1992:451). Although Buzan examines security from the perspective of the international system, the state and the individual, he concludes that the most important and effective provider of security should remain the sovereign state. This analysis thus essentially provides a contemporary examination of human security from a state-centric perspective.

Buzan (1992:106) introduces the concepts of strong and weak states to show that the creation of strong states is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for improved individual and national security. He argues that the existence of a strong state would not, by itself, guarantee security, but weakness in states would certainly encourage and sustain insecurity for their citizens. Buzan expands on this argument by stating that the strength of a state is determined by the degree of its socio-political cohesion, while the strength of its powers refers to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their comparative military and economic capabilities. Almost all weak states are found in the developing world where they find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power that leaves them underdeveloped and unable to muster the economic and political resources that are required to build a stronger state.

Tickner (1995:185) points out that, although Buzan differentiates between strong and weak states, he (Buzan) does not offer suggestions as to how weak powers and states can become strong or how they can strengthen their individual economies. Tickner purports that the integration of states into an increasingly interdependent international market economy would contribute to a mature anarchy with its promise of greater overall international security (Tickner, 1995:185). He does, however, acknowledge the fact that this would be problematic for peripheral states, such as those in Africa and other developing states that are not only trapped by historical patterns of underdevelopment, but more crucially, are weak, rendering their economic security vulnerable to market forces in an integrated global world economy. In addition to the arguments pertaining to the increased globalisation of

economies which exacerbates the uneven development fostered by a hierarchical international system of states and global capitalist economies, there are other new threats to security, such as international terrorism which defies boundaries and which cannot be solved by one state alone. Ultimately, the security of the rich seems to be increasingly diminishing the security of the poor (Tickner, 1995:185). In this regard, Naidoo (2001:5) concludes that it is clear that Buzan's theory is based on the assumption that an integrated world economy would offer mutual gains for weak and strong states and powers alike – an assumption that might not prove to be a true representation of the current global economy.

The critical or post-modernist approach to human security, reflected in some of the works of Ken Booth, also advocates a broadened conceptualisation of security that goes beyond a military determination of threats (Booth, 1994:3). However, most proponents of the post-modernist approach stress quite explicitly that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of (human) security, and that it should encompass instead a wide range of non-state actors, such as individual, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multi-national corporations (MNCs) and NGOs (Naidoo, 2001:2). In expanding the concept of human security horizontally and vertically, Booth (1994:4) argues that human security is ultimately more important than state security. Thus, the post-modernistic conceptualisation of security does not equate state security with human security. Much of Booth's argument is based on the premise that governments that are supposed to be the guardians of their peoples' security have instead become the primary source of insecurity for many people who live under their sovereignty, rather than the armed forces of a neighbouring country (Booth, 1994:5). This approach challenges the idea of a state as an effective and adequate provider of security to its people (Naidoo, 2001:2).

The post-modernist approach regarding the pluralist theoretical framework of International Relations asserts that national sovereignty is unravelling and that states are proving less and less capable of performing their traditional tasks. Many International Relations scholars argue that global factors are increasingly impinging on government decisions and that such factors undermine states' capacity to control external and internal politics. These post-modernists offer poignant arguments to support their views on interdependence, the diminished importance of the institution of the state, and the view that concepts such as nationalism and sovereignty have become outdated. According to the post-modernists, traditional concepts pertaining to national security have thus also become by extension, similarly outdated.

According to Hendricks (2006:2), these arguments have dovetailed with the emergent neo-liberal discourse on structural adjustment measures and the need to limit the role of the state in favour of that of the market. The discourse on human security emerged within this structural and ideological framework and as a result, the elements contained within it reflect these theoretical preoccupations. However, Hendricks (2006:2) stresses the viewpoint that the human security paradigm holds currency primarily because of its expanded definition of security, its focus on the root causes of conflict, the integrative, multi-actor nature of conflict prevention, as well as its emphasis on well-defined post-conflict resolution requirements and premises.

Other scholars, such as Carim (1995:53), are convinced that the logical alternative to the modern state as the unit of analysis is the diffusion of power from states to local or regional communities so as to cater more effectively for cultural diversity. The wider problems of economics could thus be dealt with effectively at the regional level – hence the support for what is often referred to as the ‘new regionalism’, and they agree that regional integration and cooperation as a current trend within the international system, aims not only to address the political and economic interests of member states, but also the security needs of their people (Carim, 1995:53–71). Therefore, regional mechanisms created to address such threats are ultimately the building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security.

It is clear that the conception of human security is to a great extent dependent on the respective approaches to International Relations and that the concept holds different meanings for different people. However, although a commonly accepted definition does not seem to exist, Werthes and Boshold (2004:2) argue that there are some basic premises all definitions of human security have in common, namely that it comprises a liberty/rights and rule of law dimension, a freedom from fear/safety of peoples dimension, and a freedom from want/equity as well as a social justice dimension.

### **2.2.3. Expanding the concept of human security**

In addition to the UN Human Development Report of 1994 that refers to human security in Africa, the AU’s Common African Defence and Security Policy is also premised on the viewpoint that the causes of intra-state conflict necessitate an emphasis on human security, based not only on political values, but also on social and economic imperatives (Neethling, 2004:78). This implies embracing the broader concept of respect for human rights, the right to participate fully in the process of governance, the right to equal development, as well as the right to have



access to resources and the basic necessities to life. In addition, the concept also includes the right to protection against poverty, the right to conducive education and health conditions, the right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender, protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation (AU, 2004:1).

Some middle powers, such as Canada, base their approach on a strong human rights and an extended arms control nexus. In this regard, Canada, as an advocate of ‘soft power’ has often been recognised as leading the non-militaristic and progressive human security approach (Lewis, 2006:12). On the other hand, the Asian (Japanese) approach seems to be more related to a conceptualisation that stresses the connection between security and economic and social development (Werthes and Boshold 2004:2-3). Former Japanese Minister Keizo Obuchi expresses this approach in the following statement:

Human security is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crises confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to the socially vulnerable – the poor, women and children, and the elderly – threatening their survival and dignity (as quoted by Werthes and Boshold 2004:3).

The important point is that human security discourses have multiple origins and they manifest in many political and ideological ambivalences. “As a field of policy-making and research, human security agendas have been very vulnerable to state and multilateral policymaking that sets limits on which freedoms are important to human security” (Lewis, 2006:12).

One of the primary challenges in terms of effective capacity-building is to link conflict prevention to the promotion of human security on the basis of common priorities already identified and on the widely shared concern for meeting the needs of the most vulnerable populations. This concern is dependent on the following (Goucha and Cilliers, 2001:vi):

- major dimensions of human security must be taken into account in regional, sub-regional and national policies as part of the shift from the resolution of conflicts to the building of democratic and stable societies that are respectful of human rights;
- all the priorities that require long-term action must be adequately identified and addressed;

- the building of the most significant capacities that are required for the promotion of human security, in particular those pertaining to education and training; and
- the formulation of strategies that can best contribute to the mobilisation of the most vulnerable populations which must ultimately emerge as stakeholders in the democratic process by means of participation and dialogue.

Naidoo (2001:7) concludes that an adequate conceptualisation of human security for African states would establish a link between human security and human development. According to Mandaza (1995:29–31), economic development will have to be at the top of the institutional agenda, since “development and security are two sides of the same coin”. In order to address the challenges pertaining to security and development effectively, it is essential to build the institutional capacity to manage non-traditional security threats. Clover (2005:104) argues that this calls for a critical review of current security structures, institutions and processes where these are seen to threaten or undermine people’s security, as well as for the development and construction of a more holistic concept of human security.

The fact that the AU has initiated steps to integrate human security doctrines into AU binding agreements and other documents is significant. It is significant because legalisation is one of the most important aspects of the institutionalisation of ideas and also because legislation provides a basis for the incorporation of human security doctrines into national laws and policies. The legalisation of human security doctrines has also strengthened the hands and the work of human rights advocates operating in the African region. It has provided the human rights advocates and their organisations with regional-wide legal instruments and resources they could use to influence African governments to pursue human security-oriented policies (Tieku, 2007:35).

Hendricks (2006:3) argues that part of the difficulty in implementing human security perspective can be attributed to the fact that

- it requires operationalisation (measures for knowing when it is deemed to exist and mechanisms for its achievement);
- it necessitated an interrogation of power relationships (where power is located and how it is exercised);
- it forces us to reconstruct the ways in which governments, inter-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, and researchers function (forming partnerships rather than functioning in silos);

- it requires that citizens change their perception of their own responsibilities; and in addition
- implements a human security perspective that necessitates flexibility to deal with, and accommodate, changing and often competing needs.

Recognition that security threats cover a far broader spectrum – among them resource scarcity, diseases, global warming or religious fundamentalism – has increasingly gained credibility. Clover (2005:104) argues that the traditional security institutions have begun to respond to the validity of this shift in security thinking – a paradigm shift that requires answers to central questions such as: *whose security? security from what? and security how?* The current understanding of the relationship between development and security in this regard has increasingly gained support for the development of the conception of DPMs as a construct to address the challenges associated with the security-development nexus effectively.

## **2.3 The security-development nexus**

Mutisi and Maregere (2006:16) emphasise that the relationship between the concepts security and development is becoming increasingly significant in developing countries, such as those on the continent of Africa. The concept of security has shifted from concerns over sovereignty of nation-states and territorial boundaries, to a concept that focuses on human development. Overall, it is currently an accepted fact that security is central to development, while development is a pre-condition for security (Mutisi and Maregere, 2006:16). The merger of development and security makes it obvious that any linear transition from war to peace is difficult to maintain, but it also shows how development has been entrusted with the task of controlling and pacifying target populations, as well as being a bridgehead for security.

### **2.3.1. Theoretical analysis of the security-development nexus**

According to Duffield (1999:8), development has been increasingly merged with and subjected to security concerns. What some refer to as the ‘securitisation of development’ became more visible during the 1990s in relation to the salience of internal armed conflict in poorer countries and the growing preoccupation with crime and violence in developing and rapidly urbanising economies. This link between security and development is highlighted by the continued violent conflict in many of the world’s poorest states, and it has become widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflict, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflict. In general, there has been, for some years, a growing

concern with the necessity of linking security and development in order to achieve meaningful and lasting peace. It is to this end that a range of reforms has been implemented throughout the international system to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours (Neethling, 2005:33).

These reforms have, inter alia, been encapsulated in UN Development reports in which it was stated that underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, poor social, economic and environmental conditions and weak or ineffective political institutions. However, it certainly diminishes a society's capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner (UN, 2004b). While underdevelopment can explain armed conflict, the calamities of conflict are viewed as having huge cost implications in terms of missed development opportunities, disintegrating and failing states and low indexes of human development. According to the World Bank (2005), development institutions should coherently integrate crime prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, demobilisation, security reforms and good governance into development intervention. To this end, the UN has become involved in development assistance, which is geared towards building or rebuilding that capacity.

The security-development nexus should thus be viewed against the background of linkages between security and development that formed a central focus of research during the latter half of the 1990s. In addition, it was only in the late 1990s that a clear and more politicised agenda emerged, which bore the promise of and integration between development and security policy. "As an agenda related to the concept of human security, it was launched in an effort to integrate both development and security concerns with the focus on individuals, rather than states" (Neethling, 2005:37). Using the notion of human security, security has been developmentalised in the sense that a number of basic human needs have been suggested as being indispensable for the survival of the individual (UN, 1994a). According to Duffield (2001:7), the traditional conception of (national) security and the human security agenda focus on the safety of people rather than states, and on a conception of sovereignty that is conditioned by the state's respect for the rights of its citizens. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, specifically states that the 'responsibility to protect' – i.e. any form of intervention by international role-players or multi-national institutions against a state or its leaders – should be focused on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance (ICISS, 2001:8–13). Moreover, according to Neethling (2005:37), this report should be seen as a radical political document, by means of which the ICISS effectively makes state sovereignty dependent upon the ability to provide human security. Thus, the

emphasis of the security debate should be on human development with access to food and employment (ICISS, 2001:15).

### **2.3.2 Recurring elements of the security-development nexus**

From a security-development point of view, the question arises as to what confronts the specific peacebuilding agendas of developing countries. The link between conflict and development is complex, but indisputable. In this regard, most of the world's 20 poorest states have experienced violent conflict in the past few decades. These violent conflicts usually materialise in the form of intra-state conflicts, as opposed to the inter-state conflicts that were most prevalent during the Cold War. This phenomenon demanded a re-assessment and the development of new approaches and concepts in terms of security policies that were formalised by governments and related institutions.

The Commission for Human Security (2003:84–85) proposed that the following be used as norms for security policies in the new era:

- that all people, no less than states, have a right to a secure existence and all states have an obligation to protect those rights;
- that the primary goals of global security policy should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet's life-support systems by eliminating the economic, social environmental, political and military conditions that generate threats to the security of people and the planet, and by anticipating and managing crises before they escalate into armed conflicts;
- that military force is not a legitimate political instrument, except in self-defence or under the auspices of the UN;
- that the development of military capabilities beyond that required for national defence and support of UN action is a potential threat to the security of people;
- that weapons of mass destruction are not legitimate instruments of national defence; and
- that the production of and trade in arms should be controlled by the international community.

The conception of the security-development nexus has undergone significant changes during the past few decades. However, rather than regarding the security-development nexus as a recent post-Cold War invention of the international community of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it should be understood at a more generic level, and

in terms of how linkages are changing between ‘hard’ militarised forms of power (traditionally linked to the establishment and maintenance of sovereignty), and the apparently benign ‘soft’ forms of power (linked to the enlightenment agenda of human progress, security and development). Similarly, the global shift in terms of what is understood by the concepts of human security and the security-development nexus also prompted a re-evaluation of the concepts and processes related to peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

## **2.4 Peacebuilding**

The concept of peacebuilding was introduced by the former UNSG, Boutros-Boutros-Ghali, in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In this document, the UNSG argued that peacebuilding consists of “sustained, co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems...”. In response, Haudgerudbraaten (1998:6) argues that the measures listed in *An Agenda for Peace*, namely disarming, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security forces, monitoring elections, advancing the protection of human rights, reforming institutions and promoting political participation, do not carry the notion of being sustained efforts that address the underlying root causes of problems.

### **2.4.1. Theoretical analysis of the concept of peacebuilding**

The concept peacebuilding remains ill defined, and peacekeeping analysts are notorious for their conceptual muddles. It is common for terms such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement and peacemaking to be used interchangeably, and even if distinctions are made, there is not necessarily agreement among scholars and practitioners to specify a single, universally agreed-upon definition of peacebuilding. After considerable debating and disagreements regarding the exact meaning of peacebuilding, the UNSG modified his position in the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, and suggested that peacebuilding could also be preventive (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). This notion supports a somewhat broader view that peacebuilding is essentially about removing or weakening factors that breed or sustain conflict. It is also about reinforcing all the factors that build positive relations and sustain peace (Hitchcock, 2004:38). Hence, it could be stated that peacebuilding has evolved from a strictly post-conflict undertaking to a concept with a broader meaning, and the general consensus would seem that peacebuilding efforts should already be attempted during the earliest indication of tension in a situation of potential conflict. Against this background, Tschirgi (2003:1) states that the term peacebuilding was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to

address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict cycle, thus before, during and after the conflict. Hence, the term peacebuilding was being gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict during all the different phases of the conflict cycle.

Shannon (2004:36) purports that, despite the widespread acceptance of the peacebuilding concept in academic and political circles, the exact conception of peacebuilding remains an issue of conceptual confusion, disagreement and discourse. Disagreements revolve primarily around the point that some international role-players or functionaries view peacebuilding as short to medium-term undertakings aimed at preventing a resumption of violence, and not as long-term developmental and nation-building endeavours. Others clearly view the purpose of peacebuilding as an effort to avoid a return to conflict, and they argue that in some cases it may require ambitious long-term nation-building efforts by international actors. Others are of the opinion that the role of peace-builders could be salient when civil wars have ended not in the conquest of one of the parties, but rather in a peace settlement between parties (typically the situation in Mozambique).

However, where civil war was the consequence of resource scarcity (as earlier in the Horn of Africa) or skewed land property structures (as in Central America), one could only hope to accomplish limited objectives by promoting good governance. In such cases, undertakings have to involve long-term processes and a number of indigenous role-players must be involved (Haudgerudbraaten, 1998:6).

Thus, according to Neethling (2005:41), the aim, duration and actors involved should depend on specific peacebuilding challenges and would differ from one case to another.

The challenge for the UN – as the pre-eminent organisation responsible for international peace and security – was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers into efforts aimed at societal transformation. Efforts aimed at building peace, as opposed to providing security, brought security thinking and practice into close collaboration with development policy. Experiences from a wide variety of peace interventions all suggested that a central challenge for the UN would be to formulate policies and strategies that focus on the foundations and requirements that are necessary for the rebuilding and restoration of war-torn societies. Tschirgi (2003:1) supports this notion and argues that, from an international macro perspective, the concept of peacebuilding needs to be redefined. It demands that the elaborate doctrines, strategies and institutions that had been developed during the

Cold War to deal with issues regarding international peace and security, be regarded as inadequate and irrelevant for dealing with conflicts in the new era.

Security policy and peacekeeping operations have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing large-scale socio-economic and political change. It has also been accepted that investments in both conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution form an integral and central element of security (Neethling, 2005:39). Peacebuilding should therefore endeavour to address the proximate and root causes of contemporary conflicts, which includes structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and environmental factors.

#### **2.4.2. Peacebuilding from ‘below’**

Pouligny (2006:x) points out that present-day UN peace missions, described as ‘multi-dimensional’ or ‘multi-functional’, imply much further and much deeper intervention in the restructuring of domestic political and social orders. By their nature, the mandates of current UN peace missions affect crucial aspects of the organisation of the societies concerned, as well as the values on which such organisations are founded. The organisation of electoral processes and the promotion of human rights and civil society are examples of the tasks entrusted to these missions, while others take over entire sections of the administration of the countries, as was the case in Kosovo and East Timor (Neethling, 2005:39). This implies that the intervening forces, in fact, become a type of sole actor confronting human, natural and environmental ‘obstacles’ in the accomplishment of their missions (Pouligny, 2006:xi). This results in a situation where the interaction between the UN missions and local societies continue to be approached through global, homogeneous, static and often, generic categories, without taking the specific circumstances and environment of the intervention into account. However, past experience with UN missions have made it clear that the variety and plurality of social logics of specific societies should be addressed within their own rhythms and references, and that peace missions should therefore be ‘tailor-made’ for each individual intervention. This implies understanding the logics and representation peculiar to different groups of actors (Pouligny, 2006:xii). The aim should therefore be to analyse the environment in which the peace mission is to take place in great sociological detail in seeking to get as near as possible to the viewpoints of local actors, especially in terms of what the local role-players understand of and could expect from the peacekeepers in their midst.

Nation-building in terms of post-colonial Africa, specifically sub-Saharan Africa, poses very specific challenges. The legacy of colonial boundary making, which has



shaped post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa plural societies, has highlighted the great challenges to be addressed in terms of establishing sustainable peace and development in these societies. Governments in these states face the daunting task not only of moulding nations out of competing modes of belonging and forms of identification, but also of enforcing the governmental and developmental state apparatus over vast and often thinly populated territories. The problem is not only the vast territories within African societies that are not captured by the state, but also the fact that states are in intense competition with other forms of authority, such as vigilante groups, political parties, traditional leaders, militias and networks of organised crime which, in fact, constitute a kind of public authority.

Haudgerudbraaten (1998:7) identifies six dimensions of variable usage of the term peacebuilding. Shannon (2004:36) refers to these six dimensions and argues that the dimensions correspond to a list of questions intended to shift conceptual ambiguities from the back of the mind to conscious awareness and scrutiny:

- *the aim of peacebuilding*: is peacebuilding about removing the root causes of a conflict or about finding ways to resolve old and new disputes in a peaceful fashion?
- *the means of peacebuilding*: do peacebuilding efforts primarily entail security, humanitarian, economic or political intervention or all of these at the same time?
- *the temporal (time) aspects of peacebuilding*: are the measures employed in peacebuilding short- to medium-term or long-term measures? Should international involvement in peacebuilding be a short- to medium- or long-term effort?
- *the main actors of peacebuilding*: who are the main actors in peacebuilding – indigenous or external actors?
- *the process/action dimensions of peacebuilding*: does the word peacebuilding refer to a set of concrete actions taken or is it a generic concept that refers to an overarching, aggregate process?
- *the organisation of peacebuilding*: should peacebuilding be viewed as a top-down or bottom-up process, as a planned and co-ordinated process, or as one that, to a large extent, is initiated locally and pursued by a multitude of actors in their field of concern and comparative advantage?

#### **2.4.3. Primary elements of peacebuilding**

The concept of peacebuilding has many facets and has been the topic of widespread debate. There is no formal or prescribed peacebuilding process that has been

officially adopted by IGOs such as the UN, but there are a few fundamental elements that have become central to the debate on what is required for effective peacebuilding. These elements include, inter alia:

#### **2.4.3.1 Governance programming**

This is aimed at shaping a society's capacity to reconcile conflicting interests and to manage change peacefully. Traditionally, neither development nor security agencies concerned themselves directly with governance programming. Tschirgi (2003:9) argues that the ongoing dilemmas regarding the security situations in weak, failing or vulnerable states have prompted both development and security agencies to initiate processes that provide guidance to governance programming. The UN, therefore, became increasingly aware of the need to integrate governance issues through the provision of technical assistance with regard to constitution making, election monitoring and public sector reform. In addition, other IGOs became involved in democratisation projects, civil society support, transparency and anti-corruption initiatives, as well as conflict resolution projects (Neethling, 2005:44).

#### **2.4.3.2 Security sector programming**

This programming implies the involvement of IGOs in security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and the protection of vulnerable and war-affected populations. Tschirgi (2003:9) purports that it also involves the fundamental restructuring of security institutions such as the police and defence forces, as well as instituting civilian oversight to advance democratic control and accountability. Traditionally, the security sector fell within the exclusive domain of political and security institutions. However, it is currently also recognised as a central building block to peacebuilding and extensive research has recently been conducted in this regard (Neethling, 2005:44).

#### **2.4.3.3 Establishing the judiciary and the rule of law**

According to Tschirgi (2003:9), the judiciary and the rule of law embrace multiple aspects such as the promotion of human rights, constitution making, traditional justice mechanisms and legal and penal reform. Given its centrality to peacebuilding, there has been a proliferation of rule of law initiatives and activities in peacekeeping operations, post-conflict reconstruction and in supporting governments to strengthen their legal institutions within a longer-term peacebuilding agenda (Neethling, 2005:44).

#### **2.4.3.4. Poverty reduction**

According to Mutesa and Nchito (2005:9), “pervasive poverty is a silent threat to human security”. Whereas traditional state-centric views of security occupy themselves with territorial interests and foreign aggression, the human security approach casts the spotlight on people’s welfare (Mutesa and Nchito, 2005:9). Poverty, like human security, is a multi-dimensional social phenomenon. It not only entails lack of what is necessary for material well-being, it also has important psychological dimensions. Poverty aggravates social exclusion and disaffection and undermines human dignity and self-esteem (Leaning, 2000:23). The Commission for Human Security (2003:74) found that hunger, unemployment, homelessness and illiteracy provide powerful emotional appeals for separatist movements and those who seek to wrest control of state power. Narayan et al (2000:7) adds to this argument by stating that poor people in general lack voice, power and independence to participate effectively in community life.

#### **2.4.3.5. Promoting participation in community life**

The promotion of participation in community life is another primary element that has to be established to promote peacebuilding. The catalysts in promoting this participation are firstly the establishment of effective leadership, and secondly that of promoting gender equity. This can be established by:

- *Enhancing social integration by means of effective leadership.* History has proven that post-conflict leaders that had been socialised in wartime institutions such as insurgent movements, military-led governments and predatory, black market economies are usually least prepared to face the enormous tasks of transition from violence to peace (Khadiagala and Lyons, 2006:9).

While the tension between institutional- and personality-based leadership occurs in all post-conflict cases, the challenges to post-conflict leaders are highly context-sensitive and vary depending on whether the old state collapsed in conflict, whether the war ended in victory by one side or in a stalemate and a negotiated agreement, and whether the war ended with self-determination for a new state (Snodgrass, 2004:259).

The strength of the institutional legacies of civil war may curb the potential for post-conflict leaders to engage in peacebuilding. Some leaders face difficulty in adapting the experiences of mobilisation and

organisation for war to the managerial imperatives of reconstruction. They may squander the exceptional opportunities that stem from the transition from leadership as mobilisation for war and rebellion into leadership for the post-conflict context. “In some cases, wartime challenges forge strong bonds in a small group that is then effective in leading the insurgency through discipline and clear vision” (Khadiagala and Lyons, 2006:15).

- *Promoting gender equity.* Hudson (1998:2) argues that the current security framework with its acceptance of multi-level and multi-dimensional principles of security errs in the sense that it holds up a false holism. An increased sensitivity to the so-called ‘marginalised’ without openly acknowledging women’s specific gendered security needs defeats all claims to total inclusivity. Women’s security must first be examined in terms of their gender roles before comprehensive human security demands can be met. The feminist perspective is highly critical of the masculine underpinnings of a state-centric approach and offers theoretical insights as well as practical mechanisms on how a fusion of masculine and feminine values may serve the goals of human security over and above those of the state.

Taking gender-based violence into account, conventional understandings of human security is extended. Lewis (2006:11) argues that the extended understanding of human security can also deepen investigations of the gendered dimensions of subjects more frequently explored in human security studies, such as militarism, ethnic formation and conflict and nationalism. Many of the intra-state wars that have characterised the developing world over the last few decades, reveal that many of the conflicts are deeply rooted in gender relations, identities and ideologies. Also, gender identities are central to the formation of group identities, such as national and ethnic identity. Fully understanding and responding to patterns such as militarism and ethnic conflict therefore require an exploration of gendered identity-formation.

Lewis (2006:15) adds that the view that women’s experiences and perspectives form some kind of corrective to masculine militarism, has been important to arguments in favour of making women central to peacebuilding. Since the early 1990s, this view has resulted in numerous women-centred peace networks and initiatives in Africa. The notion that women have a central role to play in peacebuilding has also been adopted

by the UN, which accepted (in terms of a UNSC Resolution in 1999) that gender should be mainstreamed in peacekeeping (UNSC, 1999).

Post-conflict environments thus furnish significant prospects for redefining gender roles, redrawing the rules that underpin property rights, and propelling women into leadership positions across society. In addition, the gender dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction can involve the encouragement of policies that compensate for gender disparities in rights, education, resources and power. Zuckerman and Greenberg (2004) states that given their standing and social power, women should be considered key actors in post-conflict service delivery – particularly where formal mechanisms of delivery are frail or absent.

#### **2.4.3.6. Protecting and safeguarding the environment.**

According to Clover (2005:104), security researchers have increasingly moved away from the narrowly defined military understanding of threat, vulnerability and response mechanisms and have increasingly embraced the concepts of environmental security. The focus of environmental security is on a common concern for the implications of environmental change. Clover (2005:104) purports that current research on the environment and security has, for quite different reasons, failed to produce a commonly agreed definition or a common policy agenda, with both the traditional security community and the environmental community resisting the use of the terms.

Most of the case studies pertaining to the safeguarding of the environment focused on environmental scarcity: the relationship between environmental degradation, depletion of renewable resources such as water, land and forests, and violent conflict. More recent research has focused on the importance of conflict arising from access to or control over non-renewable resources, such as gold, diamonds and oil, for strategic purposes. Clover (2005:104) points out that the term *new wars* has been used to capture the changing nature of war, the gradual shift in the causes and duration of conflicts, the duration of such conflicts and the increase in the incidents of regional conflict. Ostensibly based on identity politics, statehood (control or secession) or the control of natural and other resources, these conflicts are largely devoid of the geo-political or ideological goals that characterised earlier wars. Implicit in these greed or grievance debates are the fact that environmental factors can and should be integrated into the traditional security affairs in so far as they threaten the national interest.

Two of the key factors that contribute to tension and insecurity throughout the world are poverty and inequity. There are close and complex interconnections between people, the environment and livelihood opportunities in terms of access to natural resources, and vulnerabilities to environmental threats which are expressed in their overall impact on human survival, well-being and productivity. Khagram et al (2003:230) conclude that insecurity often arises from conditions of inequality and impoverishment, such as seen when political and economic power relations affect society-nature interconnections as evidenced by resource capture and ecological marginalisation. Environmental security problems must therefore focus on the ecosystem level and not simply within political or nation-state boundaries – creative solutions are called for. There is no place for traditional security responses where states can take unilateral action to attain and maintain the security of their own environment. In addition, whilst the challenges of the environment and of security are principally at the domestic level, they are common to a region, as well as for advanced industrialised countries that carry much of the responsibility for global environmental change (Clover, 2005:106).

#### **2.4.3.7 Protecting and fostering human rights**

The upholding and protection of human rights are inextricably tied up with the necessity for good governance. Human rights are the basic expectations and entitlements that individuals and groups should enjoy by virtue of their membership of a given society. This implies that governments are obliged not only to extend these basic rights, expectations and entitlements to its citizens, but also to uphold and to protect them. Thus, it is impossible to refer to the enhancement of human security without reference to the protection of human rights. In instances where human rights are not upheld, they are transformed into demands that individuals and groups make on the polity. Oche (2000:50) argues that the nature and form in which such demands are manifested is a critical issue, because whilst some demands may be made peacefully, others may take the form of protests, rebellions or other forms of violence. Oche (2000:50) also states that it is imperative to establish a political system that will ensure the protection of these rights which democracy provides. A democracy also provides the necessary framework for the pursuit of other aspects that are crucial for the enhancement of human security, such as equitable and sustainable development policies.

#### **2.4.3.8 Fostering sustainable development**

Most of the states that have been plagued by intra-state conflict have no effective police services, show limited inclination in providing public services to their citizens

and are primarily dependent on war-economies for their survival. As a result, the deepest causes of conflict – economic despair, social injustice and political oppression – continue to pose serious challenges to the lives of millions of ordinary people despite interventions by organisations such as the UN. According to Gueli et al (2006b:14), it has become clear that the use of military force to dismantle war economies will be insufficient if applied independently from other key peace mission activities. History has shown that, as the lifelines of war economies are progressively dismantled, so will the expectations of ordinary citizens to receive shelter, food and health care and other basic needs increase. These needs are more important than the formal procedures of democracy: without essential services, ex-combatants and ordinary citizens will return to a life of violence and crime to survive. Therefore, for any military intervention to be effective, complementary efforts should aim to fill the void of public administration and undercut popular participation in the war economy. Gueli et al (2006b:6) also argue that that special focus should be placed on introducing labour-intensive (maximising employment opportunities) and labour-extensive (maximising skills-development) programmes. Only when a peace mission has succeeded in effectively curbing the functioning of a war economy, the task of developing effective institutions can be embarked upon.

#### **2.4.4. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution**

In the same manner that a reassessment of the concept of security has occurred, it has become widely accepted that the nature and impact of peacekeeping has changed significantly in recent years. The early 1990s were the high-water mark in the euphoria of the post-Cold War era of peacekeeping, both in terms of the number of peace missions that were embarked upon, as well as in terms of the manner in which these interventions were conducted. According to Cilliers (1999a:1), only 13 operations were initiated during the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping, whereas more than 36 new operations were launched since 1988. The nature of peace missions has also changed and it has become evident that political, military and humanitarian activities are all required to be executed simultaneously, in contrast to the former ‘traditional’ UN peacekeeping, which typically involved primarily military tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires, separating hostile forces and maintaining of buffer zones. This said, since the early 1990s, there has been a shift from the ‘traditional’ approach to peacekeeping, to an understanding that peacekeeping entails much more than the contributions of the military component of a peace missions. A leading voice in this change in approach was the former UNSG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who, more than a decade ago, addressed the issue at the Summit Meeting of the UNSC on 31 January 1992. During this address, he stressed that “peacekeeping will increasingly require civilian-political officers, human rights

monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police to play as central a role as the military” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:12).

In view of the above, peacekeeping operations during the Cold War mainly entailed the creation of buffer zones and interposition of troops between warring factions. The troops were deployed with the consent and agreement of the parties to the conflict, which were often states and whose armies respected internationally recognised rules of war and in most cases, maintained a professional relationship with the peacekeepers. However, it became evident that this traditional approach to peacekeeping needed to be reviewed as conflicts witnessed during the 1990s in the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) and Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda, for instance) had been intra-state or internal by nature. Moreover, warring parties fought brutally without regard for the rules of war or respect for human rights.

This shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and multi-dimensional operations has entailed substantial civilian components in many UN and AU missions. There have been many attempts to make a clear distinction between traditional peacekeeping and the new type of operations. Traditional peacekeeping operations are described as performing a monitoring and interpositional role, whilst modern peacekeeping operations are concerned with operations responsible for overseeing or executing the political solution of an interstate or internal conflict, with the consent of the parties. Subsequently, the conception of peacebuilding is increasingly being considered as a tool to be used across the full spectrum of conflict. Tschirgi (2003:1) concludes that this broadening of the concept implies a more fluid, non-linear interpretation of peacebuilding, and suggests that peacebuilding can either accompany or immediately succeed military operations in order to ensure sustainable development and security.

Against this background, it has become evident that most contemporary peace missions are endeavours where multi-functional military and civilian components are working closely together. Neethling (2003:102) points out that peace missions are generally characterised by civilian presence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations and this implies that military peacekeepers have to deal not only with belligerents, but also with civilian and humanitarian components. The idea of integrating civilian-military resources at the earliest possible stage of peace missions seems logical and could serve as a plausible framework for successful peacebuilding. This implies that the response to conflict cannot solely be dependent on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but it should include a group of special



civilian teams that can fast-track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other socio-economic or development-related activities, even before peace agreements are brokered, break down or potentially exacerbate more conflict (Gueli et al, 2006b:29).

The essential link between peacebuilding and the security-development nexus is the reason why it has become commonplace to assert that peace and development are intimately linked and that the UN and other international role-players need to address the twin imperatives for security and development by means of integrated policies and programmes through peacebuilding in support of conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Neethling, 2005:38). Although the boundaries between peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become less defined, it is clear that the bureaucratic division of responsibilities between the UN Department of Peacekeeping (UNDPKO) and other UN departments, agencies and offices have created both gaps and duplication, as well as adding additional room for political and institutional competition. According to De Coning et al (2008:3), the distortions that are brought about by the underlying funding arrangements work against overall coherence and integration. This is especially evident in events where the political and security dimensions are funded by assessed contributions, whilst the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding dimensions are funded by voluntary contributions (De Coning et al, 2008:4).

The current approach to peace missions was defined in the new UNDPKO doctrine that was released in early 2008 (De Coning et al, 2008:1). The new doctrine is built on the principle that, whilst UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to support peace processes, there is a clear realisation that it cannot deliver peace on its own – conflict resolution requires commitment from all the relevant role-players. The capstone document clearly points out that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a larger peace process (De Coning et al, 2008:3). The 2008 UN peacekeeping doctrine thus emphasises the fact that UN operations are essentially political and security focused, but that it also has an important role to facilitate overall coherence and coordination in order to support conflict resolution processes.

#### **2.4.5. Peacebuilding as a link between security and development**

Neethling (2005:38) purports that not all development has an impact on the security environment. Conversely, not all security issues have ramifications for development. Where peace and security are affected by factors that cause, perpetuate, reduce, prevent or manage violent conflicts, peacebuilding comes into play. In support of this argument, Tschirgi (2003:2) argues that peacebuilding lies at

the nexus of development and security, and that it requires a readiness to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the conditions for a return to sustainable peace.

Tschirgi (2003:2) furthermore contends that, since the early 1990s, peacekeeping operations have become charged, for example with the task of enforcing peace and of assuming de facto sovereignty over a territory, as in the case of East Timor and Kosovo. As a result of these developments, security policy and peacekeeping operations have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing large-scale socio-economic and political change. It has been realised and recognised that investments in both conflict prevention and post-conflict resolution form an integral and central element of security policy. Neethling (2005:39) argues that it is today widely accepted that policy instruments outside the toolbox of traditional security policies need to be mobilised to provide long-term peace and security. De Coning (2006:4) points out that, as a result, contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect peacebuilding operations aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of conflict, in that such operations have mandates that combine political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase.

The importance of non-military dimensions of security, such as the economic, social and environmental spheres of security, should be taken into account in terms of peacebuilding. Both the security and development fields have the ultimate purpose of seeking to enhance and improve the human condition. Goldman (2005:1) argues that this notion was supported by the former UNSG, Kofi Annan, who acknowledged that development and security are inseparable and mutually reinforcing factors. Annan (2005) concludes that poverty, inequality and underdevelopment create and reproduce conditions of instability, making poor countries ripe for civil discontent.

In terms of security, development and peacebuilding, development actors have only in exceptional cases worked and focused on conflict – by acknowledging and setting out to address the inter-linkages between conflict and development programming. Tschirgi (2003:8-9) argues that in recent times, donors and agencies have endeavoured progressively to undertake ‘conflict-sensitive development’. In addition to the above, there are especially three sectors where international actors have started to design and develop new programmes and activities to respond to peacebuilding challenges. These are programming in the fields of *governance*, *security sector reform* and the *rule of law*.

The process of building and developing society is an enormous challenge. However, Oche (2000:46) states that undertaking this challenge within the context of a society devastated by conflict is infinitely more difficult. Yet despite the difficulties associated with such a venture, post-conflict peacebuilding is imperative for the enhancement of human security in war-torn societies.

#### **2.4.6. NGOs and peacebuilding**

NGOs have become essential in building stable communities and effective institutions, especially since the end of the Cold War, where it has become apparent that, NGOs not only have a role to play in peacebuilding, but that they are vital to the process entailed in the construction of the liberal peace (Richmond and Carey, 2005:19). Although NGO involvement can hardly be described as a panacea for the establishment of sustainable peace and development, NGOs have made enormous differences to complex peace processes through both their independent interventions at grass roots level, and via their cooperation with the local population, or attempts to modify state and unilateral interventions at the socio-political and developmental levels. However, NGOs are sometimes convinced that their involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is not sufficiently meaningful or effective, while some governments dislike the increasing pressure to make room for civil society through NGO participation in peace deliberations, monitoring and service provision (Richmond and Carey, 2005:19).

According to Richmond and Carey (2005:20), NGOs and the networks that they tend to form are perceived as key providers of the resources necessary to institutionalise human security in conflict zones by liberal states and actors. NGOs have, to a great extent, inherited the role of building *civil peace* as a key component of the *liberal peace*, along with the parallel construction of the *constitutional peace* (through democratisation) and *institutional peace* (associated with the UN system), which are also components of the *liberal peace*. Effectively, NGOs are thus crucial in building the institutions of the liberal peace from the bottom up, including free market economies and development strategies, social reform, political democratisation to human rights and humanitarian assistance (Duffield, 2001:11). NGOs are part of the peacebuilding consensus that include donors, major states, IGOs and international financial institutions, in which there is a broad concurrence on liberal peace, though there might be disagreement of how this is to be achieved in a technical sense (Richmond and Carey, 2005:3). This consensus effectively indicated that NGOs have become part of the external governance of post-conflict zones. The construction of liberal peace now focuses on peace-as-governance, and the NGOs

are vital actors in this project within the broader context of the globalisation of the norms of the liberal peace and of global civil society.

Non-state actors and the NGOs have been instrumental in broadening the understanding of peace and security. In 1914, there were only 1 083 NGOs world-wide and no firm conception of universal human rights affirmed by the international community, as it was at the time. The estimated number of NGOs is now believed to be between 37 000 and 50 000 (UN, 2004b:5). Though still contested, there are now firm conceptions of human rights, as well as emerging humanitarian norms and the discourse on human security that provides a basis for non-state actor intervention. Many NGOs were formed in the 1990s as a response to the broad requirements of the synthesis of peacebuilding, humanitarianism, human rights monitoring and advocacy (Richmond and Carey, 2005:21). NGOs have proven to be very useful in the initial stages of establishing sustainable peace. They have also become essential tools for states and IGOs and other institutions in the construction of the liberal peace, due to their unique access, legitimacy and flexibility. NGOs have the ability to react quickly, are not bureaucratically crippled, cannot coerce and are widely respected. Most importantly, according to Richmond and Carey (2005:24), the combination of these assets means that they can fulfil roles and tasks which states and their liberal organisations simply cannot fulfil.

However, NGOs also have certain limits to what they can achieve and there are certain requirements that have to be in place in order for them to function effectively. Above all – NGOs require security. They cannot control what happens to resources that they bring into the conflict zone, and they might even inadvertently confer a level of legitimacy on to actors who are not adverse to the use of violence. Secondly, there is also a level of conditionality that is introduced into the relationship between NGOs and their benefactors, especially when it comes to the economic, social and political dimensions of the peace that they are helping to construct in conflict zones. There is obviously a significant tension between attempts to introduce conditionality into relationships between IGOs, NGOs, agencies and belligerents, especially as this may undermine or impede on attempts to act in a humanitarian manner. There is also a great problem with the sheer numbers of NGOs operating in conflict zones in terms of the division of labour and overlap of roles and responsibilities. Perhaps most controversially – there is the issue of accountability. The question remains whether NGOs be held accountable and what kind of frameworks can be constructed to ensure accountability. Despite these problems, NGOs have been recognised as an essential part of the broader UN system as they play an essential part in the peacebuilding consensus (Richmond and Carey, 2005:24).

However, despite the increased quantitative and qualitative demands for civilian capabilities in peace missions, few UN-contributing states have actually paid sufficient attention to enhancing their civilian capacities in a systematic manner. As a result, peace missions lack adequate civilian experts, especially in terms of construction. According to Guehenno (2005), the armed forces tend to play a more dominant role in UN missions because they are so much easier to deploy, because, unlike civil servants they work under a common strategic framework, operate under a permanent budget and have systems in place that allow for rapid deployment. As a result, military troops have been saddled with a disproportionate share of the post-conflict burden, even though they lack formal training to provide essential socio-economic services and have battled to produce a tangible peace dividend to host populations (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006b:3).

## **2.5. Conclusions**

Armed conflicts in the developing world have seriously undermined the attainment of development, security and democratic consolidation. There is no question about the impact of conflict on the inextricable link between durable peace, long-term security and sustainable development. It is today widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts requires sustained efforts to address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic, and social dimensions of conflicts. As a result, there has been growing support for the notion that the concepts of security and development should be linked in order to achieve meaningful peace. There is thus a growing awareness that peacebuilding should be an essential part of any multi-national peacekeeping undertaking.

In order to effectively address the challenges associated with complex emergencies, it is essential to recognise that human insecurity takes many forms and that the traditional understanding of the concept of human security should be expanded. As a result, approaches to address these issues must be diverse, multi-dimensional and located at many levels. This demands a critical review of current structures, institutions and processes where these are seen to threaten or undermine people's security.

The end of the Cold War has offered such an opportunity for international role-players to revisit dominant conceptions of security and development policy, and to devise integrated and coherent policy instruments and programmes to address violent conflict from a peacebuilding perspective. Development and security need to be mutually reinforcing – especially when many of the threats that confront the

international community emanate largely from failures of development (Tschirgi, 2003:13).

It is clear that a significant range of international reforms throughout the international system has taken place to facilitate peacebuilding endeavours. This included a major overhaul of the UN system, while major agencies established conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. Some governments also aligned their foreign, security and development policies and programmes to respond to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda and challenges of the contemporary international community. This also impacted positively on supporting policies, programmes and projects that facilitate war-prone, war-torn or post-war countries to recover from conflict in order to address longer-term developmental and security goals. This has, in general, led to a better understanding of the political economy of armed conflicts, as well as a drive towards applying appropriate strategies and priorities to deal with developmental and security challenges in response to violent conflict and civil war. Obviously, this is of great importance to all developing countries, given the acute need to apply relevant and constructive measures and strategies in the search for sustainable development and long-term security.

The discourse on human security and humanitarianism has become an important indicator of the agendas of IGOs, agencies and non-state actors in their contribution to sustainable development and peace. These actors, with access, reach and legitimacy are crucial in the evolving peacebuilding consensus. In their conditional relationships with recipients, donors, IGOs and international financial institutions, non-state actors have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of interventions in civil society in order to develop civil peace and contribute to the broader understanding of sustainable peace and development through the institutionalisation of bottom-up forms of governance, engendered in the liberal peace.

The concept of DPMs was developed to address sustained development and to facilitate the institutionalisation of the liberal peace on the African continent. The DPMs framework constitutes a very ambitious concept that focuses on the realisation of the AU and NEPAD's priorities through an integrated plan or framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Proponents of the concept purport that DPMs will provide a framework and practical paradigm towards achieving sustainable political and economic development that will, furthermore, advance democracy, as well as regional integration and co-operation through the dismantling of exploitative war economies. It is also contended that DPMs will create platforms for policy reforms and set the scene for increased

investment through the dismantling of war economies. This premise will be explored in Chapter 3 of this study.

## **CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE MISSIONS: CONTEXT, CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES**

### **3.1. Introduction**

The origins of the UN's current Complex Peace Operations Model (sometimes also referred to as Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping) can be traced back to the early 1990s when the UN found itself in the midst of a series of violent and complex intra-state wars that called on the political, military, humanitarian, as well as the developmental components of the UN system. Earlier UN peace missions were essentially focused on the inter-positioning of peacekeepers between warring factions. Gueli et al (2006b:15) argue that, as a rule, this entailed separating warring factions from each other and assisting the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from cease-fire lines, without effectively addressing long-term development and peacebuilding activities.

Recent history has proven that this traditional UN approach to peace interventions has generally attained limited success and that conflict often breaks out as soon as the peacekeeping forces withdraw. The chances of successful peace interventions have proven to be even lower when warring parties fight for the control of valuable natural resources. The UN conducted research in this regard and the results indicated that 60% of African countries that are emerging from conflict stand to relapse back into conflict (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004).

There are many reasons for the mixed successes that the UN has achieved with peace operations. One of the primary reasons for these limited successes, can be ascribed to the fact that there is usually a long delay between the time when peacekeeping ends and peacebuilding begins – the so-called reconstruction gap. It has become evident that the longer it takes for peacebuilding activities to commence, the greater the probability that a country might return to conflict (Bakhet, 2001:3). In a bid to improve on the success rate of peace missions, several changes were subsequently made to this traditional linear approach that essentially regarded security as a precursor for development (Gueli et al, 2006c:6). It became evident that the traditional processes of focusing on establishing security first, and only then addressing developmental issues, have proven inadequate to effectively address modern complex emergencies. In response to this, the UN introduced some changes in terms of approaches to peacekeeping operations with the aim of addressing some of the underlying causes of conflict during the early stages of a mission. These changes were introduced, following the findings of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000 – also known as the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000).



However, Gueli et al (2006b:8) purports that, despite the changes that have already been implemented with regard to the UN's traditional approach to peacebuilding, even more changes should be forthcoming, as many of the current measures still fall short of providing real impetus in addressing the key issues regarding the security and development that is to lay the foundation for long-term development and reconstruction. They argue that, in essence, the approach to complex emergencies should move from a traditionally linear and essentially sequential approach, to that of a systems-thinking approach, in which many of the processes are implemented and managed simultaneously. This implies that peacebuilding must be brought closer to peacekeeping in order to effectively close the reconstruction gap (Gueli et al, 2006b:6). One of the methods by means of which this could be achieved is to adopt DPMs as an approach to peace missions.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the concepts and principles of DPMs. This analysis will consist firstly of an examination of the current UN Complex Peace Operations Model and how it has evolved after the Cold War. Following this analysis, peace missions will be analysed from a global perspective, where after the analysis will be focused on peace missions in Africa. The results of this analysis will then be coupled to an analysis of the development and possible implementation of the DPMs concept as a framework to effectively conduct multi-functional peace missions. The UN's newly adopted IMPP will also be analysed in terms of its possible interface with DPMs. This will be followed by the identification of the challenges that will have to be met as a precursor for the successful implementation of DPMs during peace operations.

### **3.2. A new approach to peacekeeping**

The concept of DPMs was created as a practical or functional concept to effectively address human security and development in answer to the UN's mixed success record regarding peace missions (Gueli et al, 2006c:5). As far as Africa is concerned, the former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Ms Nosizwe Madlala-Routledge, in conjunction with members of the CSIR, started to develop and present the concept in terms of its applicability in Africa. The initial research on DPMs was conducted by four researchers, Richard Gueli, Sybert Liebenberg, Elsona van Huysteen and Orienda Maitlin, and the results of their research constitute the basis of this chapter (Gueli et al, 2006d). The initial project was funded by CAGE and additional funding for the project was provided by the CSIR.

This project calls for a more timely effort to bring security closer to development in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international

and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term state building efforts. In essence, DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction efforts as soon as possible – even when conflict is still ongoing – could contribute towards security, peace, and obtaining long-term political order and economic legitimacy. Fundamentally, DPMs calls for a developmental approach, as well as quicker mobilisation of reconstruction and development resources, as well as embarking on these initiatives in unison with security efforts. “On an operational level this implies many things, among these, the deployment of civilian peacebuilders alongside military peacekeepers” (Gueli et al, 2006c:7). In this context, DPMs as a concept has been presented as a practical approach to effecting peacebuilding in strife-torn nations and to ultimately set the stage for nation-building and sustainable security and development.

### **3.3. The African peacekeeping context**

Many academics and policy-makers have endeavoured to define and determine the root causes of conflict in Africa. The post-colonial era in Africa has been characterised by widespread political instability, reflecting the uncertainty of Africa’s standing in the post-war capitalist order (Zack-Williams, 2002:9). In his 1998 political report on Africa, the then UNSG, Kofi Annan, noted that 14 of the continent’s 53 countries had been afflicted by armed conflict in 1996 alone, and that over 30 wars had occurred in Africa since 1970, mostly within states, counting for “more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide” in that period (Annan, 1998:20). Furthermore, the security situation in Africa is characterised by widespread violence, civil wars, repression, migrations and displacements, famine, disease and debt.

Many studies have been conducted to determine the root causes of conflict in Africa. In most of the cases, it was found that the interaction between economic greed, coupled with long-standing political grievances over the unfair distribution of resources, as well as the exclusionary nature of political systems in general, have been the primary causes of the outbreak and duration of these conflicts (Ballentine, 2004:4). In this regard, the World Bank similarly acknowledged that important economic resources do appear to make conflict more feasible when political grievances already exist, particularly when corrupt government elites distribute them (Collier, 2003:10). This is especially relevant to the situation in Africa.

### **3.3.1. Peace operations in Africa**

As the new millennium commences, Africa is faced with a troika of what seem to be insurmountable problems: economic marginalisation from the global market; a major health crises stemming from the destructive effects of malaria and HIV/AIDS; and the search for peace, political stability and an end to the succession of devastating civil wars. Many countries in Africa have weak security forces and show only a limited inclination in providing any kind of public services to their citizens (Zack-Williams et al, 2002:3). In the broadest sense, the deepest causes of the conflict – economic despair, social injustice and political oppression – continue to pose serious challenges to the lives of millions of ordinary people.

Despite this increase in instability and insecurity in Africa, Western countries increasingly disengaged from peace missions on the continent during the 1990s (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:vii). This can be ascribed to a general decrease in the UN and international participation in multi-dimensional complex emergencies during the 1990s. In 1993, the total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel decreased from more than 80 000 members (with a budget of \$3,4 billion) in 1994 to only 14 000 troops in 1998 – with a budget that had shrunk to less than \$1 billion. Only four of the UN missions in 1998/1999 were deployed in Africa – whereas 70% of all UN deployments took place in Africa in 1994 (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:1). The UN's failures and difficulties in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Angola have overshadowed the UN's relative success stories in countries such as Namibia, Mozambique and the Central African Republic. However, the failures highlighted the weaknesses of the UN as diplomatic arbiter, peacekeeper and peace-enforcer. This resulted in a cynical perception in the international community that peacekeeping in Africa absorbs enormous amounts of resources and energy, but, in fact, delivers very little in return (Neething, 2003:88).

Fortunately, since the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there has been renewed interest and participation in peace missions globally, as well as in Africa. According to the Report of the UNSG on the Work of the Organisation (Ki-moon, 2007c:1), the “UN has witnessed a surge in peacekeeping activity during the past few years. At the beginning of 2006, UN peacekeeping supported eighteen peace operations and thirteen other field missions and offices, involving approximately 85 000 deployed personnel. By August 2007, this number had grown to over 100 000 personnel, without counting the highly complex AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur. The current annual budget for UN peacekeeping is approximately \$5,6 billion, which represents one half of 1 percent of global military spending”. In order to reap the maximum benefits from this phenomenon, it is essential that all efforts should be

made to increase the chances of success with peace missions in order to retain this renewed interest in and commitment to peace missions (Ki-moon, 2007c:1).

Many lessons have been learnt by peacekeepers in Africa. From the viewpoint of these intervening forces, the history of political breakdown that took place in the states where the intervention was instituted, meant that the problems that the peacekeepers were expected to resolve, long pre-dated their own arrival, and were essentially concerned with domestic issues that the peacekeepers could do little if anything about. In most instances, the local trust or respect for institutions of the state in which the intervention was conducted, had long since broken down and most of the leaders of the various factions were tarnished, in one way or another, by their involvement in the events of previous years. Clapham (2000:201) points out that “peacekeepers found themselves baffled by rivalries between faction leaders and their failure to agree to apparently obvious conflict-resolving measures or to abide by them, even when they did agree”. The political breakdown that took place in the countries where the intervention was necessitated usually caused a high level of devastation to infrastructure and systems long before the peacekeepers arrived (Clapham, 2000:201).

### **3.3.2. Challenges relating to war economies**

In addition to the political, institutional and social breakdown that is a characteristic result of intra-state wars in Africa, peace missions must also address what is often referred to as *war economies* in order to establish lasting peace. Renner (2002:10) states that: “a war economy can be defined as a self-sustaining system in which resource exploitation funds conflict, a conflict provides the means and conditions that allow continued illegitimate access to these resources”. The Post Conflict Unit of the World Bank also portrays wars as essentially driven by economic agendas – particularly the conflicts of the developing world. Statistical analyses of conflicts by the World Bank of the period 1960 to 1999 indicate that economic agendas appear to be central to the origins of many wars – i.e. “greed largely causes wars” (Collier, 2000:2). According to Gueli et al (2006b:13), a prime example of such a war economy is that of the former Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor. His illegal trade in Liberia’s diamonds, rubber, timber and iron resources during the 1990’s yielded approximately \$200 million to \$250 million per year from 1990 to 1994. In the DRC, the armed conflict that lasted for about 45 years, was fuelled by local and regional actors who were attempting to gain access to roughly 80% of the world’s supply of coltan (metal heat conductor). The coltan was exported to foreign markets for hard cash that was in turn used to finance the armed conflict. This phenomenon has led some analysts to conclude that the easily exploitable natural resources in

Africa are used to finance civil wars and that the perpetuation of war in certain countries serves as an alternative way of gaining income. This approach has been collated into so-called 'resource wars' – sometimes presented as reflecting an additional 'new type of war'. However, Cilliers (2002:2) points out that although war might have both planned or intended and unintended economic consequences, any analysis that seeks to reduce the study of extensive social conflict to a single determinant, should be treated with care. Thus, economic considerations should not be used as a single-factor explanation for ongoing conflict.

Nevertheless, the primacy of war economies in weak or failed states has significant implications for conflict in Africa. Firstly, conflict is largely based on the logic of trade and the struggle for competitive advantage and accumulation of wealth and not on the attainment of definable geo-strategic goals. The continuation of conflict, and not military victory, therefore becomes a critical factor to maintain positions of power and to access the resources necessary to fund conflict. War economies are thus sustained through the prospects of profit and not through the cessation of hostilities (Kaldor, 1999:110). The money that is generated from the trade of resources allows warring parties to enforce and centralise their political-military power, which in turn, enables them to control and protect valuable resources.

In terms of establishing sustainable peace and development, it is clear that war economies must be dismantled as a precursor for development and peace. This dismantling of war economies offers a key opportunity to re-balance the economic scales between war and peace in the favour of peace (Cooper, 2001:35).

Solomon (2002:221) presents the following statistics to underline the relationship between economic factors and violent armed conflicts:

- since the mid-1980s, 15 of the world's 20 poorest countries have experienced violent conflict;
- half of the world's low-income countries are either engaged in conflict or are in the process of transition from conflict;
- almost every low-income country at least shares a border with a country in conflict, if not embroiled in its own conflict; and
- in the 1990s, 70 million of the world's poor were displaced from their homes as a result of conflict. In Africa alone, one-third of its countries have produced refugees.

These statistics confirm the notion that economic recovery cannot be dealt with, simply in the post-conflict or post-intervention stages of peace missions. Solomon

(2002:221) argues that, indeed, economic development should also be viewed as a conflict-preventative measure and should occur during all stages of an operation. This highlights the fact that one cannot separate peacemaking from the processes of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Rather, they should be viewed as parallel processes that are complementary to one another, and if approached in this holistic manner, can contribute to sustainable peace (Solomon, 2002:221).

Development initiatives and peacebuilding can only commence, once the war economies have been dismantled and essential services and infrastructures have been restored. Most important is the building of effective institutions that are capable of alleviating structural roots of instability. “The exit strategy of peace missions should be that of establishing a minimally capable state. In this regard, the ability of peace mission actors to transfer valuable knowledge and skills to local stakeholders is critically important to ensure a timely withdrawal of forces. This is because, without sufficient local demand for peace and reform, state-building efforts will almost certainly fail” (Flavin, 2003:95). Considering Africa’s current poor capacity to do state-building, peace missions should try to leverage the limited resources available in Africa to create the momentum needed for restoring those core functions that only local governments can provide (providing public goods, law and order, macro-economic management etc), rather than create the false expectations that institutions such as the AU have the capacity to implement grand designs for state-building.

It is evident that a detailed understanding of war economies is required in order to effectively implement peacebuilding efforts and it is also clear that economic developmental strategies are essential to any peacebuilding initiatives, as political and security solutions have proved less than successful. One of the greatest challenges to peace missions in Africa is often to provide viable alternatives to the sustainment of war economies. The underlying economic dilemmas must be analysed and understood, before any peacemaking or peacebuilding efforts are embarked upon. It is evident that by merely separating warring factions, the underlying causes of intra-state conflict are not addressed. To simply separate actors that have neither the political will, nor the financial compulsion to end violent conflict is insufficient as they commonly make use of global commodity markets to trade resources to fund more conflict. Africa’s peace and security and development agendas cannot realistically be attained if war economies continue to influence the nature of politics and trade in Africa. These war economies are exceptionally complex and multi-faceted and any attempt to challenge the full range of inter-related issues that characterise war economies must be addressed concurrently and in an integrated manner.

### 3.4. Current peace mission approaches and initiatives

Malan (2000:178) points out that significant developments have taken place globally in regard to the approaches and processes utilised to effect multi-functional peace missions during the past decade. He states that: “peace support operations have evolved rapidly from classical peacekeeping (involving military interposition to monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multi-dimensional interventions where the military is but one of the many participants within any particular peace process” (Malan, 2000:178). In fact, according to Neethling (2003:89), military operations play a distinctively supportive role and may even produce few obvious results as regards the outcome. Modern multi-national peace missions depend primarily on a broad political process and as a result, multi-national peace operations in the realm of peace and security are critically dependent on the extent to which international or regional authority underpins such endeavours and on the political will of the participating member states (Neethling, 2003:89). As a result, several concepts such as preventive diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking and peacebuilding have now all been incorporated in a holistic vision of comprehensive peace missions. This, according to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, has given rise to the *new peacekeeping partnership* that includes the military, civilian police, government and NGOs, diplomats, the media and organisations that sponsor development and democratisation programmes (Malan, 2000:178). The wide variety of role-players, coupled to the immense complexities of multi-dimensional interventions makes it clear that democratisation in Africa is not a simple, uni-linear process or a tactical procedure with predetermined means and goals.

Another significant development regarding current peace mission approaches, is the change towards a more robust approach regarding the use of force, although contemporary UN Complex Peacekeeping Operations in Africa are still grounded in and characterised by the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. The interpretation of and application of these principles have, however, in terms of its practical application, undergone significant development (De Coning, 2006:5).

One of the major changes was in terms of what is understood with consent, and the fact that the parties to the conflict must agree to the UN’s peacekeeping role. This is still relevant, but it is understood and accepted that strategic consent at the level of leadership of the belligerents does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field.

The use of force in terms of the minimum use of force still implies that the UN peacekeeping mission will use the minimum force necessary to protect itself and others covered by the mandate, but it is now understood that it should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats to itself or those it has been mandated to protect. According to De Coning (2006:5), it is unlikely that the UNSC will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter VII's enforcement authority. Furthermore, UN peacekeeping missions will remain impartial and will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict. However, this does not imply that the UN will stand by when civilians are in imminent threat of danger, or that it will not record and report human rights abuses that may have occurred to the International Criminal Court.

In addition to the above, there has been a change in approach of how peacekeeping missions are comprised, funded and driven. According to Othieno and Samasuwo (2007:25), this has led, to a certain extent, to the UN de-monopolising peacekeeping and ceding its 'responsibility to protect' to either lead states or regional organisations to deal with crises in the respective regions. In the first place, these lead nations/states have been empowered, financially and militarily, by peacekeeping powers to attend to crises in their respective regions to drive peacekeeping efforts. Secondly, whilst financial and military support is not paramount, regional powers have obtained the blessing of the UN to deal with regional issues and crises in various parts of their respective regions (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:25).

#### **3.4.1. Global conflict and the UN Complex Peace Operations Model**

As part of the ongoing developments in terms of UN peace missions, the concept of complex peace operations was also established. This term is used by the UN to denote the inclusion of peacebuilding mandates into peacekeeping operations. Prior to the emergence of the concept of 'complex peace operations', 'traditional' UN peacekeeping typically involved primarily military tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires and separating hostile forces (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:1). The UN's current Complex Peace Operations Model prescribes that peacekeepers deploy to do more than separating belligerents, but also to stabilise conflict between warring factions. As a rule, this entails separating warring factions, and assisting the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a ceasefire line (UN, 2004b:8). Apart from monitoring ceasefire agreements and patrolling buffer zones, UN



mandates were expanded to include the organisation of elections, the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction.

The shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and multi-dimensional operations has entailed substantial civilian components, including experts in political affairs, law, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, gender, child protection, elections, disarmament and demobilisation. The concept of peacebuilding is increasingly being considered as a tool to be used across the spectrum of conflict. This broadening of the concept implies a more fluid, non-linear interpretation of peacebuilding and suggests that peacebuilding can either accompany or immediately succeed military operations, accentuated its importance as a strategy to prevent violent conflicts in addition to preventing its re-occurrence and assisting with reconstruction in order to ensure sustainable development and security (Tschigri, 2003:2)

The first significant changes to the traditional peacekeeping model was observed during the UN's missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia when the UN authorised the use of force to protect humanitarian aid. However, the ultimate objective was still held to be the restoration of peace and the support to rebuild state infrastructures. This approach was applied in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Kosovo and East Timor, marking a new departure with 'transitional administrations' (Pouligny, 2006:2). In all these cases, the objective was no longer to interpose between two states or two armies, but to assist the installation of the foundations necessary for the restoration of law and order in a given society.

However, whilst the Complex Peace Operations Model has gradually become incorporated into the UN's conflict management repertoire, its success rate remains limited. About 40% of countries emerging from conflict relapse into conflict and in Africa, this figure rises to 60% (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004). Faced with these challenges, the then UNSG, Kofi Annan, commissioned the Brahimi Report with a view to reviewing the shortcomings of UN peace operations and to take practical recommendations to ensure their future success.

After reviewing the successes and failures of current and previous UN peace missions, the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000:1) offered clear advice about the minimum requirements for successful UN operations. These recommendations include aspects such as political support, a rapid deployment capacity and robust force structures, as well as a sound peacebuilding strategy. The Brahimi Report encouraged the UN to update its peacekeeping doctrine and strategies from primarily observing ceasefires to laying the foundations for peacebuilding (UN, 2000:1). It also emphasised the

need for a more integrated post-conflict peacebuilding strategy. The report prescribed that the revised strategies for peacekeeping and peacebuilding need to combine in the field to produce more effective complex peace operations (UN, 2000:2). Gueli et al (2006c:9) argues that by expanding the concept of peacekeeping beyond conventional military operations, the Brahimi Report gives some recognition to the underplayed role and untapped potential that initial development work can bring to address the causes of conflict and to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

As part of the transformation that took place in UN systems, following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000), the UN made several structural changes to its organisational framework in order to play a more coordinated role in peacebuilding activities. In December 2005, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an inter-governmental body, which will convene representatives of the UN's major organs, financing institutions, troop contributors, the respective governments in question, as well as other stake-holders in order to improve on the coordination activities and the marshalling of resources for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives (UN, 2000).

The establishment of the PBC was based on the realisation that nearly 50% of countries in which the UN had intervened, had slid back into conflict within five years of signing the peace agreement. This phenomenon has primarily been ascribed to the lack of effective coordination of activities, the lack of sustained commitment, poor financing and funding gaps and poor coordination of peacebuilding activities (UN, 2004a:par 261–269).

The recommendation for the establishment of a PBC were first presented to the UN in the 2004 reports of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that was convened by the UNSG to assess the greatest threats to global insecurity. This Panel reported that the UN suffered a key institutional gap in specific areas in that the UN system was explicitly designed to avoid state collapse, as well as to assist war-torn societies in their transition from war to peace (UN, 2004a:par 261–269).

In the light of the latter, the PBC was established as an UN inter-governmental advisory body during the 2005 World Summit. The Summit Declaration called for the PBC to (UN, 2005a:24-25; UNSC, 2005:2-3):

- bring together all actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacekeeping and recovery;

- focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts for recovery from conflict;
- support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN; and
- develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

The PBC's role and resources are limited. A small staff and a small peacebuilding fund that is made up of voluntary contributions will support the activities of the PBC. The PBC will be tasked with addressing critical gaps, particularly after the signing of peace agreements, until long-term support is made available (UNSC, 2005:2-3; UN, 2005a:24-25). However, several issues regarding the working of the PBC are yet to be finalised. Still, the contribution of the PBC in terms of more effective coordination of peacebuilding activities will clearly contribute to greater success with peace missions in general and the establishment of the PBC is a clear indication that the UN is working towards more practical solutions for bringing peacebuilding closer to peacekeeping.

Despite significant changes to UN peace mission strategies that expand the concept of what was initially understood in terms of complex peace operations, Gueli et al (2006a:1) point out that, although this expansion heralds a significant change to the approach to UN peace missions, the changes to processes that have been instituted, have not been formalised to its required depth as yet. A crucial factor in effecting successful peace missions is the contribution of the civilian reconstruction sector. However, very few UN-contributing states have paid sufficient attention to enhancing their civilian capacities in a systematic way. As a result, civilian experts, especially those involved in reconstruction, are in short supply during peace missions. As an example, only 19% of the total UN forces in the DRC in April 2006 were civilians – a very poor contribution if one considers that the UN mission intends to fast track the provision of social services and other reconstruction programmes in the course of 2006. During the same time, merely 12% of the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was civilian (Gueli et al, 2006b:81).

Gueli et al (2006c:7) also point out that, despite a general acceptance that the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be managed in a parallel fashion, the manner in which current UN Complex Peace Operations Model is operationalised is essentially still based on the premise that peacebuilding work is

generally not feasible during conditions of instability, and that long-term humanitarian, development and reconstruction efforts at this time would likely be wasted. As a result, peacebuilding will usually only commence, once the environment has been secured by peacekeepers.

In this respect, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under-UNSG for Peacekeeping once remarked: “We (the UN) have peacekeeping operations that succeed – only to lapse back into conflict. Successful operations, as it were, in which the patients dies” (Guehenno, 2005:2). These comments are relevant to most developing countries in which cease-fires are only partially adhered to, peace efforts often fail and post-conflict societies often relapse into conflict. It is these challenges that prompted the re-evaluation of the systems, approaches and processes that are currently being utilised during peace missions.

#### **3.4.2. Developments in the African context**

According to Cilliers and Mills (1999:1), the “nature of peacekeeping globally and in Africa has changed in many respects in recent years. The early 1990s were the high water mark in the euphoria of the post-Cold War era of peacekeeping. While thirteen operations were established in the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping, 36 new operations have been launched since 1988. Malan (2000:178) points out that, “in less than a decade, peace support operations have evolved rapidly and in an ad hoc fashion, from classical peacekeeping (involving military interposition to monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multi-dimensional interventions where the military component is but one of many participants within any particular peace process. The concepts of preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking and peacebuilding have all been incorporated in a holistic vision of comprehensive and ambitious peace missions. This has given rise to what the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has dubbed the new peacekeeping partnership – a partnership that includes the military, civilian police, government and NGOs, diplomats, the media, and organisations sponsoring development and democratisation programmes.

According to Mandrup-Jorgensen (2007:37), the relationship between defence and development is seen as both an oxymoron and a contingent relationship. Williams (2005:57) points out that investment in defence has traditionally been considered as the use of state resources in an unproductive sector, something that is highly contested. The role of the armed forces have changed from the traditional narrow territorial defence to a broader societal approach, in which the armed forces are just one element in dealing with the security threats that modern societies face. This

evolved understanding of the concept of 'defence' emphasises the shift away from the former 'peace-crisis-war' logic, based on the mobilisation of a defence force, to dealing with declared and undeclared challenges or conflicts, which means that modern society is in a state of constant preparedness against a multitude of mostly unconventional security threats (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2001:38). The consequence of this is that the traditional distinctions between civilian readiness, both state and NGO, and military readiness are undergoing significant change and are being incorporated into what is called 'integrated thinking' in defence circles. As a result, modern complex peace missions, which involve simultaneous political, military and humanitarian activities, have thus expanded the concept of 'traditional' UN peacekeeping, which typically involved primarily military tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires, separating hostile forces and maintaining of buffer zones (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:1).

This shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and multi-dimensional operations has entailed the inclusion of substantial civilian components in many UN and AU missions, since the establishment of the AU in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. This should also be viewed in the context of the emerging AU's security architecture and is informed by the Continental body's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework. Importantly, the African Heads of State and Government agreed to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2003, which, like its UN counterpart, would be in a position to deploy multi-national contingents to conflict when peace and security on the continent were threatened (Munusamy, 2002:1). The PSC was established by AU member states in 2003 as the main decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and several entities such as the AU Commission, the ASF, a Panel of the Wise and a Continental Early Warning System. A Special Fund has also been established to support the PSC (Munusamy, 2002:1).

### **3.4.3. Hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa**

In the light of the failure of the UN to deal with all Africa's security requirements, the UN and some regional organisations such as the AU and the EU have developed what is referred to as 'hybrid peacekeeping'. This implies that regional organisations initially take the lead in peace intervention operations, until the hybrid force eventually transitions into a full-blown UN multi-functional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission. This implies essentially that the regional organisation will run the day-to-day operations, whilst the UN will have overall control of the mission.

The trend towards hybrid peacekeeping has highlighted several problems that were not initially appreciated. One of the primary problems is that of sidelining the UN in favour of hegemonic unilateral initiatives. The UN, as the most representative supra-national body, should not be allowed to become obsolete in the global peacekeeping agenda. Despite its shortcomings, the UN's operations are still observed as legitimate and viewed as having a significant role to play in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. According to Othieno and Samasuwo (2007:23), the UN not only has the moral high ground or impartiality that other organisations may not necessarily have, but also has certain clear comparative advantages in setting global security standards, humanitarian assistance and development.

The issue of legitimacy of hybrid operations have also not been finalised and hence the legitimacy and legality of certain peace missions, although they might enjoy the support of the AU or UN, may be disputed. Disputes might emerge between donors and regional organisations over who should play the leading or bigger role in a particular region or peace mission. By virtue of their financial muscle, donors may wish to smuggle in their own political agendas. Disputes might also arise over who will have the authority to implement future peace missions or ceasefires – especially in hybrid operations in which the UN plays a secondary role or only enters a particular mission at a later stage to legitimise unilaterally initiated missions.

Although it is evident that rich countries have borne the burden of the UN's overall budget, it is also true that some of these countries have attempted to use the 'power of the purse' to control the way in which the UN operates in general. In addition, there is a tendency that developed countries prefer deploying their citizens in missions outside the African continent. This has resulted in the situation that African missions have had to rely on an increase in the number of African and Asian personnel, while places such as the Balkans and the Middle East have relied almost purely on Western military personnel (Gowan and Johnstone, 2007:2). According to Sidhu (2006:32–37), this 'peacekeeping apartheid' has strengthened the perception that powerful donor countries prefer 'big leagues, big budget, advanced technology, war fighting roles' and that they leave the UN and other continental bodies such as the AU to clean up the mess in African peacekeeping theatres.

In the light of the above, critics of modern peacekeeping operations have likened them to a new form of neo-colonialism. According to Adebajo (2007:6), the five permanent members of the UNSC have tended to maintain an ambiguous attitude towards regional organisations, by rejecting to fund them and then recognising them

while attempting to maintain control over certain missions. This point is supported by the fact that some of the UNSC veto-wielding members have shown greater willingness to sanction deployments of peace missions only in their former colonial or geo-strategic spheres of influence. Examples are the British in Sierra Leone, the Americans in Liberia and Somalia, and the French in Côte d'Ivoire. In reaction, some critics have stated that some peacekeeping missions have thus provided the opportunity for former colonial powers to interfere in the internal affairs of their former colonies, especially against unpopular governments, by motivating their actions by using the newly adopted controversial norms of intervention in international affairs, such as the concept of 'the responsibility to protect'. There is no doubt that such perception contributed to the attack on French peacekeepers in the Côte d'Ivoire in November 2004 (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:34).

In order to meet the implementation challenge of integrated and hybrid missions, UN-contributing states cannot continue their ad hoc, piecemeal and fragmented responses to complex emergencies by piecing together makeshift committees or teams for each new crisis. What is needed is an overall political framework and institutional base, backed by permanent staff for developing plans and procedures for integrated civil-military efforts. The current absence of any specific coordinating entity for reconstruction within Africa's peace and security architecture, for example, contributes to the clouding of priorities, the ineffective use of resources and their reactive nature of responses. As such, it would be useful to establish lead agencies that can provide clear strategic direction, and identify key gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities for responding to conflict and assisting with reconstruction. In order to improve integration, such agencies should be endowed with sufficient authority to bring together all the relevant military and civilian agencies when a crisis emerges. In this regard, the establishment of a standing civilian corps for reconstruction will require conducting an inventory of existing capabilities and support technologies or to determine human resource, organisational, and technical gaps for civilian reconstruction-related activities. Gaps for stability operations will invariably be addressed as Africa has many trained and experienced military peacekeepers, but very few civilian experts (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006b:3).

The AU has also acknowledged the requirement for improved integrated systems that are required between the military and civilian components involved in post-conflict reconstruction and development. During the 5<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Security in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 24–28 March 2008, the AU decided that a working group of experts should be appointed to, inter alia, consider "the need for appropriate terminology (to be used by the AU)

to reflect the multi-dimensional and multi-functional mechanisms, given that the expressions ‘Standby Force’ and ‘Standby Brigade’ have exclusive military connotations (AU, 2008:2).

#### **3.4.4. The African Standby Force**

In the light of the UN’s challenges to deal with all Africa’s security requirements, the UN and AU has begun to put its own security architecture in place in order to effectively deal with the conflict on the continent (Murithi, 2005:101). To this effect, it has established its own PSC as a collective mechanism to facilitate timely and quick responses to conflicts, as well as promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities (AU, 2004). In addition to the PSC, the AU also established the ASF in its goal to beef up its security apparatus. The creation and development of the ASF is the first initiative to establish a common approach and action plan for the development of an effective peacekeeping capacity in Africa. De Coning (2006:7) points out that: “this means that the various disparate donor initiatives to enhance Africa’s peacekeeping capacity can positively be channelled to support one coherent effort”. Despite all the shortcomings and problems experienced with the establishment of the ASF, it does, however, point to the fact that Africa has a comprehensive African Peace and Security Architecture in place.

The concept of the ASF entails that it shall be flexible and transparent in nature and that it would perform its functions in the context of preventative deployment and peacebuilding – including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation. The concept of the ASF prescribes that it should be structured to undertake the full spectrum of missions and tasks, ranging from observation and monitoring, to peace enforcement, as well as to contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. The fact that the foreseen tasks of the ASF included peacebuilding activities makes the concept of the ASF a useful conduit for the operationalisation of the concept of DPMs.

Despite good progress with the development of the overall concept of the ASF, the actual operationalisation of the ASF has proven to take longer than anticipated. The primary focus during the establishment of the ASF has been on military aspects of peace operations. One of the remaining key issues is the requirement to equally develop the civilian and police components of the ASF framework so that the multi-dimensional nature of complex peace missions can be integrated into the overall AU peacekeeping concept (De Coning, 2006:7). Initial progress with the operationalisation of the five regional brigades that should constitute the ASF, has



been slow. The major problem with many of the regional brigades is to get the required number of troop pledges from the various countries as well as getting together a regional military logistic depot. However, at the time of writing progress has been made in all the other regions on the continent in terms of the establishment of headquarters, ensuring that a continental planning element exists in each region, instituting Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between member states, setting up policy frameworks, having host nation agreements and having standby agreements between regional states.

During the 5<sup>th</sup> Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) and Heads of Security on the operationalisation of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) that was held at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 27<sup>th</sup> March 2008, progress with the operationalisation of the ASF was discussed. During the meeting, it was confirmed that the ASF draft policy documents on Doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures, Logistics, Training and Evaluation, Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence and Surveillance (C3IS) and related recommendations as proposed should be adopted. It was requested to convene meetings of Member States and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to review the policy documents by 2010. It was also decided that the additional documents formulated with respect to the ASF Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) and the Logistic Depot Study Reports should be accepted in principle and that the Commission should be requested in liaison with the RECs/RMs and Member States, to further continue developing these areas and submit proposals by 2010 (AU, 2008:1). It was confirmed that in the event of an intervention, the RDC would be part of the regional brigade that will deploy in advance, while the rest of the brigade would deploy as a follow-on force. It was also confirmed that in terms of logistical support, the initial concept of one continental depot and five regional depots should be retained, pending the outcome of further consultation on the issue with the RECs/RMs and Member States (AU, 2008:1).

Interestingly, it was decided that appropriate terminology should be introduced which would reflect the multi-dimensional and multi-functional mechanisms, given that the expressions 'Standby Force' and 'Standby Brigade' have exclusive military connotations. It was also stressed that the MSC's capacity and effectiveness should be enhanced as a critical advisory structure to the PSC. Member States concerned were urged to urgently take the necessary steps to be appropriately represented in the MSC by deploying Defence Attaches who should be actively involved in the evolving process to establish the ASF and offer assistance to the AU Commission in order to ensure African ownership. It was also recommended that reflection should be initiated on the composition of the MSC to reflect the multi-dimensional nature of

the ASF and peace support operations. It was also confirmed the ASF Training Plan of 2007 to 2010 would continue as planned (AU, 2008:2). It is clear that, although progress with the operationalisation of the ASF continues to be slow, progress is, however, still being made. While better training and coordination will definitely help to make ASF arrangements more effective, it is important to note that sub-regional arrangements remain highly dependent on the political will of African leaders themselves. Without new and locally funded innovative approaches, there is a risk that the continent will continue to limp from one crisis to the other. Millions of people will continue to die and suffer and subsequently, hundreds of billions of dollars will be required for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:37).

Resources and capacity constraints such as technological, financial, human, logistical and infrastructure have all impacted heavily on the AU's efforts to resolve conflict through regional and continental initiatives. This is primarily as a result of asymmetric political and political development of member states (DFA, 2007:11). Therefore, the consensus and capacity required to pursue a collective security mandate and execute effective responses to conflict is severely undermined. The AU must develop a strategy of financing its own operations and to develop the ASF capacity.

### **3.5. Between peacekeeping and peacebuilding: the reconstruction gap**

It has become evident that the initial response to conflict cannot rest solely on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but should also include a group of special civilian teams that can fast-track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other socio-economic institutions – even before peace agreements are brokered, break-down or potentially exacerbate more conflict (Gueli et al, 2006b:9). This 'peacekeeping-peacebuilding gap' results from, inter alia, slow mission build-up, prolonged military action, delayed civilian reconstruction build-up and few dedicated civilian reconstruction resources. It is evident that multi-national intervention in intra-state wars will involve considerable costs for those states that initiate the intervention, and that the intervention often impedes, rather than aids or expedites the process of domestic political reconstruction, which ultimately, provides the only long-term solution to the conflicts that precipitate the intervention (Clapham, 2000:212).

The AU, in its Draft Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) also states that experience has proven that in the early phases of transition from conflict to peace, "peace processes remain fragile and the risk of resumption of

violence high” (AU, 2006:2). This is because countries emerging from conflict are characterised by weakened or non-existent capacity at all levels, destroyed institutions and the absence of a democratic culture, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as widespread poverty. “In addition, responses to post-conflict situations have, in the past, remained fragmented and largely ineffectual” (AU, 2006:2). The AU’s policy framework goes beyond merely addressing the physical conflict that forms part of intra-state wars, noting that PCRD activities do not cease with stabilisation, but seek to achieve long-term sustainable development as underpinned by the vision for Africa’s Renaissance.

Gueli (2007:29) argues that the functional gap between military peacekeeping and civilian peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction has “received a lot of attention, because it remains a weakness in the policy framework of the United Nations (UN) conflict resolution repertoire, particularly in peace missions”. Experience has shown that “the window between the end of military action and the start of development is very narrow and that the first few months and weeks following an intervention are perhaps the more critical period for laying the ground work for peace and establishing the credibility of foreign forces” (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006a:14). To this effect, it is argued that the concept of DPMs provides a practical approach to effecting peacebuilding and to ultimately set the stage for nation-building and sustainable security and development. DPMs call for a more timely effort to bring security nearer to development – “the two veritable pillars of all UN peace missions – in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting longer-term state-building efforts” (Gueli et al, 2006c:3). However, although the notion of integrating civil-military resources at the earliest possible stages of a mission seems plausible, civilian reconstruction specialists are notably absent in peace missions (Gueli et al, 2006b:22). This results in the situation where the pace of reconstruction and development becomes very slow and a number post-conflict societies have relapsed into armed conflict, as there was no other alternative. This confirms the assumption that the response to conflict cannot solely be dependent on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but that it should also include groups of special civilian teams that can fast track the delivery of critical infrastructure and other socio-economic activities.

DPMs are focused on the realisation of the AU and NEPAD’s priorities. Firstly, it is believed that DPMs would work towards achieving sustainable political and economic development which will, furthermore, advance democracy, as well as regional integration and co-operation through the dismantling of exploitative war economies. Secondly, it is contended that DPMs will create a platform for policy

reforms and increased investment through the dismantling of war economies. This is primarily to be achieved through the development of an integrated development plan or framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (Neethling, 2005:56).

### **3.6. Concept of DPMs**

The concept of DPMs evolved from concepts such as peace operations, complex peace operations and multi-dimensional peacekeeping. The UN, in most cases, still uses the expression peace operations as a generic term that addresses the entire continuum of peace missions. This includes aspects such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding. Furthermore, the term complex peace operations refers to the inclusion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations into one mandate as authorised by the UNSC (UN, 1999:8). Despite the differences that exist in terms of what is understood with these concepts, they were/are all still based on a linear approach to peace missions – following an essentially phased approach in which peacekeeping must be concluded, before peacebuilding can commence.

However, those who support the concept of DPMs do not follow the traditional time-line in terms of the stages of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The concept of DPMs is defined as a post-conflict reconstruction intervention that aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development, which would ultimately result in the dismantling of war economies and conflict systems, and replacing them with globally competitive peace economies (Madlala-Routledge, 2004a:23). The concept of DPMs proposes that these stages be combined or integrated in order to address the non-linear and inter-related nature of complex emergencies, rather than being approached as separate, but related concepts of a linear process. On an operational level this means that post-conflict reconstruction interventions operate in synergy with peacekeeping and peace enforcement. According to Gueli et al (2006c:21), the application of a systems-approach to address conflict will enable decision-makers to effectively identify the most important activities and relationships in a manner that is useful for the development of policy to ensure sustainable development and peace on the African continent. This demands that the characteristic delay between security and development in UN and AU operations is diminished and that, in fact, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations should be collapsed and integrated into one mutually reinforcing process (Madlala-Routledge, 2004b:3).

DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction efforts as soon as possible, even when conflict is still continuing in some areas/regions of the theatre of operations, could contribute toward securing peace and obtaining long-term political order and sustained economic development (Gueli et al, 2006a:7). Solomon (2001:220) points out that the challenge for peacemakers is to “engage in peacemaking between belligerents while at the same time making efforts towards reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Although the prospect of rebuilding in the face of destructive forces might seem like a contradiction, the complex interaction between the diverse variables can make this possible”. Although the intention with the implementation of DPMs is essentially to ‘bring development closer to security’ and that this essentially implies the deployment of civilian peacebuilders and peace workers in the midst of conflict, it is clear that civilians cannot be expected to constantly operate in the face of ongoing violence. The cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to replace ad hoc institutions and approaches with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private agencies on board when a crisis emerges with a view to facilitating a greater depth of coordination between the diverse military and civilian agencies involved in a peace mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:19). Fundamentally, DPMs calls for an approach that entails quicker mobilisation of reconstruction and development resources and embarking on these initiatives parallel to and in unison with security efforts. The development of this type of capacity will require better inter-departmental cooperation and strong political leadership, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies (Gueli et al, 2006c:19). The concept of DPMs is thus intended to provide decision-makers with a framework in which the challenges related to the security-development nexus can be addressed simultaneously – thus decreasing the risk that a country would fall back into a protracted conflict situation.

It is clear that role-players and belligerents who have vested interests in the continuation of conflict and disorder, need to be effectively dealt with. However, to simply separate these actors through ceasefires is insufficient, as they often make use of global commodity markets to trade resources for weapons that in turn, are utilised to secure access to and control valuable commodities. “Possible courses of action, although these entail taking considerable risks, would be to recapture key commercial targets, deny warring parties access to their major sources of sustainability, as well as to capture or remove warlords. Of necessity, this level of outside coercion will involve much more than conventional military power, but also the active participation and tight integration of specialised military units, as well as intelligence and police services” (Gueli et al, 2006c:71).

Essentially, the concept of DPMs is rooted in the following assumptions (Gueli et al, 2006c:22):

- speed and momentum do matter in peace missions;
- effective peace missions require integrated efforts;
- security and development are intimately linked (however, the one is not necessarily a precursor for the other);
- launching development and reconstruction work as soon as possible (even when conflict is continuing) can be a major incentive for peace;
- the window of opportunity to avert a return to conflict is very narrow; and
- effective targeting of this 'window' or 'reconstruction gap' requires that civilian reconstruction experts deploy alongside security forces.

DPMs should therefore be defined not only as peace interventions, but in effect, as 'reconstruction interventions' that aim to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of initiatives by the military and civilian components that is aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development. An important feature of DPMs is that it does not distinguish between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as sequential processes, but that these processes should be executed simultaneously. This view implies that peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding are thus integrated into one process. This would mean that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers irrespective of the existence of cease-fire agreements (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:128). This implies that the military must establish a 'window of opportunity' for peacebuilding personnel in environments where the mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth. For civilians, it implies taking risks in order to ensure the provision of basic services and repair damage to critical infrastructure at the earliest possible stages of the mission – thus enhancing the overall credibility, legitimacy and sustainability of the mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:9).

The military component of peace missions should thus be augmented with civilian reconstruction elements as early as possible. The concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for civil-military operations that bridge the traditional 'gap' between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention and resolution. Colonel Garland Williams, who commanded a US Army Engineering Battalion in Kosovo and helped to direct NATO reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, argues that the 'reconstruction gap' that is sometimes experienced between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases of the peace mission, often leads to renewed outbreaks of violence among

belligerents. He emphasises the notion that “all efforts should be made to blitz the country’s infrastructure repair and reconstruction efforts sooner rather than later during peace missions” (Williams, 2005:xiii). Failure to do so will lengthen the deployment times of peacekeepers, and will mean that the international community’s efforts will continue to be reactive rather than preventive.

The underlying causes of conflict are complex. In answer to this, DPMs can be utilised, in theory, to establish sustainable human development through the integrated application of security and developmental efforts. As a result, after the military intervention, right after the cessation of hostilities in a protracted conflict, a peace support operation’s host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position: not only must it reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it must also rebuild much of its basic infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict: roads must be rebuilt, public utilities must be restored and land mines must be removed. If these issues are not effectively addressed, such a chaotic situation can easily sustain the conditions and garner resentments that led to the conflict in the first place.

However, although the theoretical foundation of the concept of DPMs is easy to understand, it remains very difficult to implement: the maintenance of safe and secure environments for peacebuilding cannot solely rest on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but should also include civilian experts that can fast-track the reconstruction of essential services and ensure a seamless transition from short-term responses to long-term assistance. According to Gueli et al (2006c:3), what distinguishes this sort of civilian capacity from humanitarian aid is that it begins immediately at the cessation of major combat operations, and it goes beyond saving lives to providing the foundation of reconstruction.

The above coincides with the view of the former UNSG, Kofi Annan, who noted in 1998 that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be simultaneous activities used in combination, and as complements to one another (Annan, 1998:8). This is why it is essential to have a multi-lateral systems-approach towards solving conflict, which will contribute to more integrated and co-ordinated actions in establishing peace. This notion is supported by Barungi and Mbugua (2005:31) who point out that “experience from across Africa show that there is a need to broaden the intervention strategy from peacekeeping and security agreements to Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) activities that address the root causes of conflict, confidence-building measures between divided parties and people, and changing the pervasive culture of violence and conflict”.

According to Gueli et al (2006c:31), several specific issues need to be addressed in order to effectively conduct DPMs:

- the ability and feasibility of embedding systems-thinking methods, tools and techniques in the policy arenas in order to develop viable and sustainable responses to conflict, specifically the need to model and simulate conflict as part of an integrated decision-support system;
- translating a systems-based understanding of conflict into a strategic framework, policies, doctrine and appropriate structures;
- identifying and mobilising the technical implementation requirements relating to funding, institutional structures, skills, capacity and interoperability;
- mobilisation of support for the implementation of DPMs interventions by the international community with special reference to the UN, AU and other regional structures;
- providing the means to accelerate short-term capacity-building, service delivery, equitable re-distribution of natural resources in accordance with long-term development goals in an unstable, volatile and non-consensual environment;
- the feasibility of deploying civilian reconstruction capacity alongside the military forces in hostile environments;
- operationalise development approaches into security efforts in such a way as to advance the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals;
- defining the requirements of a suitable conflict transformation, conflict termination and exit strategies; and
- accurately assess Africa's capacity to implement DPMs in support of its own strategic objectives.

The above-mentioned issues are all very complex and diverse, and it has become evident that the only manner in which these issues can be integrated and executed in a meaningful way, is to apply a systems-thinking approach by means of which all the aspects can be integrated in a meaningful way.

The rationale for the adoption of a DPMs approach is that it would replace existing ad hoc institutions and disjointed approaches with a permanent capacity that is endowed with sufficient authority to bring all the relevant public and private agencies, including the military, on board and under control when a crises emerges. DPMs can effectively be utilised to attain greater depth of co-ordination between diverse military and civilian agencies involved in peace missions (Gueli et al, 2006c:1). The development of this sort of capacity will require better inter-



departmental cooperation and strong political leadership, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies. The notion of more active involvement by the private sector in reconstruction activities during peace missions was also confirmed in a report by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), in which they assessed the trends and challenges of multidimensional and integrated peace operations. This report stresses the fact that the private sector in Africa should take proactive stance on providing critical infrastructure and enhancing service delivery in conflict affected states. In this regard, “the development of a private-public partnership is critical for the realisation of developmental peacebuilding” (DFA, 2007:11).

### **3.7. DPMs and a systems-thinking approach**

DPMs as a concept, as modern conventional operations, strongly draws on systems-thinking for its conceptual base and utilises systems-thinking tools and techniques to identify and understand the underlying structure and framework of conflict (Gueli et al, 2006c:21). De Coning (2002:46) argues that conflict systems continue to change and adapt to the geo-political environment and economic context within which they are grounded. Thus, “by studying the changes that occur in the conflict systems that we try to influence, and by analysing the international trends in conflict resolution and peacekeeping which occur in response to these changes in the conflict systems, we should be able to extrapolate some major trends and issues that could shape the path that African peacekeeping may take in the near future” (De Coning, 2002:46). However, as far as identifying and understanding the root causes of conflict are concerned, there is surprisingly little consensus on what the causes and conditions are. As a result, it is extremely difficult to plan and implement a peacekeeping capacity-building programme in Africa, where nobody can say for sure what kind of capacity we need, and how or where we will need it. Holsti (1998:5) purports “that the reason for this (limited understanding) could be ascribed to the fact that there is a disturbing lack of integrative knowledge on the subject of conflict”. As a result, academics from various disciplinary boundaries have attempted to understand conflict by studying isolated events and their causes that usually arise in situations of conflict, without trying to examine how the mutual interactions between events actually create the ideal conditions for, and determine the nature of conflict (Gueli et al, 2006c:20). This results in a situation where contradictory and sometimes mutually exclusive conflict theories have been proposed. Many of these theories are still based on current UN conflict resolution approaches that usually focus on responding to the symptomatic, more obvious problems of conflict, and solving these events in a linear or sequential and compartmentalised manner, for example, focusing on security efforts, followed by developmental initiatives (Porto, 2002:1).

De Coning (2002:50) points out that there has been a growing realisation that multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations should be understood as complex systems. All the mission components are inter-connected and interact with each other and outside elements, in a complex relationship in order to achieve the overall objective. "All functions overlap in time and space, so that the actual activities of a modern multi-dimensional peace operation will have, in varying degrees, tasks that represent activities such as preventative diplomacy (conflict prevention), negotiations (peacemaking), stabilisation and security operations, humanitarian relief, disarmament, demobilisation, de-mining, electoral assistance, civilian police assistance, human rights monitoring, and reconstruction and development assistance programmes (peacebuilding). These activities all combine, interact and influence each other in self-organising patterns that are typical of any complex system" (De Coning, 2002:50).

Furthermore, systems-thinking in terms of conflict resolution initiatives is based on the argument that symptomatic solutions to conflict tend to have only short-term benefits at best. This can be ascribed to the fact that, by merely identifying the symptoms of conflict, rather than analysing the fundamental root causes of the conflict, the chances of finding lasting solutions to conflict are significantly diminished. According to Gueli et al (2006c:20), the systems-thinking approach underscores that to impose artificial linear solutions to a complex social problem such as conflict, ignores the reality that conflict is created by a multitude of interdependent and interweaving forces. As a result, management tools and techniques that rely on conventional methods of analysis are thus of limited use in complex and seemingly unpredictable conflict environments (Gueli et al, 2006c:21). Consequently, peace mission campaign plans should not be approached as a linear or binary progression of actions aimed at reaching an end state as defined by time. Rather, it should be viewed as an intervention that is aimed at influencing a system that is developed around a set of multi-dimensional benchmarks, which monitor the conflict system across the spectrum (De Coning, 2002:50). In addition, feedback mechanisms need to be established in order to carefully monitor progress, both across the spectrum and at the overall system level. In so doing, the intervention can be continuously adjusted according to the changes within the conflict system. A systems-thinking approach to understanding the complex and non-linear processes of conflict therefore provides for new tools, analytical methods and concepts such as DPMs to effectively address conflict.

The concept of DPMs proposes to do just that – in bringing significant changes to the methodology and processes that are currently used to plan and conduct peace

operations, as DPMs are based on a systems-approach in which many stages and processes are integrated and simultaneously executed (Gueli et al, 2006b:22). In this regard, the concept of DPMs suggests that peacekeepers and peacebuilders deploy simultaneously at the onset of a mission. This assumption forms the basis for the concept of DPMs and is in accordance with South Africa's current White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions, tabled in Parliament on 24 February 1999.

### **3.8. UN Complex Peace Operations Model, the IMPP and DPMs**

Significant changes have recently taken place in terms of the UN approach to peace missions and one of the solutions is to have a more integrated approach in terms of the planning processes pertaining to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In order to manage the inter-relationships among the diverse range of functions pertaining to peacekeeping and peacebuilding more effectively, the UN developed the Integrated Missions Model (IMM) that is essentially aimed at enhancing the coherence between the UN Country Team that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peacekeeping operation, that is essentially peace and security focused (De Coning, 2006:4). The current missions in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Southern Sudan all have Integrated Mission management structures (De Coning, 2006:4). This more integrated approach has been encapsulated in the UN IMPP as part of a broader UN peacebuilding strategy in the form of guidelines that were endorsed by the UNSG on 13 June 2006. These guidelines serve to promote a more comprehensive and inclusive UN systems-approach to the planning of integrated peace support operations (hereafter called 'integrated missions'). However, while structural reforms have been made, and approaches to and processes of peace missions have been altered to accommodate integrated planning processes, these reforms still do not explicitly explain how and when to integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding on 'grass roots' level – thus how to effectively address the military-civilian interface on the execution level.

In view of this, the concept of DPMs, proposes a way for policy-makers to effectively organise, plan and co-ordinate the integration of civil-military operations that bridge the traditional gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as to mainstream development principles into conflict prevention and resolution (Gueli et al, 2006d:4). It is important to note that the concept of "integration" as it relates to peace missions, is aimed at planning processes, and not focused on the integration of the actions by the various role-players during the execution of their respective tasks on tactical level. Malan (2007:3) points out that the role and functions of humanitarian organisations should not include humanitarianism within the scope of

the military strategy. He argues that humanitarian aid boils down to far more than the mere provision of basic human resources. Humanitarian aid should be provided in the true spirit of humanitarianism: adhering to the “‘core principles’ of humanitarianism – humanity, impartiality and independence and that these should be used to guard against the use of humanitarian assistance to induce compliance with political demands, and upholding the principles demands constant vigilance against cooptation of the language of humanitarianism by political and military actors” (Malan, 2007:3). In light of the above, it is important to note that there should be a clear differentiation in terms of the line-functions of the respective humanitarian, political and military role-players on the tactical or execution level.

However, in many instances, humanitarian interventions are called for as a direct result of the crises that were created by the failures of political actors. As result of the complex nature of these crises, it will essentially require the combined efforts of the military, political and humanitarian role-players to solve the problem. Malan (2007:3) argues that not many scholars and observers would contest the need for these three components to collaborate in the field. However, he also points out that the differences in philosophy and operational priorities mean that these three types of responses do not naturally co-exist. He concludes: “there can at best be good liaison and perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military actors – but not integration. Even within UN peace operations, which are reliant on relatively weak voluntary troop contributions, there has been stiff resistance from humanitarians to the concept of ‘integrated missions’ in the field” (Malan, 2007:3). The term ‘integration’ as far as peace missions are concerned, should therefore be understood in terms of planning processes, and not in terms of the execution of tasks in the field by the respective role-players.

The UN developed the IMPP as part of a broader UN peacebuilding strategy (UNSG’s Guidelines on Integrated Missions, 2006). The UN adopted the IMPP as the “authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes” (UN, 2006:K-2). Following the endorsement of the UN IMPP Guidelines by the UNSC on 13 June 2006, the Draft ASF Doctrine Handbook (Chapter 7) was presented. This chapter encompasses the *Planning of Multi-dimensional Peace Support Operations for the AU*, which has drawn extensively on the existing UN IMPP Guidelines. The IMPP is presented as a process by means of which structure is derived from an in-depth understanding of the specific country setting, of the evolving imperatives facing the security, political, humanitarian and development pillars in that particular country, and of the particular mix of assets and capacities available and/or required to achieve the desired impact

(UN, 2006:K-3). The UNSG's IMPP Guidelines noted that: "integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding, political development, humanitarian aid, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects into a coherent support strategy" (UN, 2006). An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.

The IMPP approach is in line with the UN's current IMM, and is more focused on fusing the planning of security and development efforts by military and civilian elements from the start of a mission, rather than only shifting the focus to peacebuilding and post-conflict environments during the later stages of a mission as was the pattern when utilising the IMM. This process is directly in line with the aims of and approach to DPMs. The IMPP can thus very effectively be applied to plan DPMs in bringing security closer to development, as the IMPP aims to ensure that the right people are at the table, that the right issues are being considered, and that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate flexible, creative and integrated strategic and operational thinking and planning (UN, 2006:K-2). The IMPP thus promotes simultaneity and integration of planning processes and role-players (military and civilian) right from the start of a mission, thus meeting one of the key prerequisites of effectively implementing DPMs. The IMPP also addresses security and development issues in an inter-related and contextually relevant way – as opposed to a primarily sequential, sectorised approach that has been applied in terms of the UN's earlier Complex Peace Operations Model (Midlarsky, 1997:1).

De Coning (2006:5) points out that, as is the case with most new innovations, the adoption of the IMPP has not been without its detractors. There are still various technical, administrative, organisational and budgetary challenges that need to be resolved, before all the aspects of the model can be fully implemented.

Earlier peace mission planning processes proved that there was, generally, a lack of strategic vision, and that planning occurred along functional 'stovepipes', which in turn lead to potential contradictions. The lack of awareness of specific processes lead to partial application and there was no common approach between missions, that all the role-players were not included and that there was insufficient information and data on the situation in the battle space (UN, 2006:K-2).

The current IMPP is guided by specific planning principles and assumptions and requires the full engagement of the key UN actors, both at headquarters and the country level, as well as consultations with the national authorities and other relevant external actors. However, it is emphasised that the IMPP should be implemented in a flexible manner, taking into account varying circumstances and timeframes, while ensuring that adequate planning standards, outputs and the key decisions points are respected. The IMPP proposes differentiated time frames for each level and provides for the fact that planning according to minimum timeframes necessarily involves tradeoffs (UN, 2006:K-2).

It is evident that planning for integrated missions must be inclusive from the outset and that both the process and mission structures must be effectively established so as to avoid the ad hoc approach of the past and ensure that system-wide strategic objectives are clearly established and supported by the functional planning of the respective mission and UN components (UN, 2006:K-3). The development of the IMPP that is focused on the concept of the integration of processes and activities is the result of a realisation that, when responding to conflict, speed and momentum do matter in peace missions and that effective missions require integrated efforts, and not separate tracks that do not converge (Gueli et al, 2006c:1).

The integration and coordination of processes and approaches towards the resolution of conflict and the streamlining of different national interests into a common and cohesive strategy shared by all the countries involved, remains a major challenge for political and military role-players working for conflict management, especially in the regional context (DFA, 1999:9). Hence, coordination of different national interests and their synthesis into a common strategy by all countries concerned are imperative (Williams, 1999:15). This interface between political and military affairs also emphasises the importance of clear mandates and rules of engagement.

### **3.9. DPMs and the security-development nexus**

Current peacekeeping approaches are characterised by extended time lapses before developmental and peacebuilding interventions can be implemented in war torn zones. This leads to an inadequate capacity to dismantle war economies, as well as an inability to absorb ex-combatants and to destroy conflict systems (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:127). The result is a concept that is based on the premise that security can only achieve permanent benefit if its vital development and peacebuilding activities are rolled-out within a reasonable time. By reasonable, is understood the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and

reconstruction capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e. the one activity must be applied without losing sight of the other) (Gueli et al, 2006c:1).

The underlying causes of conflict are so complex, that the alternative approach of DPMs provides, as a concept, sustainable human development through the integrated application of security and developmental efforts. As a result, after the military intervention, right after the cessation of hostilities in a protracted conflict, a peace support operation's host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position: not only must it reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it must also rebuild much of its basic infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict: roads must be rebuilt, public utilities must be restored and land mines must be removed (Gueli et al, 2006c:18). Otherwise, such a chaotic situation can easily sustain the conditions and garner resentments that led to the conflict in the first place. In addition, military forces are often repeatedly deployed in peace operations, usually with a UN mandate, to put an end to hostilities, but are then retained in the theatre of operations for an indeterminate amount of time without a clear exit strategy and without a clear mandate to execute peace-operation tasks other than that of providing security and stability. There is usually no well-established strategy to make the transition quickly from the military's peacemaking and peacekeeping mission to civilian IGOs and NGOs longer-term mission of peacebuilding – that is fortifying a post-conflict society's institutions to prevent it from lapsing back into conflict – and reconstructing a war-torn nation.

Omar Bakhet, the Director of the UNDP's Emergency Response Division, commented that: "UN efforts in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone all demonstrate the clear need to integrate development into peace operations from early on" (Bakhet, 2001:14). Bakhet emphasises the fact that development is the key building block that is required to consolidate and build lasting peace. In a similar vein, the former South African Deputy-Minister of Defence, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, has been contending since 1999 that conflict in Africa is ultimately a failure of development, and that a solution to conflict fundamentally requires a developmental approach. Madlala-Routledge argues that the UN's preoccupation with establishing the military security of a war-torn country is currently being overplayed, whereas it should in fact run concurrently with an equally vital aspect of an overall peace plan, which is the commitment to human security (Madlala-Routledge, 2004a:2).

### **3.10. Critical success factors for DPMs**

The following factors can be viewed as critical success factors for the successful implementation of DPMs:

- the planning processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other;
- development and security imperatives should be fused into a holistic systems-approach to effectively deal with the full range of inter-related issues that threaten peace and security;
- the window of opportunity or 'reconstruction gap' between peacekeeping/military action and development work is very narrow and, as a result, the first few weeks after the signing of a ceasefire agreement is the most critical period for creating an environment that is conducive for establishing a sustainable peace;
- it is essential for all role-players to establish a clear understanding of the reinforcing processes that originally gave rise to the conflict in order to effectively address the processes that would sustain the conflict;
- the various stakeholders and role-players that are involved in a mission must plan and work together under a common strategic framework;
- lead agencies that can provide clear strategic direction and identify gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities for responding to conflict and assisting with reconstruction must be established (Gueli and Liebenberg, 2006b:23); and
- lead agencies should be endowed with sufficient authority to bring together and task all the relevant military and civilian agencies when a crisis emerges.

### **3.11. Challenges for the successful implementation of DPMs**

The UN, following the findings of the Brahimi Report has gradually begun to explore the possibility and advantages of incorporating peacebuilding work into peacekeeping operations as a way to address the root causes of the conflict during the early stages of a complex peace operations. The Brahimi Report recommends that future complex peace operations should include, amongst others: 'quick impact projects' and initial work on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes into peacekeeping operations (UN, 2000:4). Both are intended to demonstrate immediate results and improve the credibility of a new mission, strengthen the capacity for peacebuilding and to serve as a basis to attract humanitarian, development and reconstruction workers (UN, 2000:5). The greatest



challenges with these initiatives are that they rely on voluntary contributions that are to be completed and essentially pursued as ‘quick-fix’ strategies – that is, they are not designed to form part of a larger framework for long-term development and reconstruction (Gueli et al, 2006c:17).

What has become clear in terms of effective reconstruction and development initiatives is that the divide between budgeted and voluntary contributions for DDR and other peace initiatives continues to be an impediment to the seamless support that is needed to move from ‘disarmament and demobilisation’ to ‘reconstruction’. Both reconstruction and nation-building are essentially long-term and very expensive processes (Gueli et al, 2006c:17). The availability of funding for DPMs will thus be one of the key determinants of the successes of peace missions. Furthermore, in the face of the continuing availability of lucrative resources, the success of reconstruction may depend on the provision of new forms of civilian economic opportunity and supporting programmes so that the temptations to continue participation in the war economy can be undercut. “This means that the standard donor proactive of treating ‘Disarmament and Demobilisation programmes’ in peacekeeping as prior to ‘Reconstruction Programmes’ in peacebuilding should be collapsed into mutually reinforcing processes and introduced at the earliest possible stages of a mission” (Gueli et al, 2006c:18).

In answer to all these challenges, the UN has embarked on a process of reviewing the processes as prescribed in the UN Complex Peace Operations Model. A study, commissioned by the UN, entitled, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, proposes that developmental work should be embedded at the start of peacekeeping, and that long-term success of peacebuilding is dependent on effective developmental initiatives implemented at the start of operations (Eide et al, 2005:52).

In addition to the lack of efficient processes to effectively address the multiple challenges that are associated with complex emergencies, the greatest other challenge is the lack of resources and funds. The Economic Community of West African States Mission to Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), for instance, provided valuable lessons in terms of other aspects of peace missions, specifically in the fields of logistics and financial support. According to Gberie and Addo (2004:33), there was a great deal of financial uncertainty, and there was a total absence of an integrated logistic plan for the mission. The Force Commander of ECOMICI did not have any control over the future of the mission’s finances, and he was sometimes compelled to operate without any fund for periods up to two months. The lack of integrated logistic support resulted in a laborious build-up of the force, which had to be stopped

on several occasions to get the communication equipment operational and to wait for the arrival of more radios from France. There was also incoherence in force generation and donor support. ECOMICI, for instance, had to wait for the contingent from Benin, who was in turn waiting for the Belgians to provide the logistics support it had had promised.

The ECOMICI experience clearly points to the fact that the lack of a proper and well-integrated logistics system was a major hurdle to successful operations. It also identified deficiencies in the chain of command and emphasised the problems created by language barriers. It was evident that ECOMICI could not be deployed and sustained without adequate visibility for its financing and a proper command structure to give the necessary directive and guidance, as well as to carry out its responsibilities for mission management. It was found that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as the regional co-ordinating mechanism, should generate its own mission planning and management capabilities and that it should encourage troop contributing countries to deploy with their own equipment by signing MOUs in terms of scales of equipment and reimbursement rates as per the UN. It was also suggested that ECOWAS should encourage the future development of joint training at operational and tactical levels, and that future missions should have only one finance cell, which would be manned by finance officers from ECOWAS and the respective donor countries (Gbrie and Addo, 2004:33). Gueli and Liebenberg also suggest the establishment of a central finance cell in their arguments on DPMs (Gueli et al, 2006b:27).

This dependence on donor support from developed countries will continuously have great impact on the time – and logistics planning processes of African peace missions. Malan (2000:179) points out that “in the absence of a well-funded, vibrant and internationally focused civil society in Africa, the bulk of the ‘civilian component’ and finances of multi-national peace missions in Africa will continue to be provided by the North”. The key role players in respect of humanitarian assistance, human rights action, and economic and social action are not national or regional actors from Africa or the South, but IGOs and NGOs from the northern hemisphere (Malan, 2000:179).

The reality is that “African peacekeeping will remain under-funded, and that the functional devolution by the UN will fail to be matched by resource devolution” (Malan, 2000:179). African peacekeepers will thus have to be trained to be able to perform their tasks with limited resources and accept the reality that the prospects for improved resource availability for future peace missions are limited. In order to improve the chances for successful African peace missions by African peacekeepers,

there is a clear need to establish common ground and principles to ensure that all the role-players in the region are moving in the same direction in regard to their approach to peace missions – if only in terms of the military component's contribution to DPMs.

The civilian component of peace mission should be strengthened to improve rapid response capabilities. In this regard, the UNDPKO is currently exploiting ways of improving in-house rapid deployment for mission start-up and reconstruction, *inter alia* through the development roster of approximately 1 000 to 1 500 career officials that would provide the UNDPKO with a reliable pool of experienced personnel, able to deploy at short notice to fill core mission positions. The drive for improved rapid deployment also includes attempts to draw experts from member states and agencies to complement UN staff in the field. The need for civilians to match military capability and deployment in time should be accompanied by the need to correctly sequence and synergise military and civilian tasks. Different agencies and institutions will invariably play different roles and take priority across the spectrum of conflict. The armed forces would, for instance, play the required role in providing initial security and as the security situation improves, civilian agencies will progressively move to the forefront of the reconstruction process.

### **3.12. Conclusions**

It has become evident that the high failure rate of international peace interventions demands a redefinition of current peace operations practices and approaches. In response to the limited successes achieved with the traditional approach to UN peace missions in Africa, the concept of DPMs is presented as an alternative (African) paradigm that aims to ensure that future peace operations on the continent are implemented in an effective and sustainable manner. This ultimately implies that the planning processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding should be integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is implemented in a phased and linear fashion. It ultimately implies the adoption of a systems-thinking approach to address the inter-related problems experienced by war-torn states during complex emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding simultaneously.

Despite the general realisation that, in terms of peace operations, security can no longer be regarded as a precursor for development, the need to efficiently link security and development as twin imperatives through integrated policies and programmes from the start of peace operations, are still to be formalised by the

various role-players (Gueli et al, 2006b:55). Security can only achieve permanent benefit if early and well-placed socio-economic resources are available within reasonable time. Despite this realisation, very limited in-roads have been made in explicitly formalising the methods of fusing developmental initiatives with security efforts in order to deal holistically and simultaneously with the full range of inter-related issues that threaten peace and security.

It is not possible to determine exact time scales for the duration of developmental assistance and peacebuilding, as the duration of development initiatives will depend on the nature of each specific crisis. However, experience has shown that the window between military action and development work, i.e. the 'reconstruction gap', is very narrow and that the first few weeks after a ceasefire agreement are perhaps the most critical period for establishing a sustainable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers (Gueli et al, 2006c:6). Furthermore, credibility and political momentum that is lost during this short period is usually difficult to regain.

The DPMs approach rests on an in-depth systems-analysis of the inter-related issues of conflict (including both military and human security) in the target-region in order to determine its underlying structural source and logic. This requires a clear understanding of the reinforcing processes that originally gave rise to the conflict and the balancing of the processes that sustain it. Understanding conflict through a systems-paradigm can thus assist decision-makers to determine what needs to be done, by whom, how and when during a mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:22). The complex challenges posed by violent conflicts in Africa furthermore require a high level of policy coordination. Coordination is necessary to ensure a clear division of labour, to set priorities and requirements, as well as to develop platforms of principles to guide planning and implementation activities. Coordination is also critical to establish a shared strategic vision among military and civilian planners, which in turn, is essential to ensure unity of efforts.

Of utmost importance, is the fact that the various stake-holders and role players involved a mission, must plan and work together under a common strategic framework to ensure that combined security and developmental efforts are started as soon as possible, and that these efforts form part of a larger framework for long-term developments and reconstruction. In order to achieve this, the AU should work for the entrenchment of a developmental peace doctrine and PCRD that would contribute to the reconstruction of the African continent. There is thus a need for effective coordination in hybrid arrangements, especially those involving a division of labour such as the AU and its international partners at strategic and operational levels. This approach is focused on fusing security and development efforts

throughout the course of a mission and on addressing the security-development nexus in an inter-related and contextually relevant way.

The development of a group of civilian ‘first-responders’ will be crucial for planning as they will be able to inject greater ‘grassroots reality’ into needs assessments or resource requirements. One of the key tasks of this group will be to determine the length of the time interval between initial military response and full-scale developmental assistance. In the event that the interval between the two aspects is too short, the lives of civilian reconstruction teams could be placed in severe danger; if the interval between the military response and developmental activities is too long, the benefits that could be derived from the initial military response, could be negated.

Gueli et al (2006c:4) concludes that the cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to replace existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in government with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private entities (including the military) on board and under control when a crises emerges, and with a view to facilitating a greater depth of planning and coordination between the military and civilian components of a mission. The development of this sort of capacity will require, among others, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies, and reversing the underplayed role and untapped potential that (South African) universities, science councils, and other centres of excellence can bring to address the complex challenges posed by reconstruction and development in war-torn regions or states.

Against this background, the peace interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC will be explored to determine whether and under which circumstances the concept of DPMs could successfully be implemented during peace missions to improve the chances of establishing lasting peace and sustainable development.

## **CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPORARY PEACE MISSIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: KOSOVO**

### **4.1. Introduction**

During a plenary session of the International Commission on Kosovo that took place in Johannesburg in 2000, Judge Richard Goldstone stated that “in a world sadly inured to incidents of gross human rights violations, and accustomed to the various reactions of righteous governments and hamstrung IGOs, it is seldom that a single event should spark worldwide debate and polarise international opinion. The 1999 military intervention by the NATO in Kosovo in response to serious human rights violations, was one of these rare occurrences” (Goldstone, 2001:vii).

The arrival of the international administration in Kosovo was a historic opportunity in which newly formulated international ideas about reconstruction and stabilisation of post-war societies were tested for the first time (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:26). The simultaneous deployment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) emphasised the shift away from the traditional linear approach to UN peace missions, as peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities were carried out simultaneously, and not sequentially. A high premium was placed on efforts to ensure that the international civil and security components in Kosovo acted in a fully integrated manner in order to focus their efforts towards the achievement of a single goal – setting the scene for sustainable peace and development in Kosovo. In other words, the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was conducted in accordance with the new approach to UN peace missions that was adopted in the early 1990’s in which peacebuilding is brought ‘closer’ to peacekeeping – thus effectively addressing the reconstruction gap that is so often presented as the cause or the reason for the relapse into violence in states that have been plagued by intra-state conflicts. The jury is still out in terms of the successes, failures, justification and legality of the intervention and these uncertainties have generated fierce disputes among political figures, military leaders and academics. Furthermore, the political issue of Kosovo’s independence have not been resolved, and this situation was exacerbated by Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008. What is, however, very clear, is the fact that the events in Kosovo “ushered in a sea-change in the arena of humanitarian intervention” (Goldstone, 2001:vii).

The NATO intervention in Kosovo was significant in many ways and one of the key issues highlighted as a result of the intervention, is the issue of state sovereignty and the conditions or circumstances that would legitimise a humanitarian intervention

within the borders of a sovereign state. According to Sidiropoulos (2001:xi), the NATO campaign against Serbia in March 1999, casted a dramatic spotlight on the tension between respect for state sovereignty and the international trend towards intolerance of human rights violations. The absence of a legitimating UN mandate for the NATO operations in Kosovo raised the concern that militarily and economically powerful states could take arbitrary action against smaller and weaker states without obtaining the required UN mandate prior to an intervention.

These events must be viewed against the introduction of a new dimension to the responsibility of the international community to intervene in internal conflicts involving gross violations of human rights which threatens to generate wider instability or unacceptable human suffering (Muguruza, 2003:238). The decision to intervene in Kosovo highlighted questions regarding sovereignty, mandates, rules of engagement, force levels and the need for robust UN international peacekeeping. The UNSC, in a series of resolutions that were adopted since 1991, based on the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as set out in Article 24 of the UN Charter, has clearly recognised that massive and systematic breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law constitute threats to international peace and security and therefore demand its attention and action (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). As a consequence of this development, humanitarian interventions, instead of being a matter of self-help by states as it was during the Cold War, is now mainly a collective response with the purpose of implementing UNSC Resolutions. Ultimately, 'intervention' is no longer understood to refer only to the use of force, but it is now more about considering what kind of intervention is required and determining the relationships between humanitarian assistance, military intervention, rehabilitation and reconstruction (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996:70). This closer connection between humanitarian crises and threats to international peace and security points to the phenomenon that static non-intervention norms seem to be giving way before the new international consensus whereby minimum humanitarian standards within states would be enforced by the international community. This development opens the way to view state sovereignty as a matter of responsibility and not just power (Annan, 1999b:57).

Another key issue that came to the fore was the role that regional organisations should play in supporting humanitarian interventions in member states. In the case of Kosovo, a number of bilateral and regional initiatives, such as the Kinkel-Vedrine Initiative of November 1997 and the Turkey-inspired initiative to create a Multinational Rapid Intervention Force were also agreed upon (Wolff, 2003:79). Individually, the governments of Russia, the USA, and, to a lesser degree, Germany,

Italy and Greece all played a part in the international community's response to the evolving and subsequently escalating conflict in Kosovo. What has become evident, is that as long as UN standards and rules of engagement are followed in terms of how and when to intervene in humanitarian crises, regional organisations and groups of states or even single states have a crucial role to play in the provision of security.

Ultimately, when analysing the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, the questions remain: Why is the Kosovo War important? What are the experiences gained regarding the military component's role and function during humanitarian interventions, and how did the Kosovo war impact on the roles of regional and IGOs during humanitarian interventions? Furthermore, what experiences have been gained from Kosovo, specifically in terms of the implementation of the concept of DPMs, by simultaneously conducting peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding activities, and how do these questions' significance transcend the case of Kosovo?

The simultaneous execution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in Kosovo, was one of the primary reasons why the intervention in Kosovo was chosen as a case study for assessing the feasibility of successfully implementing the concept of DPMs – which is based on the integration and simultaneous execution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. The aim of this chapter is thus to analyse the approach to and nature of the intervention, as well as to assess the results and impact of the international response to the crisis in Kosovo. The analysis also addresses the course of events that led up to the intervention that took place in Kosovo, as well as an analysis of the experiences gained from the intervention that could be used to inform future peace missions – specifically in terms of the feasibility and requirements for successfully implementing the concept of DPMs during humanitarian or peace interventions.

#### **4.2. The background to the conflict and NATO intervention**

Kosovo is a territory with a long history of contested and ambiguous status, and a history of coexistence – sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent – between a variety of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups of people (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:7). The territory of Kosovo covers an area of about 11 000 square km with a population of 2 million. The ethnic composition of the population is made up of 88% Albanian, 7 % Serb and 5 % others, mainly Slavic Muslim (1,9%), Roma (1,7%) and Turkish (1%). Over 60% of the population live in rural areas (World Bank, 2005).

The widespread conflict that erupted in Kosovo during the 1990s caught many of the primary role-players in Europe, as well as the international community, off-guard.



Although the confrontation between the Albanian leadership and the Serbian regime had been simmering throughout the 1990's, most Western policy-makers were caught unprepared when the conflict erupted (Troebst, 2003:xiii).

The decision to intervene in the conflict or not, was thrust upon Western decision-makers in 1998 when the escalating conflict between the Yugoslav security forces (Serbs) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Albanian) threatened to develop into a full-fledged war. This escalation opened the window of opportunity for international mediation, but Kosovo's neighbours, as well as the rest of the international community, was slow to take the initiative. When the EU failed to act upon the urgent appeal by the European Parliament of 18 April 1996 to open a permanent office in Pristina, the USA did. Various other international role-players, (Russia, France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain) subsequently indicated that they were also prepared to intervene, as the American involvement in the mediation process raised the stakes for other Western governments (Troebst, 2003:xiii).

Despite the momentum that had been brought about by the beginning of the internationalisation of the conflict, the international community did not follow up the momentum by means of any action for more than a year. Instead, the diplomatic formula of 'deep concern' was coined and stereotypically repeated. Many political commentators remarked that 'concern is not a policy' and when the situation escalated again in the fall of 1997, it was too late for therapeutic conflict intervention or any type of conflict prevention at all (International Helsinki Federation, 1998:3). "By early 1998, both sides to the conflict were determined to solve it by violent means. The relatively low intensity war of 1998 "turned out to be the '1<sup>st</sup> Act' of a much fiercer 'Act Two' in 1999 when both sides applied an all-or-nothing strategy: Slobodan Milosevic supported the total ethnic cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo, whilst the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) applied the high risk tactic of provoking a superior military adversary to over-react: which would subsequently trigger international outrage and military intervention on their behalf" (Troebst, 2003:xiii). This strategy proved to be successful – some 10 000 civilians and combatants were killed and up to 900 000 Kosovar Albanians were temporarily displaced (Troebst, 2003:xiv).

#### **4.2.1. Reasons for the conflict: A Serbian perspective**

The crisis in Kosovo was rooted in a centuries-long history of Balkan strife. The Serbs settled in Kosovo during the 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> century (Ilic, 1995:2). They were mainly crop farmers and thus inhabited only the plains and river valleys of present-day Albania – leaving the mountains to the early Balkan shepherds – the Vlachs and

the ancestors of modern Albanians. Kosovo was subsequently incorporated into the Serbian medieval empire in the 12<sup>th</sup> century and by this time Kosovo was known as the 'heart of Serbia' – the state, economic and cultural centre of the Serbian nation (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003:15). However, by 1385, the Serbian medieval empire was mostly broken into pieces – falling under Turkish domination. Serbia itself, much divided among feudal lords, clashed with the Ottoman armies at the battle of Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389 in a battle that is described by Serbians as the battle which "of all Kosovo battles is the only one that counts in the formation of the psyche of a Serb" (Dragnich and Todorovic, 1984:3). Thus, for some Serbian historians "Kosovo is not a myth, but an historical idea, which helps a nation to forge a link with its real historical past" (Bieber and Daskalovski, 2003:15). For the Serbs, the legend of the 'lost Kosovo', regardless of how it actually happened was another indispensable factor that kept the Serbian national consciousness alive and contributed to the successful end of the struggle for independence (Djordjevic, 1992:18).

After Joseph Tito's death in 1980, the manifestation of Albanian nationalism became more frequent and many Albanians assaulted Serbs and attacked property (Daskalovski, 2003:17). A pattern was emerging – that of systematic pressure on the Serbs and Montenegrins to leave Kosovo, to sell everything they owned and leave for Serbia (Dragnich and Todorovic, 1984:24). The percentage of the Serbs in Kosovo fell from 23,6% in 1961 to 13,2% in 1981 (Daskalovski, 2003:17). These secessionist tendencies of the Albanian population culminated in the 'March Riots' in 1981 and the central message of these mass protests was the demand for Kosovo to firstly become a republic of Yugoslavia and finally to achieve unification with the mother-state of Albania. As a result of the riots, a state of emergency was declared and the Yugoslav People's Army had to crush the revolt and restore order (Daskalovski, 2003:17).

Serbian historians claim that by 1990, some 400 000 Serbs had been forced to leave Kosovo during the period 1970 to 1990. The plight of the Serbs were ignored by the federal government and as a result, resentment for the state that could not and did not want to protect its own citizens was rising. This created an atmosphere that was conducive to the rise of Serbian nationalism (Daskalovski, 2003:17). Slobodan Milosovic, an emerging figure on the political scene, used these emotions to gain political power. Milosevic supported what most of the Serbian people wished for: the centralisation of the Serbian Republic.

#### **4.2.2 Reasons for the conflict: A Kosovo-Albanian perspective**

From an Albanian perspective, the ethnic and cultural continuity between the early Illyrians and medieval Albanians is a legitimate and well-established fact. The Albanians are quick to point out that the Serbs only showed their presence in the area only from the 12<sup>th</sup> century and onward – whereas the Albanians were in the region long before that (Stipcevic, 2002:1). The Albanians believe that the aim of the Serbs was to occupy the land of the Illyrians-Albanians and view the presence of the Serbs in Kosovo not as ‘liberation’ of the Serb lands, but as an annexation and occupation of Albanian territories (Pulaha, 1997:2).

After World War II, the Albanians of Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia were prevented from uniting with Albania. Due to the persecutions, terror, violence and genocide inflicted on them, many Albanians, between 3 000 and 4 000 people, were forced to flee abroad. At the end of January 1953, the President of Yugoslavia, Joseph Tito, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Kuprili, bowed for a gentlemen’s agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey: the agreement provided for the expatriation of Kosovar Albanians to Turkey and indeed, more than 400 000 Albanians were forced to leave their homes and emigrate to Turkey between 1950 and 1966. Serbian domination of the Kosovo province continued after 1966, despite Yugoslavia’s constitutional changes in 1974 that upgraded the status of Kosovo into autonomy (Daskalovski, 2003:20).

Under Milosevic, Serbia wanted to change its constitution and abolish Kosovo authority. The Albanians of Kosovo did not accept these proposals for abolishment of their autonomy, and in fact, advocated its expansion (Dragnich and Todorovic, 1984:47). However, on 23 March 1989, the then President of the Assembly of Kosova (a Serb), proclaimed the approval of the constitutional amendments without public discussion or consultation. At the time of the voting for the Serbian constitutional changes, tanks, military police and members of the secret police surrounded the building of the Assembly of Kosovo. Thus, many view the constitutional changes that were approved on 28 March 1989, as illegal (Daskalovski, 2003:21).

Despite the repressive regime in the 1990s, the struggle against the Serbian occupation continued. After the Dayton Agreement in 1995, radical Kosovar Albanians started to advocate a military solution to their demands. They were disappointed with the slow pace of their community’s struggle for independence and in early 1997 they subsequently started an armed rebellion against the institutions of the Serbian state. The conflict led to the loss of about 2 000 lives and created

thousands of refugees that poured into Albania and Macedonia and caused unprecedented material damage (Daskalovski, 2003:21).

#### **4.3. The road to war**

Bieber and Daskalovski (2003:xiii) point out that the Dayton Peace Agreement neglected to adequately address the Kosovo issue. The first assassination attempts on Serbian army and police officers in April 1996 by militant Kosovar Albanian groups immediately raised the levels of frustration among the ethnic groups, which subsequently led to widespread outbreaks of violence. The “moderate leadership of Fehmi Agani and Ibrahim Rugova’s pacifist Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was not able to contain the situation” (Troebst, 2003:xiii).

The causes of the conflict in Kosovo were complex, and the implications of the conflict were broad and impacted upon many role-players. Despite the fact that the methodology of the war-fighting significantly shaped the ultimate outcome of the NATO intervention, the Kosovo War ultimately did not exhaust itself in military terms. In fact, the NATO military intervention was only partially successful in halting the suffering of the Kosovar Albanians (Troebst, 2003:xiii). Approximately 1 000 000 Albanians had become refugees and about 10 000 had lost their lives by the time that the Yugoslav troops withdrew. In addition, “NATO and the Kosovo International Security Forces (KFOR) were unable to stop Albanian retaliations against the Serbs and by the end of 1999, only 50% of the original 200 000 Serbs remained in Kosovo” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000:97).

The difficulties that the international community experienced in formulating and implementing a consistent and effective policy approach towards the conflict in Kosovo can be ascribed to the complex nature of the reasons for the conflict. The causes of the conflict could be found within Kosovo, as a land-locked country itself, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within the wider region, as well as within the complex framework of relations between the main actors in the international arena. From the onset, the combination of these factors limited the range of possible policies, resulting in international governmental actors failing, individually and collectively, to prevent and effectively settle the conflict (Wolff, 2003:80). For all these reasons, Kosovo serves as an important example to illustrate the ambiguities of humanitarian intervention and its wide-ranging implications for peace and political stability, as well as sustainable economic development.

#### **4.4. Air War in Kosovo: the military contribution to the intervention**

As mentioned before, NATO's Air War for Kosovo received widespread reaction and has been the origin of many discourses as to how it has impacted on war-fighting in general, as well as in terms of the role and contribution of the military component during peace missions and humanitarian interventions. After the failure of the last-ditch negotiation in Rambouillet, near Paris, NATO began a 78-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. NATO, led by the USA, conducted the Air War against the government of Yugoslavia and its elected president, Slobodan Milosevic, in an effort to halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were committed by armed Serbs against the ethnic Albanian majority living in Yugoslavia's Serbian province of Kosovo (Lambeth, 2001:v). The NATO campaign was finally suspended on 10 June 1999 (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:10).

NATO has presented Operation Allied Force as a success for two reasons. Firstly, the refugees and displaced persons have returned to Kosovo, which was one of the objectives that the international community wanted NATO's air campaign to achieve. Secondly, there is peace, or at least an absence of large-scale violence, which was NATO's overall objective after the war. But NATO's overall success is doubtful, not only because it took 78 days for the Kosovo war to end which, for the world's strongest military alliance pitted against a relatively insignificant military opponent, is a very long period, but also because many of the objectives that it set out to achieve, were not achieved by the time the military activities were halted (Cohen and Shelton, 2000:126).

Despite several shortcomings, Operation Allied Force was ultimately deemed a military success, as Milosevic was defeated and an end was brought to the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign (Operation Horseshoe – *Potkova*) that was aimed at forcing the Albanians out of Kosovo (Lambeth, 2001:68). However, although many analysts insist that Milosevic's capitulation can be ascribed to the Air War alone, there is ample reason to be wary of any intimation that NATO's use of air power produced this ending, without any significant contributions by other factors (Lambeth, 2001:68). These 'other' factors include the fact that NATO, despite severe criticism by the international community, remained unified in its efforts; the fact that Russia joined hands with NATO in the diplomatic end game; as well as the fact that the Alliance began to develop a credible threat of a ground invasion (Lambeth, 2001:69). The combination of all of these factors contributed to the creation of an end state in which Milosevic was unable to find doors through which he could escape.

Ultimately, the bombing had two primary determining effects: “firstly, it convinced Milosevic that NATO not only would not relent, but that it was determined to prevail and had both the technical and political wherewithal to do so. Secondly, given the incapacity of the Serbian Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) to shoot down significant numbers of Allied aircraft, it further convinced him (Milosevic) that his own defeat sooner or later was inevitable” (Hedges, 1999). NATO finally showed that it would not be moved by the public outcry over collateral damage and could sustain the bombing indefinitely, at a negligible cost in terms of friendly losses (Lambeth, 2001:84).

In order to make any judgement on the military successes or failures of the NATO intervention, the ‘cost of actions’ (sins of commission) should be measured against the ‘costs of inaction’ (sins of omission) (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:9). If one is to judge the operation by the criteria of *human cost* only, the death toll as a result of Operation Allied Force cannot be compared to the losses incurred with the 10-year long Serbian rule in Kosovo. While the death toll incurred by NATO varied between 500 and 2000 mainly Serbian military personnel, the toll of the last year of Serbian rule in Kosovo is estimated to amount over 10 000 victims of which the vast majority were civilians (Malazogu, 2003:125). However, Human Rights Watch estimated that about 500 civilians were killed by NATO’s bombing campaign (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:9). On the other hand, as far as refugees and displaced people are concerned, the opposite result was achieved: the Serbian military repression displaced up to 300 000 Albanians from their homes, whereas the NATO air campaign that started on 24 March 1999, was accompanied by escalating violence and a large refugee outflow that included organised expulsions. Within nine weeks of the beginning of the air strikes, nearly 860 000 Kosovar Albanians fled or were expelled to Albania (444 600), Macedonia (344 500) and Montenegro (69 900) by the Serb forces (UNHCR, 2002).

In terms of the impact that it had on the economy in Kosovo, the results of the Air War were devastating. By the time that Operation Allied Force was launched, the nation’s economy had already been weakened by almost four years of international sanctions imposed for Serbia’s earlier role in the war in Bosnia. By the time the Allied Force had reached its halfway point, the bombing of infrastructure targets had halved the remainder of Yugoslavia’s economic output and deprived more than 100 000 civilians of jobs. Local economists reported that the effect was more damaging than that of the successive Nazi and Allied bombing of Yugoslavia during World War II, when the country was far more rural in its economic makeup (Lambeth, 2001:42). Mladjan Dinkic, a respected economist at Belgrade University who coordinated a group of economists from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and

the World Bank, called the results of the bombing an “economic catastrophe”, adding that, while the Serb population would not die of hunger, “our industrial base will be destroyed and the size of the economy cut in half” (Erlanger, 1999:23).

Therefore, as far as the military component’s contribution to finding a political solution to the humanitarian crises in Kosovo is concerned, the comparison between acting or not acting should be measured in terms of what would have resulted, had NATO not attacked. Hundreds of thousand of refugees remained in the mountains of Kosovo without any food or health care whilst being chased by the Yugoslav Army and para-militaries. The last 200 refugees who fled Kosovo, just one day before Milosevic signed the accord, were in the worst condition of all the refugees who had crossed the border until then (Malazogu, 2003:124). Around 300 000 IDPs faced rapidly deteriorating circumstances, facing death, not only from the Yugoslav Army, but also from starvation, exhaustion and various diseases. “By mid-2000, over 4 000 bodies had been recovered from the war and judging from the lists of missing people, at least 6 000 could be unaccounted for” (Malazogu, 2003:125).

In terms of the military component’s contribution to the peace process in Kosovo, it is still to be determined whether the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia ultimately contributed to finding a solution to the situation in Kosovo on a political, and or economic level. Was it a positive contribution, or did it merely marginalise the opposition and created some deep suspicion towards Western policy? Or, did this action, in fact, possibly delay the transition to democracy? After the semi-negotiated revolution of 5 October 2000, the main energy of the new authorities has been directed toward economic reconstruction and the political issue of Kosovo subsequently disappeared from the main political agenda in terms of Serbia. In terms of addressing war crimes, the subject of determining who was responsible for the crimes in Kosovo, remained largely taboo and Serbian politicians have been reluctant to discuss the long-term relations between Serbia and Kosovo (Graham, 2000).

Operation Allied Force was the most intense and sustained military operation to have been conducted in Europe since the end of World War II. It represented the first extended use of military force by NATO, as well as the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian objectives against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. Because of its size and cost (more than \$3 billion), it turned out to be an unprecedented exercise in the discriminate use of force on a large scale (Graham, 2000).

Another factor that contributed to the significance of the intervention in Kosovo is the fact that the military component (KFOR) was deployed in unison with the civilian peacebuilding component (UNMIK). The simultaneous deployment of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo emphasised the shift away from the traditional linear approach to UN peace missions, as peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities were carried out simultaneously, and not sequentially. However, despite the scale and intensity of the intervention, Kosovo had not yet become a stable area by the end of the war. The conflicts in its vicinity (even after the democratic changes in areas such as Presevo, Bujanoca, Medvedja and Macedonia), is evident of the continued instability of the region (Malazogu, 2003:129).

It is therefore difficult to accurately define the successes or failures of the military component towards finding a solution to the political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. It is, however, important to understand that the military component contributed significantly to setting the scene for the signing of the ceasefire agreement, as contributing to the creation of a stable platform for the peacebuilding process in Kosovo – thereby emphasising the close relationship between security and development. The chances of successfully embarking on the peacebuilding process were increased by the fact that peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities were conducted simultaneously – thus significantly shortening the ‘reconstruction gap’ which, if not addressed in time, often leads to a resumption of large-scale violence as soon as the peacekeepers return to their respective troop contributing countries.

#### **4.5. The peace process in Kosovo**

It has already been explained that, before 1989, peacekeeping was essentially a military affair in terms of the nature of tasks and the composition of role-players. Currently, most contemporary multi-national peace processes are civilian operations with military and humanitarian components working closely together. In Kosovo, the UN – in its own assessment – has taken up an undertaking that, for any international institution, is unprecedented in complexity and scope. Moreover, no other missions have ever been designed in which other multi-lateral organisations are full partners under UN leadership (UNMIK and OSCE, 1999). Neethling (2000:30) points out that, in this sense, peace missions should be regarded as political-diplomatic strategies being pursued by the international community or certain regional role-players. He concludes that peace missions should be viewed as “long-term endeavours that aim at political and development solutions for the achievement of lasting peace”. This argument is in line with the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, which asserts that



“peacebuilding includes activities such as the identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace, build trust and facilitate conflict resolution to prevent a relapse into conflict” (DFA, 1999:10).

#### **4.6. Undertaking peacebuilding in Kosovo**

The intervention in Kosovo heralded the general change in approach to peace missions in which newly formulated international ideas about reconstruction and stabilisation of post-war societies were tested for the first time. The simultaneous deployment of UNMIK and KFOR emphasised the shift away from the traditional linear approach to UN peace missions, as peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities were carried out simultaneously, and not sequentially. This approach is in line with the concept of DPMs, which is based on the integration of the planning processes regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The intervention in Kosovo also accorded with other critical success factors relating to DPMs, namely the fusion of development and security imperatives into a holistic system that addresses the full range of inter-related issues that threaten peace and security. It furthermore complied with another critical success factor for the successful implementation of DPMs in that all the role-players established a clear understanding of the reinforcing processes that originally gave rise to the conflict in Kosovo and the fact that the various stakeholders and role-players who were involved in the overall mission plan worked together under a common strategic framework. To this effect, both KFOR and UNMIK successfully carried out their respective parts as part of the overall plan.

##### **4.6.1. Role of KFOR**

The peace process in Kosovo commenced on 10 June 1999 after Operation Allied Force was terminated (Lambeth, 2001:v). In addition to the international civil presence in Kosovo, the UN, in terms of the UNSC Resolution 1244 of 1999, decided that NATO and Russia would integrate their forces into an international security presence in Kosovo, known as KFOR. Thus began ‘Operation Joint Guardian’ – a development that promised to be a new phase in the international community’s involvement in Kosovo (Fursdon, 1999:24; UN, 1999). Within days of the arrival of the first contingents of the 40 000 strong KFOR, tens of thousand of refugees started to head home (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:10). The primary responsibilities of KFOR, in terms of the UN Resolution 1244 (1999), included the following (UN, 1999):

- deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary, enforcing a cease-fire and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of the Yugoslav military force;
- demilitarising the KLA and other Kosovar Albanian groups;
- establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety and humanitarian aid could be delivered;
- ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence could take responsibility for this task;
- supervising de-mining until the international civil presence could take responsibility for this task;
- supporting, where appropriate and co-ordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;
- conducting border monitoring duties as required; and
- ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of the force itself, the international civil presence and other IGOs.

Neethling (2002:30) summates, in view of the above, that KFOR's immediate task was to conduct robust peacekeeping activities in the peace process in order to combat the violence that had become so prevalent in Kosovo. Ultimately, KFOR's role was also to create the conditions necessary for the rebuilding of Kosovo and to assist in the establishment of a democratic and legitimate political dispensation (Fursdon, 1999:24).

As KFOR advanced, thousands of Serb civilians fled Kosovo and many Serbs who stayed in the province along with minorities such as Roma, who were suspected of being collaborators, became the targets of revenge attacks. After the summer of 1999, only about half of the pre-war Serb population of 200 000 people remained in Kosovo, isolated in KFOR-guarded enclaves (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11).

#### **4.6.2. Role of UNMIK**

The UNSC, through Resolution 1244 of 1999, authorised the UNSG to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration under which the people of the province could enjoy substantial autonomy. To this extent, UNMIK was formally approved on 10 June 1999. UNMIK was therefore handed the task of building institutions of democratic self-governance in Kosovo while administering the territory in the interim (UN, 1999). In effect, the UNSC vested authority over the territory and the people of Kosovo in UNMIK. The Special Representative of the UNSG (SRSG) was appointed as the highest international civilian official in Kosovo and as the head of UNMIK in order to

facilitate the political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status (Annan, 1999a). In what constituted a fairly non-democratic form of governance, the SRSG effectively holds a veto power over all the provisional institutions of self-governance, whether they have been established by the international administration or elected by the people of Kosovo (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11). In terms of Resolution 1244, the primary responsibilities of UNMIK were to:

- promote the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
- perform basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;
- organise and monitor the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
- support the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peacebuilding activities;
- facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status;
- oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
- support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;
- support, in conjunction with international humanitarian organisations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
- maintain civil law and order, including the rebuilding of the local police forces, and the interim deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
- protect and promote human rights; and
- assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

In view of the above, it is evident that the situation regarding the role of the military in peace missions has changed significantly. Whereas peacekeeping was primarily a military affair before 1989, most current peace missions are led by a civilian representative of an international organisation – most commonly a SRSG, supported by an experienced staff component. As a result, a large number of civilians are normally engaged in a wide range of responsibilities in support of the broad political objectives of peace processes. One of the most significant features of the peace process in Kosovo was the joint, but in fact, separate international civil and security components under UN leadership in the area (Neethling, 2000:36). The co-ordination and liaison between UNMIK and KFOR were essential to the overall

success of the peace process. To this effect, UNMIK and KFOR have, since the beginning of their activities, worked towards the establishment of a close working relationship and have put a comprehensive structure of co-ordination mechanisms in place. This commitment lies at the centre of the concept of DPMs and the respective contributions of KFOR and UNMIK showed that DPMs could, in fact, be successfully implemented. A plethora of NGOs also committed personnel and resources to meet the relief needs of the people of Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. These organisations all received vital support and protection from KFOR. In this regard, specifically human rights monitors worked closely with KFOR on actions to protect and promote human rights (Annan, 1999a). Ultimately, it has become clear that peace missions have evolved from being an essentially military affair and developed into a complex, integrated, holistic endeavour, involving role-players from the security, as well as the civilian sector involved in the intervention.

A high premium was thus placed on efforts to ensure that the civil and security components in Kosovo act in a fully integrated manner and work towards a single goal. Accordingly, the UNSG reported in a letter to the president of the UNSC, dated 8 July 1999, that: “KFOR continues to provide a secure environment and is establishing coordination mechanisms with UNMIK” (Annan, 1999a). The UN involvement in Kosovo is a clear case of how multi-functional peace processes are currently being managed and perceived (Neethling, 2000:32).

The SRSg in Kosovo, Dr Bernard Kouchner, arrived at Pristina on 13 June 1999 – a day after the initial deployment of KFOR. UNMIK and other partner organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decided to categorise tasks and activities into four main components (Annan, 1999a):

- a civil administration component;
- an institution-building component;
- a humanitarian component; and
- a reconstruction component.

#### **4.6.2.1. Civil administration component**

The civil administration component was tasked to establish the multi-ethnic governmental structures that were needed for the sustainable delivery of public services. To this effect, the UN mandated UNMIK on 10 June 1999 to begin the long process of building peace, democracy and self-government in Kosovo. To achieve this goal, UNMIK acted as the transitional administration for the region.

UNMIK representatives worked closely with Kosovo's leaders and citizens and the mission performed a whole spectrum of essential administrative functions and services, covering aspects such as health and education, banking and finance, post and telecommunications and law and order. UNMIK set up a regional structure with five Regional Administrators and 30 Municipal Administrators. It established central departments to administer public services (education, health, garbage collection, etc), which were subsequently converted into Kosovo-wide administrative departments in the Joint Interim Administrative Structure. One key department, the Central Fiscal Authority prepared the Kosovo Consolidated Budget. The police department was tasked to define UNMIK's law and order strategy in Kosovo in accordance with two main goals: the provision of interim law enforcement services and the rapid deployment of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (Annan, 1999a). The internationally recruited UNMIK Police, later in conjunction with the newly founded Kosovo Police Service, sought to maintain law and order. A Kosovo Protection Corps was created to provide emergency response and reconstruction services. This Corps absorbed some of the manpower of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which had meanwhile been disarmed and demilitarised under the supervision of KFOR. In addition to the above, a judicial affairs department was established in the context of the urgent need to build genuine rule of law in Kosovo, including the immediate establishment of an independent, impartial and multi-party judiciary (Neethling, 2000:32).

#### **4.6.2.2. Institution-building component**

The institution-building component was tasked to strengthen and enhance the capacity of local and central institutions and civil society organisations, as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights – especially in a country where intolerance among ethnic minority groups have resulted in the deaths of thousands. This also entailed the organisation and management of elections (Pula, 2003:208). In addition to the latter, UNMIK was tasked to undertake programmes to facilitate the conditions that would be conducive to political diversity and a healthy democratic political climate. UNMIK was also tasked to promote the emergence of independent media in Kosovo, as well as the establishment of a broad-based media culture that is based on democratic principles (Pula, 2003:207).

#### **4.6.2.3. Humanitarian component**

The humanitarian component of UNMIK was placed under the leadership of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and humanitarian assistance and demining activities were listed as special tasks of this component. The primary aim of the humanitarian assistance component was to ensure the provision of adequate shelter, food, water and medical assistance to meet the needs of internally displaced persons and the growing number of people returning to Kosovo (Annan, 1999a). All refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo had the right to return to their property and personal possessions. The competent institutions in Kosovo were tasked to take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo and to co-operate fully with all efforts by the UNHCR and other international and local NGOs concerning the return of refugees and displaced persons (UNMIK and OSCE, 1999:4). Humanitarian programmes were also aimed at targeting urgent and essential infrastructure repairs and short-term rebuilding efforts (Neethling, 2000:33).

#### **4.6.2.4. Reconstruction component**

The reconstruction component was tasked to promote peace and prosperity in Kosovo and to facilitate the development of a sustainable economy in Kosovo. It was decided that the EU would manage the reconstruction component of the mission (Annan, 1999a). As a consequence of its role within the Stability Pact and within UNMIK, where it was in charge of the economic sector, the EU had a central responsibility in the reconstruction and development of Kosovo, as well as the region as a whole.

The EU was the single biggest donor of assistance for reconstruction. In 1999, the EU, not counting the bi-lateral contributions by its member states, provided a total of €505 million for people throughout the region affected by the Kosovo intervention (Muguruza, 2003:245). The financial allocation for the period 2000 to 2006 was envisaged to be €5,5 billion for the region. If one is to include the €6 billion in pre-accession assistance for Romania and Bulgaria, the assistance to south-eastern Europe amounts to a total of €11,5 billion. The primary functions of this component included the planning and reconstruction of the infrastructure in Kosovo, as well as the planning, development and evaluation of policies pertaining to economic, social and financial fields and to co-ordinate between various donors and international financial institutions in order to ensure that all financial assistance was directed in accordance with the planned priorities (Neethling, 2000:34). The EU took the lead in

the funding and reconstruction activities in Kosovo. The EU provided about 70% of all reconstruction assistance.

The EU also set up a European Agency for Reconstruction to respond to urgent needs for special measures to tackle the post-war-reconstruction. This agency was tasked to enhance the effectiveness, speed and visibility of European operations, allowing them to be both decentralised and closely coordinated with UNMIK. In addition to the comprehensive public reconstruction programme, so as to better target donor resources in support of the mission's priorities for reconstruction, the EU presented an ambitious plan for privatising Kosovo's medium and large-scale enterprises and for introducing the legal underpinnings and need for a market economy (Muguruza, 2003:245). The EU's expected contribution for the period 2000 to 2006 represented over half of the World Bank assessment of what was still required. However, these statistics only reflect the contribution of the EU and does not include contributions by member states. Independent evaluations predicted that some €26 billion would be required over a period of four years, and that, in the long run, about €79 billion should be envisaged for a period of 12 years (Vukadinovic, 2000:151). "If the EU wants to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality, the member states should contribute at least the same amount" (Muguruza, 2003:247). The high costs listed above, emphasise the fact that, in the event that there is political will or a decision to intervene, this decision must be sustained by the resources to enforce the decision to intervene. In short: the capability and the willingness to act should be matched with adequate resources.

#### **4.7 Role of international and local NGOs**

NGOs played a pivotal role during the intervention in Kosovo. In fact, international NGOs and local NGOs faced a daunting task in the aftermath of the NATO intervention. The war had a devastating effect on the infrastructure of a province already damaged by years of under investment and conflict. About 500 000 people lacked shelter in July 1999 (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11). More than 500 schools were in need of repair, the health care system, civil administration and the banking systems had collapsed. Roads were in ruin, village wells had been deliberately polluted and there were no electricity, telephone or mail services. The European Commission and the World Bank estimated that nearly \$2,4 billion would be needed for preliminary reconstruction (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11).

UNMIK, as the leading structure of the international peacebuilding community in Kosovo, promulgated principles and guidelines that were applicable to all actors in the field. The transmission of these principles and guidelines occurred by means of,

amongst other channels, a clear 'chain of command' that connected policy-making offices at headquarters level with regional and municipal offices at local level (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:11). The conceptualisation of peacebuilding strategies and aims was embedded into UNMIK's criteria for registration of NGOs as legal entities. Strict guidelines regarding both management structures and decision-making procedures had to be met by local NGOs to be legally recognised (UNMIK and OSCE, 1999).

Most peacebuilding literature advocates local ownership of reconstruction processes, for both pragmatic and principled reasons. Large (1997:157) argues that the unique resources that local actors bring to the process make it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. She argues that a successful peacebuilding intervention should enable "indigenous leadership and activity rather than importing either expectations or packaged solutions". In this regard, local NGOs have attributes that distinguish them from their international counterparts, such as greater access to beneficiary communities and a deeper knowledge of the cultural and political setting. However, in reality, when preparing funding proposals, local NGOs have to conform to international priorities and use similar terminology to their potential donor (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:19). For example, the UNHCR's 'Manual for Sustainable Return' sets out not just general principles, but very specific operational guidelines which all organisations wishing to be involved in returns must follow (UNMIK and UNHCR, 2003). It seems that, although most international NGOs in Kosovo advocated participatory partnerships with local NGOs, "the power dynamics within these relationships means that international definitions of what kind of peace to build and how to go about it often prevail" (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:19).

The inter-relationship between international NGOs and local NGOs often glosses over what remains an essentially unequal relationship, with a clear division of labour between the two categories of actors. The methods and activities of IGOs are quite often pre-determined by their mandate and by their own donors (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:19). Although local NGOs bring distinct attributes to the partnership, it is fair to say that most of the decisions about what projects to implement and how these projects must be managed ultimately rest with international donors. "The rhetoric of partnership, capacity-building and empowerment often masks a relationship of dominance on the one hand and dependency on the other" (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:23). Llamazares and Levy (2003:23) uses the metaphor of 'colonisation' to describe the type of asymmetric symbolic and financial power relationship that sometimes characterises international-local NGO interaction. This leads to "outcomes controlled by the international agencies'



frameworks, assumptions, meanings and practices” (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:23).

Although most international policy documents and agencies involved in peacebuilding agree that local NGOs should play a significant role in the peacebuilding processes, this “rhetoric is belied by the reality of the top-down imposition of a particular vision of peace. Often, concerns such as coordination and cost effectiveness take precedence over principled approaches to peacebuilding” (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24). This means that the space for local definitions and contributions to peacebuilding is greatly reduced through the essentially disempowering partnerships between international NGOs and local NGOs.

The funding frenzy that characterised the immediate aftermath of the war meant that many local NGOs emerged due to the demand of international NGOs rather than careful assessment of the real needs of their own communities. Equally, the eventual withdrawal and reduction of donor funding for local NGOs was only partially reflective of the fulfilment of the needs of communities (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24).

The situation in Kosovo was marked by the strategic renegotiation of the relationships between all of the actors involved in peacebuilding – international and local, governmental and non-governmental. The number of international NGOs involved in the peacebuilding in Kosovo was approximately 400, although this number subsequently decreased. It was also estimated that the number of local NGOs (2 079) that were involved would also dramatically decrease as time passed, primarily due to international funds being cut or diverted to local government structures (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24). The dramatic reduction in direct funding for local NGOs from international donors led to the closure and scaling back of many NGO operations. This caused a loss of income for many people formerly employed in the NGO sector, and this inevitably had negative knock-on effects in terms of local economic activity. Ultimately, the transfer of funding and support from civil society actors to government structures redefined the social contract in Kosovo, as local NGOs were required to strengthen and complement, as opposed to substitute, local government service programmes (Llamazares and Levy, 2003:24).

In order to effectively transfer peacebuilding in Kosovo from international NGOs to local NGOs and civil society, international NGOs were encouraged to network and build relationships among local NGOs through the diversification of local partners and encouragement of horizontal cooperation among them. Local NGOs were encouraged to develop strong capacities for strategic analysis, planning and

evaluation in order to maintain their relevance. Equally, NGOs were required to clearly define their mission and participatory mechanisms for incorporating feedback from their beneficiary community. As the international community reduced its operational presence (including funding and personnel), co-operation among local organisations became increasingly important for effective programming in Kosovo.

#### **4.8. Experience gained from the deployment of NGOs in Kosovo**

International NGOs and local NGOs all played a vital role in laying the foundations for the road to peace and sustainable development in Kosovo. It was evident from the start of peacebuilding activities that the NGOs were posturing themselves as vehicles for civil society to become involved in the peacebuilding activities from grassroots level – thus giving impetus to the notion of ‘peacebuilding from the bottom-up’, rather than relying on frameworks that would be imposed upon civil society by external organisations and agencies. This is in line with the general acceptance during the last two decades that civil society has a pivotal role to play in consolidating nation-building processes after protracted intra-state wars. According to Mertus and Sajjad (2005:119), the space between the government and the people has been rapidly filled with institutions, organisations and movements with increasing legitimacy to voice the concerns of those outside the formal power structures. In this regard, the focus is often on the development of NGOs, at times to the extent that the term ‘NGO’ has often, erroneously, been equated with ‘civil society’. As a result, grassroots organisations and other alternative forms of social arrangement are unfortunately squeezed out.

In this climate, the measure of a healthy democracy has, to a great extent, implied NGO-centred infrastructure for elections and the establishment of a civil society network that challenges government and fills in the gaps in the provision of public services. Civil society has hence emerged as a crucial component of democracies, and has been seen as one of the most essential elements for assisting a society in making the transition from conflict into the post-conflict state and consolidating peaceful politics. However, although a healthy civil society is essential to the process of nation-building, states should be wary about the fact that a strong civil society and vibrant NGO sector has the potential to hinder, rather than enhance, civic nationalism, and thus to create a weak state. This could occur when civil society in fact fails the project of nation-building through undercutting the legitimacy and the potency of new states. Weak or failed states should take time to consolidate and build their own institutions and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents, rather than rushing the process by accepting and implementing the

continuing largely Western dictated formulas for functional and open societies (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:119).

If all goes well, the growth of civil society should support the development of strong state institutions, defined in terms of capacity (ability to devise policy and to see it through), autonomy (ability to act independently of local and international actors) and legitimacy (defined in terms of acceptability of processes and normative content) (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:120). However, experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan have proven that the emergence of a strong civil society might indeed fail to support, and even in some cases, undercut state capacity, autonomy and legitimacy. The problem lies in the fact that civil society is expected to take charge of the transformation processes and to transform overnight, despite the destruction, and to take the lead in the quest for social reconstruction. However, many of the developmental frameworks provided by NGOs, do not take the socio-political nuances of specific societies into consideration, making the aims and end states of developmental frameworks largely unsustainable and impractical. In this regard, some commentators point to the fact that: “stunted civil society can act as a causal factor in both war and reconstruction reform” (United States Institute for Peace, 2002:97).

To this effect, large amounts of development aid delivered over long periods have the potential to undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions in developing countries (Brautigam, 2002:90). Donor agencies and foreign experts often take over many of the critical functions of governance: substituting their own goals for an absent leadership vision, using foreign experts and project management units in place of weak or decaying public institutions – to an extent humanitarian aid then becomes part of the problem, rather than the solution. The ‘cycle of dependency’ that emerges in post-conflict states as a consequence of foreign donors deciding and controlling agendas for local NGOs, creates a sharp division between the local populations and the well-intentional bodies designed to serve them (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:123). According to Bieber (2002:2) the ‘dependency trap’ effectively reduces the potential of local grassroots NGOs by creating numerous incentives that are based on assessment of Western donors and less on local needs. Local organisations are constrained by the necessity of designing projects around changing donor agendas, rather than on the building of local constituencies (Bieber, 2002:2).

The tension between nation-building and civil society is pulling civil society in two directions. One direction is guided by the international community’s vision for a post-conflict society, whilst the other follows the aspirations of the constituents of

the society. This would set the stage for possible fragmentation and cleavages within the new state. One alternative would be for the international community to become better state builders and they could guard against the creation of dependency relationships and stop imposing western-orientated models, foreign priorities and outsider norms. Another alternative would be to temporarily stop endeavours to build a strong state. They could engage in the kind of projects that are required to preserve the peace, such as building democratic institutions and quietly nurturing future leaders, but should refrain from taking the lead in nation-building endeavours. This would entail standing by and supporting a weak state, even when it falters from time to time, whilst it slowly finds its own way to establishing sustainable peace and development. Ultimately, when evaluating the impact of civil society on the ultimate state building process, one should, rather than focusing on civil society's relationship with the state, study whether civil society supports the kind of local political processes that may be a component of an eventual strong and just state (Mertus and Sajjad, 2005:127).

#### **4.9. Role of regional organisations in the Kosovo peace process**

The peace process in Kosovo clearly shows that peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN, which previously entailed observing the parties to a conflict and ensuring that they abided by a negotiated truce. It also bears testimony to the growing importance of regional organisations and alliances in international peace initiatives in the post-Cold War era. Neethling (2002:3) points out that: "the ability of the UN to be successful in any peace process and especially in post-conflict reconstruction depends in no small measure on the extent of support rendered to the over-burdened UN by competent regional role-players". Therefore, the peace process in Kosovo cannot be seen in isolation from the dynamics of economic integration under the EU and its various institutions, and the fact that mutual trust has been built historically in that part of the world. The peace process also drew on the support of a number of wealthy industrialised states that are members of NATO and the OSCE.

The EU soon realised that Kosovo's problems should not be analysed or viewed in isolation from the region of which it forms part. Faced with the emergency, the EU foresaw that: "a political solution to the Kosovo crises must be embedded in a determined effort, geared towards stabilizing the region as a whole" (Muguruza, 2003:243). The EU thus defined its overall objective in the western Balkans as being the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe. This process entails the development of a stabilisation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania. However, if success is to be achieved by the regional organisations involved in Kosovo, it is essential that political commitment be linked to regional cooperation and practical and financial support from the international community. The capability and willingness to act, needs to be matched with adequate instruments. The EU has, to a great extent, finally accepted its international responsibilities and has demonstrated the political will to act on behalf of the region. In addition, the EU has the ability to provide adequate resources and finances to match its political will. However, in the event that all these requirements are met, success in terms of Kosovo, will ultimately only be achieved when the cause of the current situation – the political solution to the independence of Kosovo – has finally been addressed (Muguruza, 2003:243).

#### **4.10. Experience gained from the intervention in Kosovo**

The experience in Kosovo emphasised the fact that situations involving armed conflict and humanitarian crises pose a twofold challenge for the international community. Firstly, there is a growing duty to intervene and save lives and relieve the suffering and, secondly, there is a responsibility to assume the consequences of the intervention. In short: the capability and the willingness to act needs to be matched with adequate instruments. Secondly, these emergencies need to be addressed in a coherent manner with an appropriate mix of all available policy instruments (among others political, economic, social, legal, environmental and development measures). Therefore, the provision of emergency aid must be combined with measures to protect human rights in conjunction with rehabilitation measures with long-term strategies that address the underlying causes of the emergency (Muguruza, 2003:248). Despite several key issues that are yet to be effectively addressed to ensure sustainable peace and development in Kosovo, it is clear that “Kosovo has made significant progress in achieving substantial autonomy and self-government, as required under Resolution 1244 (1999)” (UNSC, 1999). There was, however, concern about the on-going inter-ethnic violence and lack of tolerance. Major challenges in Kosovo had to be addressed, such as the strengthening of the rule of law, especially concerning improved security and freedom of movement for all. The transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the Provincial Institutions also had to be completed. Most Kosovars ranked the economy as their number one concern and unemployment was still running at approximately 57%. On a positive side, the Euro provided for monetary stability and Kosovo had a balanced budget that relied on a functioning revenue-collection service (UNSC, 1999).

Some progress has been made in terms of the political situation in Kosovo, although many challenges have not been addressed. In a report to the UNSC on 28 September 2007, the UNSG reported that although the ongoing negotiations on the status of Kosovo continue to be at the centre of the political process in Kosovo, political parties and the population as a whole have become increasingly focused on elections. After careful consultation with relevant stakeholders in Kosovo, representatives of the international community, as well as the OSCE, the start of technical preparations for elections in the Kosovo was authorised in Pristina on 16 August 2007 (Ki-moon, 2007b). After the election process, Kosovo declared independence on 16 February 2008.

The NATO campaign against Serbia in March 1999, put the spotlight on the significance, maintenance and respect for state sovereignty on the one hand, and the international trend towards intolerance of human rights violations and limits of sovereignty on the other. For many, the absence of a legitimating UN mandate for the NATO operation also raised the concern that militarily and economically powerful states could take arbitrary action against smaller and weaker states (Sidiropolous, 2001:xi). The speed and cost of the NATO intervention in Kosovo reinforced this perception of an asymmetry in the West's priorities, as did the stationing of 45 500 UN troops in Kosovo.

From the above, it is clear that one of the key problems in terms of humanitarian intervention is the dilemma of bridging the divide between the idealism of intervening to protect human rights with the reality of setting a framework or constant criteria that could be applied to achieve consensual multilateral support for humanitarian interventions – thus setting the standards for intervention and consistency. “Without the latter, UN action is improbable, increasing the possibility of the formation of a ‘coalition of the willing’, such as NATO in the Balkans, or even unilateral intervention” (Gumbi, 2001:8).

According to Schnabel and Thakur (2001:31), the Air War for Kosovo essentially also taught us that violence pays. They contend that: “non-violence does not pay, at least not in attracting international attention to one's plight” (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:31). In addition, it was confirmed by the events of the Dayton Peace negotiations and the 1999 NATO operation that the international community cares and will only act if it is directly and negatively affected by the effects of internal conflict, including negative economic effects, refugee movements, environmental damage, military spill-overs and political embarrassment. In the absence of such direct negative consequences, the international community is unlikely to involve itself (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:32).

Furthermore, the operation in Kosovo indicated that the focus of conflict management and prevention should also be on regional organisations and non-state actors, and not solely on state governments and the UN. The case of Kosovo was too sensitive (because of its location, as well as its nature as a conflict over self-determination) for concerted UN or UNSC action (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:32). The UN is a good peacekeeper – when there is a solid and locally supported peace to be kept. But ultimately, “the UN is not (and probably should not be) good at fighting wars. If forceful intervention is required in some conflicts, the UN will have to delegate such tasks to regional organisations or ad hoc alliances of concerned states” (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:32). Otherwise, conflicts are left to themselves – or to virtually any interested party – with or without the blessing, control and monitoring of the UN.

In Kosovo, the regional military organisation took the initiative to intervene and had the capability to do so. In Africa, regional organisations do not have the same capacity as the EU and NATO. As an example, in the absence of a strong case made by neighbouring states against the gross human rights violations in Rwanda, nothing was done (Sidiropoulos, 2001:xiii). This emphasises the fact that whilst humanitarian interventions are presented as based on moral imperatives, these are always placed within a cost-benefit framework, taking into account the broader strategic interests (Sidiropoulos, 2001:xiv).

On the whole, it has become evident during the last two decades that military interventions in countries where gross human rights violations are being/were committed, multi-lateral military intervention does/did not resolve problems or set the scene for sustainable development. Military intervention might be required, but it is always an insufficient condition to achieve lasting peace with justice. Indeed, the post-intervention experiences of NATO in Kosovo arguably indicate that multilateral intervention and occupation does not resolve problems. This is very evident in the renewed outbreaks of violence that were experienced in Kosovo, when Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. According to Gumbi (2001:8), this explains the call by some leaders to allow belligerents to ‘fight it out’ to arrive at stable state structures. This, however, is not only unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective, but also unlikely in a modern, media age in which the plight of people receives more attention than the fate of states. Furthermore, the chances of progressing to the establishment of stable governmental structures and infrastructure will be extremely slim if belligerents are permitted to ‘fight it out’ during protracted intra-state conflict.

According to Gumbi (2001:9), the intervention in Kosovo also pointed to another fundamental issue that has to be addressed in terms of humanitarian interventions: the achievement of greater commitment to the notion of multilateral engagement through UN reform. This issue focuses on the adoption of a multi-faceted and holistic approach to humanitarian interventions which not only focuses on security/military aspects, but which also addresses the economic, social, development and political aspects of peace missions.

The activities of UNMIK and KFOR exemplified the new relationship that multinational peacekeeping has imposed on both civilian and military components in recent and current peacekeeping processes. Contrary to cases where interaction between the military and civil components of UN missions was not good, UNMIK and KFOR were able to direct their focus and efforts towards one identified centre and ultimate end state. Although they constituted two different operations that took place in the same country with different mandates, they were able to achieve synergy of efforts and activities (Neethling, 2000:38).

The involvement of UNMIK and KFOR also illustrates the fact that peace processes should be viewed in a holistic sense, including simultaneous peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks. All functions are supposed to be streamlined in a concerted and organised approach with the view of ensuring lasting stability and a desired political end state. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the normal military operational approaches are not geared to implement long-term developmental activities.

Another lesson learned from Kosovo is that post-conflict peacebuilding is at least as important as the conflict management itself, as it constitutes second generation conflict prevention: the avoidance of the recurrence of past conflict. Rebuilding a working legitimate judiciary, government, economy and society is a long-term effort that requires long-lasting commitment and action to settle a conflict (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:33). Despite the involvement of the UN and all major European regional organisations, UNMIK suffered from a lack of funding, equipment and supporting commitment by member states, despite the global attention that was brought to bear on the Kosovo conflict and the subsequent Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo. "Since post-conflict commitment quickly evaporates, local populations need to seize any post-conflict assistance they can get in order to take initiative, responsibility and ownership in rebuilding their war-torn societies" (Schnabel and Thakur, 2001:33).



Ultimately, one of the primary experiences gained from the NATO intervention in Kosovo, is that the 'humanitarian intervention' has indeed resulted in some destructive consequences. The by-passing of international and legal mechanisms, notably the UN, did not remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other underlying factors that originally caused the conflict. Moreover, such an intervention may in fact, disrupt the basis of intra- and inter-state relations (Chernomyrdin, 1999:139). As a result, even after the cessation of hostilities, the prime problem of creating a lasting settlement was only partially addressed and many of the problems that initially caused the conflict, remain unresolved. Chernomyrdin (1999:139) emphasises that, "in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, solutions to international problems should be handled on a democratic and collective basis". He maintains that international peacemaking has to be conducted in strict conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. This should also involve, under the aegis of the UN, active participation by regional and sub-regional organisations. Any other method, including the use of concepts such as humanitarian intervention and limited sovereignty, is illegal and will continually threaten to destabilise the system of international relations. Chernomyrdin (1999:141) concludes that, if there is a need for a peace intervention, it should ultimately be conducted collectively and on the basis of the observance of the norms of the UN and international law.

#### **4.11. Conclusion**

The peace intervention in Kosovo sparked a worldwide debate regarding the issue of state sovereignty and what conditions or circumstances would legitimise intervention action. The NATO campaign against Serbia in March 1999, without a legitimising UNSC mandate to do so, emphasised the tension between the sovereignty, independence and equality of individual states on the one hand, and the contemporary trend towards collective multinational intervention action in cases of egregious human suffering on the other.

From the experience gained from the peace intervention in Kosovo, it is evident that, as long as UN standards and rules of engagement are followed in terms of how and when to intervene in humanitarian crises, regional organisations and groups of states or even single states have a crucial role to play in the provision of security. Therefore, although NATO's Air War might be questionable in the absence of a legitimising mandate, it points to the weakness of the UN in being unable to respond adequately and in time to humanitarian crises, which might compel regional organisations to take matters into their own hands as far as peace interventions are concerned. There was thus a clear acknowledgement by all parties concerned that time was of the essence when embarking on peace missions and that peace

initiatives could not be halted until such time as the UN authorised an intervention. This commitment to timely action effectively addressed the reconstruction gap, which, according to the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of DPMs, so often causes a relapse to violence in communities where peace interventions are embarked upon. In this regard, the peace intervention action by NATO was in accordance with one of the primary premises for the successful implementation of the concept of DPMs – thus proving that DPMs can provide a feasible solution or paradigm to humanitarian crises when resourceful role-players such as the UN and EU are prepared to make the required funds and resources available in support of peace interventions.

In the case of Kosovo, the international community firstly correctly appreciated the fact that a successful intervention in Kosovo would be dependent on the timely deployment of peacekeepers, and secondly, the international community correctly decided to simultaneously deploy a military, as well as a civilian component to address the diverse challenges associated with peace interventions – thus bringing peacebuilding closer to peacekeeping. These two decisions are in accordance with the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of DPMs and NATO successfully operationalised both these aspects during the intervention in Kosovo.

In addition to the debate regarding the legitimacy of the peace intervention in Kosovo, NATO's Air War in Kosovo also received widespread reaction and has been the origin of many discourses as to how it has impacted on war-fighting in general, as well as in terms of the conduct of peace missions and humanitarian interventions. Despite many criticisms regarding the operational and tactical effectiveness of the Air War, Operation Allied Force was presented as a success for two reasons: the refugees and displaced persons returned to Kosovo, and there is peace (or at least an absence of large-scale violence) – which was NATO's objective for the war. The significance of the military component's role in the peace process in Kosovo, is to be found in the fact that the reconstruction phase commenced immediately after Operation Allied Force was concluded, and the fact that the military component (KFOR) and the civilian component (UNIMK) were deployed simultaneously. The military and civilian components worked in unison in order to set the scene for sustained peace and development – thus effectively implementing the key success factors of DPMs by preventing the development of a reconstruction gap, which often leads to a resumption of conflict when peacebuilding activities are not rolled-out in time. In this regard, it is evident that the concept of DPMs is a feasible concept for establishing the conditions for sustainable peace and development in a conflict-stricken state such as Kosovo.

Ultimately, the peace process in Kosovo clearly shows that international peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN. It also bears testimony to the growing importance of regional organisations and alliances in international peace initiatives in the post-Cold War era – especially in the provision of funds and resources for peacebuilding initiatives. Complex emergencies require multi-faceted responses and it implies acceptance of the fact that the military is but one of the participants in any particular peace process. The intervention in Kosovo proved that the roles played by international, as well as local NGOs, are as important as those performed by the military component during peace interventions. Furthermore, the intervention in Kosovo bears testimony to the realisation that modern peace missions require an integrated systems-approach in order to effectively address the wide variety of inter-related issues that caused the conflict in the first place and that the capability and the willingness to act needs to be matched with adequate instruments in terms of funds and resources. Most importantly, the peace process in Kosovo emphasises the fact that complex peace missions call for the rapid and simultaneous deployment of peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding components – the essence of the philosophical and theoretical basis of the concept of DPMs. In this regard, the intervention in Kosovo proved that the concept of DPMs can indeed be a feasible framework for establishing sustainable peace and development. However, the experience in Kosovo also emphasised the fact that peace interventions must be supported by role-players that are able to provide the funds and resources required to successfully address all the aspects that constitute the DPMs construct.

## **CHAPTER 5: PEACE MISSIONS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT: SIERRA LEONE**

### **5.1. Introduction**

Africa has faced and is still plagued by a multiplicity of ‘old’ and ‘new’ security challenges (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:26). The problems are compounded by the fact that the “new challenges are nourished by the same ‘old’ security problems” (Aning, 2007:1). Both old and new security threats have been particularly prevalent in the regional security complexes of the Great Lakes, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. The interconnected nature of these security challenges has made it very difficult for the UN to deploy successful peace missions. The nature of these peacekeeping missions resulted in a shift away from traditional peacekeeping models to more complex models and approaches, especially the manner in which new missions are composed, funded driven or controlled and legitimised. There has also been a shift to greater security cooperation and hybrid arrangements involving combinations of both regional and global powers, the UN, continental bodies such as the EU and AU, as well as regional economic communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007:26).

In the light of the above-mentioned developments, the term ‘peacekeeping’ has come to be used to describe almost the entire range of activities that can be carried out by international personnel. According to Macqueen (2002:3), this variety of ‘peacekeeping’ functions has probably found a broader application in Africa than in other parts of the world where UN military missions have been deployed. These activities have ranged from discreet observation and monitoring carried out with the lightest of touches to the enforcement of outcomes by large, combat-figured forces.

In order to understand peace missions on the African continent, it is essential to understand the factors and influences that shaped the continent. According to Clapham (2000:29), in seeking to understand the international relations in Africa:

It is helpful to start by looking at a map of the continent on which state boundaries do not appear, and which is not coloured – not in the patchwork of blocks demarcating the formal territories of individual states – but in shades which correspond to population density and forms of

economic activity, and to the patterns of altitude, rainfall and vegetation on which human life largely depends (Clapham, 2000:29).

The link between poverty and conflict is complex, but indisputable. This is evident in the fact that nearly all of the world's twenty poorest states have experienced violent conflict in the past few decades. These violent conflicts usually materialise in the form of intra-state conflicts – a phenomenon that has plagued the world in the post-Cold War era. In the light of the above, many proposals and frameworks have been suggested to find answers to this quest for greater peace and prosperity in Africa. These proposed solutions are intended to effectively and holistically address the causes of conflicts by proposing realistic and achievable recommendations that would reduce or end ongoing conflicts, whilst at the same time creating conditions that would be conducive to sustainable development (Annan, 1998:1).

In view of the above, the peace interventions in Sierra Leone and the DRC were chosen as case studies to determine the feasibility of successfully implementing the concept of DPMs in Africa. These interventions were approached as peacekeeping operations that included simultaneous peacebuilding activities. To this effect, the interventions were both conducted in accordance with the new approach to UN peace missions that was adopted in the early 1990's in which peacebuilding is brought "closer" to peacekeeping – thus effectively addressing the 'reconstruction gap' which is so often presented as the cause or the reason for the relapse into violence in states that have been plagued by intra-state conflicts.

With both interventions, the challenge for the UN, regional organisations and NGOs was how to transform the short-term presence of peacekeepers in these two countries into efforts essentially aimed at societal transformation. As a result, the focus of the peacekeepers was to create an environment that would contribute to building sustainable peace, as opposed to merely providing security. This approach brought security thinking and practice into close collaboration with development policies and initiatives.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the approach to and nature of the intervention in Sierra Leone, as well as to assess the nature of and impact of international and regional responses to the crises. The analysis also addresses the course of events that led up to the interventions and includes an assessment of the experiences gained that could be used to inform future peace missions – specifically in terms of the feasibility and requirements for successfully implementing the concept of DPMs during UN peace initiatives on the African continent. The focus of the analysis will be on the inter-relationship between UN peace initiatives in Africa and the concept

of DPMs. This said, the conclusions and recommendations will thus have specific reference to the UN's peace initiatives in Africa, in as much as the concept of DPMs are concerned. This said, it needs to be noted that conclusions on the peace initiatives of the AU in Burundi and Darfur, where the AU was the lead organisation, will most probably differ from UN peace initiatives, as the AU does not have the same level of access to peacebuilding resources. In addition, authorisation for AU missions is most often based on different approaches and motivations than those of the UN.

## **5.2. The background to the conflict in Sierra Leone**

The conflict in Sierra Leone resulted from a great variety of causes, which shaped the complex environment that fuelled the widespread violence that ravaged the country. These include aspects such as the governmental corruption, the widespread corruption in the diamond industry, the deadly impact of Charles Taylor's influence in supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the atrocities committed by the RUF against the peoples of Sierra Leone, the import of weapons from neighbouring countries, economic decline and wide-spread unemployment (Siler, 2004:xliv).

Violence broke out in Sierra Leone in March 1991 when the Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor, provided weapons to a group of dissidents in Sierra Leone – allegedly in exchange for diamonds. His motive was thus primarily based on economic motivation, or at least for economical and political reasons. According to Macqueen (2002:224), the fundamental crisis in Sierra Leone was therefore not created by the disintegration of a central authority, as was the case in Liberia, but by the hopeless fragility of central authority in the face of the 'warlord challenge'. In terms of the latter, Taylor argued that he launched the attacks to hit back at the government of Sierra Leone for allowing its territory to be used by Nigerian planes on bombing missions against his forces. The violence continued for the next decade despite several regional attempts to broker a peace. Despite efforts by the Nigerian-led Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and a UN force, control could not be established over the rebels. Members of the RUF continued with their reign of terror and were funded by the illegal trade in diamonds – known as blood diamonds (Macqueen, 2002:183). Men, women and children were killed in a most brutal fashion, which reminded people of the genocide in Rwanda. Ultimately, the quest for political power by means of armed conflict, left this tiny West African country with a loss of 70 000 lives and thousands of amputees in the course of a decade (Abdulla, 2004:1). In essence, Sierra Leone followed the classic pattern of current intra-state wars in that the most striking feature of these conflicts had been their impact on civilians, who had been both perpetrators and victims of

violence. The conflict in Sierra Leone, as is the case in most African countries plagued by internal conflict, was also characterised by the total breakdown of state institutions, accompanied by vast human rights abuses and abject poverty.

There are many reasons for the widespread violence that broke out in Sierra Leone. Members of all the major tribes in Sierra Leone took part in the civil war. Sierra Leone has a population of 5,3 million people of which 60% are of Muslim faith and 30% are Christians. There are more than 17 tribes in Sierra Leone, of which the Temne and Mende tribes are pre-eminent – each comprising about 30% of the population. When the conflict broke out, the Mende tribe was the dominant party in government (Malan et al, 2002:13). Although the belligerent parties in the conflict contained members of all the major tribes in Sierra Leone, it would be wrong to classify the civil war in Sierra Leone as an ethnic conflict. In this regard, it would be more correct to describe it as an “inter-generational conflict”, as it was primarily the unemployed and disaffected youth who had become increasingly alienated from an ageing and stagnant government who were at the forefront of the armed insurrection that took place in Sierra Leone. Although the youth made up the majority of the belligerents, the whole population of Sierra Leone suffered as a result of the violence: some 2,5 million people (nearly half the population) were made refugees or became internally displaced as a result of the violence, and an estimated 27 000 children were enlisted as combatants in the war which resulted in 70 000 deaths and left 20 000 citizens maimed as a result of violent amputation (Malan et al, 2002:13).

### **5.3. The road to war and external peace intervention**

The widespread conflict in Sierra Leone ensued when the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) by 1994/1995 “had become a bloated, ill-trained organisation, which had become very much part of Sierra Leone’s problem”, was overrun by the RUF, led by Corporal Foday Sankoh (Douglas, 1999:178). The RUF soon after began to seize diamond-mining properties, which was the main source of hard currency for the government. By early 1995, the RUF had effectively laid siege to the capital city of Freetown (Abdullah, 1998:203). While far from a disciplined force, the RUF was sufficiently effective to disrupt the national army, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). Badly trained, paid, equipped and led, the SLA was deeply demoralised and soon showed an alarming proclivity for fraternisation and even co-operation with its supposed enemy. The term ‘sobel’ (soldier) was coined to describe SLA troops who were happy to kill, maim and loot either independently or along with the RUF as the mood took them (Macqueen, 2002:183).

In the face of inaction by the UNSC, the government of Sierra Leone contracted the services of Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African-based private military company to defend the capital, Freetown. EO was originally contracted to deploy 160 of its personnel in Sierra Leone from May 1995 to March 1996. After training company-sized contingents of the RSLAF, EO provided the leadership, helicopters and fire-support necessary prosecute a war against the RUF. By the end of 1995, the siege of Freetown by the RUF had been lifted and the RUF headquarters at Makeni had been destroyed. The Koindu diamond area and the Sierra Rutile area had been liberated and were again open for operations (Alao, 1998:50).

After the siege had been lifted, peace talks between the government and representatives of the RUF were initiated on 22 February 1996. Numerous peace agreements and cease-fires were negotiated over time, but widespread violence continued to plague the population of Sierra Leone despite all the efforts. The peace talks were soon followed by, as it turned out, wholly premature elections, without following the usual prescribed UN pattern of ceasefire, peace agreement, disarmament, demobilisation and then election processes. After two rounds of voting, and amidst gross intimidation of the electorate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) emerged as President in March 1996. However, this experiment with democracy was abruptly ended on 25 May 1997 when Kabbah's government was violently overthrown by Major Johnny Paul Koromah in a typical palace *coup d'état* (Malan et al, 2002:17). The SLA faction of Koromah, invigorated by the prospect of plunder, provided a match for the Nigerians who continued to back the elected government. However, ECOMOG had already left the country under the terms of the then irrelevant Abijan Agreement. Almost immediately, the unpredictable Koromah announced his alignment with the 'ideology' of the RUF, invited them to join him in 'government' and inaugurated a reign of chaos and terror in the parts of the country over which he could claim control (Macqueen, 2002:185).

These events were immediately condemned by a wide variety of international and regional organisations. The former Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also condemned the *coup* and called for the immediate restoration of the constitutional order, urging the leaders of ECOWAS to take immediate action against the instigators (Ejime, 1997). On 23 October 1997, ECOWAS and Koromah's junta reached agreement on a six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea. This agreement called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the supervision of the cease-fire agreement by ECOMOG and the UN military observers (Macqueen, 2002:186). The Conakry agreements also provided for the effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants as well as the restoration of the



constitutional order and the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah as president and head of a more broadly based government on 28 May 1998. The operational mandate of ECOWAS' military arm, ECOMOG was consequently extended from Liberia to Sierra Leone in order to prevent the total breakdown of law and order. The Conakray agreement was not respected by Koromah and in February 1998, ECOMOG, in response to an attack by the junta forces, launched an attack that finally led to the collapse of the junta, as well as its expulsion from Freetown. ECOMOG subsequently expanded its force deployment in an attempt to secure the rest of the country and on 10 March 1998, President Kabbah formally returned to office (Macqueen, 2002:186). However, socio-economic conditions continued to deteriorate and the UN eventually established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) alongside the regional ECOMOG force in June 1998.

UNOMSIL, a relatively small peace force if compared to other UN missions, was deployed for an initial period of six months. The aim of the mission was to promote national reconciliation and to provide assistance with the demobilisation of former combatants, in collaboration with ECOMOG (Macqueen, 2002:187). The security situation in Sierra Leone made headlines when, despite the presence of UNOMSIL and the ECOMOG force, rebel forces sacked Freetown in January 1999 (UNSC, 1999). These events precipitated the negotiation of the Lome Agreement that was signed in July 1999. However, little progress had been made towards the achievement of this aim when on 6 January 1999, members of the deposed Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the RUF overwhelmed the ECOMOG defences and swept into Freetown. They subsequently went on a rampage, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, whilst even more civilians were dismembered and raped. Ultimately, the fighting resulted in the deaths of about 5 000 people, whilst up to 150 000 people who were living in the Freetown area, were displaced when large numbers of public buildings and homes were also burnt to the ground (UNSC, 1999).

At the time of these events, Nigeria, who had been the backbone of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, could no longer sustain its regional commitments and subsequently informed the international community that they could no longer maintain its deployments in Sierra Leone. The impending Nigerian withdrawal resulted in a frantic scramble among the other West African states to broker a peace agreement. The SRSG initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels (Malan et al, 2002:19). Negotiations between the belligerent parties began in May 1999 and after coaxing from the UK and the USA, a controversial peace agreement was signed by President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh and other members of the RUF on 7 July 1999 in Lome, Togo. The Lome

Accord granted total amnesty to Corporal Sankoh and the members of the RUF, promised the reintegration of the RUF into the new Sierra Leonean army, assured the RUF several cabinet seats in the transitional government, and left the RUF in control of the diamond mines and invited Sankoh to participate in UN-sponsored elections. In exchange for senior government positions for its commanders, as well as a blanket amnesty for atrocities committed during the war, the RUF pledged to disarm along with the pro-government CDF and other paramilitary units (Macqueen, 2002:188).

Ultimately, despite the obvious flaws in the Lome Agreement, the UN was obliged to back it up with a peacekeeping mission. This resulted in the decision to deploy UNAMSIL as a peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone in October 1999 (UNSC, 1999).

#### **5.4. UNAMSIL deployment**

UNAMSIL initially consisted of approximately 6 000 military personnel, of which 260 were military observers from 30 countries. Four ECOMOG battalions (comprising troops from Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria) were already in Sierra Leone and were 're-hatted' as UN peacekeepers. The latter was essential, in order to avoid a security vacuum during the period of mission build-up. The remaining units of UNAMSIL would be provided from India, Bangladesh, Jordan and Zambia. The force build-up progressed haphazardly and UN peacekeepers were often denied freedom of movement amidst frequent cease-fire violation and ambushes of both civilian, as well as UN personnel (Macqueen, 2002:189). The maintenance of illegal roadblocks by elements of the RUF and CDF continued (Adebajo, 2007:2). In response to these serious security concerns, the UNSC unanimously voted on 7 February 2000 to strengthen UNAMSIL's mission in Sierra Leone in accordance with UN Resolution 1289, 2000. This Resolution raised the maximum authorised force strength from 6 000 to 11 000, and also granted the mission and expanded mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter (UNSC, 2000).

UNAMSIL was created on 22 October 1999 by the UNSC Resolution 1270. The Mission was tasked to achieve, inter alia the following objectives (Molukanele et al, 2004:42):

- assisting the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilise the situation progressively throughout the entire country; and

- assisting in the promotion of a political process that should lead to a renewed DDR programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.

UNAMSIL, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, was mandated to (Molukanele et al, 2004:42):

- assist with the implementation of the peace agreement;
- assist the government in the DDR programme;
- ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel;
- monitor adherence to the ceasefire of 18 May 1999;
- facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- support the operation of UN civilian officials; and
- provide support, when requested with regard to elections as constituted in the constitution of Sierra Leone.

Later, under UNSC Resolution 1289, the mandate was expanded to (Molukanele et al, 2004:42):

- to provide security at key government installations, intersections and airports;
- to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian aid on designated roadways;
- to provide security at the DDR sites;
- to co-ordinate with and assist Sierra Leone law enforcement bodies in carrying out their duties; and
- to safeguard weapons and ammunition recovered from ex-combatants and assist in the disposal of some weapons and ammunition.

However, UNAMSIL was neither sufficiently strong in size, nor properly configured and or equipped to pose a credible military deterrent to the rebels. Although Resolution 1289 provided the legal framework for coercive action by UNAMSIL in pursuit of its disarmament mandate, it could not be translated into assertive and credible action on the ground. Although the total number of disarmed combatants that passed through the five UNAMSIL-supervised DDR camps numbered about 23 000 by April 2000, the ratio of collected arms to the number of ex-combatants who had given up arms, remained low (UNSC, 2000:186). According to statistics provided by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), only some 5 000 weapons had been handed in by Sierra Leonean belligerents who reportedly numbered about 45 000 by 15 April 2000

(Malan et al, 2000:23). By May 2000, the mission was in crisis when four UN peacekeepers (Kenyan) were killed and about 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF (Neethling, 2002:39). The RUF took the Zambian contingent hostage, disarmed them and stole thirteen armoured personnel carriers (APCs). A dead Zambian soldier was flayed and his skin nailed to a tree as part of the RUF's psychological terrorising (Prins, 2007:15). The RUF then advanced on Freetown – using the captured Zambian APCs (Malan, et al, 2000:23). This incident was unprecedented in terms of the UN's history and many scholars and observers reacted by fiercely attacking and blaming the UN-system as the reason for its occurrence. It was only after the UN Force Commander vacated his post as a result of his frustrations with the UN's inability to act decisively, that the UN started to take action. This incident contributed to the collapse of the coherence of the UN force and resulted in the highlighting of the issue that UN troops are often ill-equipped and ill-prepared for actual fighting or peace enforcement operations. The then UNSG, Kofi Annan, appealed to UN members to come to the rescue (Prins, 2007:15). Parallel to new initiatives embarked upon by the UN, following the above-mentioned killing and hostage-taking of the peacekeepers, the UK deployed a Battalion of Special Forces and five warships at a critical juncture in an attempt to resolve the situation and to send the important message that UNAMSIL would not be abandoned in the face of a crisis. The UK named this operation '*Operation Palliser*', which, according to Prins (2007:15), ultimately rescued the UN force and the UN's reputation. The UK also stepped up its effort to train the national army and police service.

Malan et al (2002:23) point out that although the British forces maintained that their primary mission was to safeguard their citizens, the troops defended parts of Freetown and Lungi international airports and set up patrols on the streets of Freetown and the main highway leading to the capital (BBC, 2000). In terms of credibility, the military force that was deployed by the UK was immediately perceived as professional and effective, and operated with a clear chain of command and political support (Hayes, 2000:1). This was in stark contrast to what was demonstrated by the deployment of UNAMSIL at the time. The UN's inability to distinguish between impartiality and neutrality nearly sank the UNAMSIL mission. As a result, it was the primary aim of the commander of the British Force, Brigadier (now Lieutenant-General) Richards to switch the UNAMSIL mindset into support for the electoral Kabbah government (Prins, 2007:17).

The small, but decisive unilateral intervention by Britain raised some hard questions about UN peacekeeping in Africa at the beginning of the new century. In this regard, Macqueen (2002:228) asks: "had nothing been learned from the failure of

earlier peace processes that the UN had been supposed to implement? And, at the operational level, why had UNAMSIL, a large force with a far-reaching mandate, been so supine in the face of challenges from ill-organised and untrained gangs of rebels? Even in the strict minimalist terms of peacekeeping set out in the Hammarhjold-era, the right of self-defence was fully acknowledged. Was the apparent impossibility of this operation so demoralising to its participants that even basic military instincts were dulled?" (Macqueen, 2002:228). In contrast, while their goals were limited and not open-ended, the military intervention by the UK proved to be vital in restoring order in Sierra Leone in a limited period of time. In failed-state emergencies, the lack of security greatly hampers the ability of NGOs to complete their humanitarian missions. According to Jackson (2005:109), the NGOs in countries such as Sierra Leone must have the backing of military forces such as the British or Australian in the East Timor intervention of 1999 to succeed. All parties to the conflict perceived these forces as reputable, professional and effective. Most UN peacekeeping forces lack these professional requisites. The quality of the military forces is thereby crucial for NGO success.

After successfully assisting the Jordanian and Indian Army elements of UNAMSIL to halt the advancing rebels, Brigadier Richards designed a psychologically-led operation that relied heavily upon collaboration with the international assets of the Sierra Leonean Army to create such fear and uncertainty in the minds of targeted rebel commanders that they abandoned their positions and fled into the interior of Sierra Leone. According to Prins (2007:20), *Operation Palliser* was completed within the span of a month and exemplified ways in which a commander with small, but highly capable joint services force create the conditions for economic and political confidence in the wider population, while at the same time applying poison that can destroy the enemy forces from within by breaking their morale and undermining their leadership elements.

In addition to the deployment of UNAMSIL, political and economic pressure was applied on Liberia, thus weakening the rebels' access to assistance and sustainment of their war efforts. In addition, Guinea also dealt the rebels a decisive military blow on the Sierra Leone-Guinea border (Guehenno, 2005:14). The UN also mandated the expansion of the UN forces to one that was more robust and deployed a significantly stronger 17 500 force. This was the strongest force that the UN had deployed in years. At the same time, these events prompted the UN to re-assess its capacity to resolve conflict that resulted in the Brahimi Report in 2000 in which the strengthening of the UN's institutional capacity in terms of conflict resolution and peacekeeping was addressed at length. In effect, the result of the analysis pointed to the fact that the UN required more funds and better equipped men and women – in

terms of equipment, as well as training (Neething, 2005:24). The problems experienced by UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone had clearly demonstrated the danger of sending a weak and inadequately trained peacekeeping force into a country where a fragile peace process prevailed. It became very evident that the key to the successful prosecution of peace missions was the credibility of the intervention force. According to Hayes (2000:1), this credibility encompasses much more than the simple military over-matching of the indigenous combatants, and must certainly not degenerate to an unacceptable use of violence. It must be demonstrated and, more importantly, perceived as a credible force for good at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, both internationally and in the theatre of operations (Hayes, 2000:1).

The UN force arrived in a piecemeal fashion and the available troop strength was too low to allow a widespread deployment. Following the RUF offensive in May 2000, the entire peace process reached an impasse. The RUF's aggression against the peacekeepers, culminating in the widespread hostage taking in May 2000, made UNAMSIL realise that the compliance with peace accords and UNSC resolutions cannot be taken for granted, and that the peace force must be equipped with an effective deterrence capacity (Macqueen, 2002:194).

The (Indian) UNAMSIL force commander, Major-General Vijay Jetley, left the mission in August 2000 after several confrontations with his Nigerian lieutenants. In addition to alleging that Nigeria was attempting to sabotage the UNAMSIL mission through collusion with the RUF, Major-General Jetley experienced some serious problems of a logistical nature, and was forthright in his criticism of the various national contingents that had been placed under his command. Following these events, India and Jordan announced that they would leave the mission in September and October 2000 respectively. At his time, the conflict progressed to that of a regional operation, when an attack took place on Guinean soil by a group of dissidents who were supported by the RUF on 8 September 2000 (Pratt, 2001:9). The violence escalated and by January 2001, the Guinea Armed Forces were attacking dissidents and RUF members with artillery fire directed into Liberia. This action elicited threats of retaliation from Charles Taylor. ECOWAS was very concerned about the threat of the looming regional conflict and consequently deployed a force of 1 796 peacekeepers at the convergence of the borders of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia (Malan et al, 2002:25).

The UNAMSIL deployment remained painfully slow, due to constant troop rotations, the uneven quality of the various national contingents of the troop contributing countries, and continued logistical challenges and co-ordination

problems associated with the sheer massive size of the UNAMSIL deployment (Farah, 2000:A42). Despite concerted efforts to overcome these challenges and to find a workable solution to reconcile the multiple interests involved in the Sierra Leone peace process, the numerous external policy conflicts essentially thwarted all efforts. This resulted in widespread dissatisfaction among role-players, and generally demoralised the peacekeepers.

After the departure of Major-General Vijay Jetley in August 2000, the new UNAMSIL Force Commander (Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande of Kenya) and Chief of Staff (Brigadier Alistair Duncan of the UK) arrived in theatre in November 2000. The new Force Commander and his Deputy immediately embarked on a programme of visits to the demoralised contingents of the respective troop contributing countries. Following the departure of the previous Force Commander, the military elements of UNAMSIL, both in the headquarters, as well as in the field, had done little but administrative work. The situation demanded a return to military basics, and the various planning process were immediately shifted into top gear. The UN headquarters in New York provided the strategic guidance and a very important task was force generation to get the mission up to its required strength, as well as to restore UNAMSIL's credibility in the theatre (Malan et al, 2002:27).

The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 November 2000, followed by the Abuja Ceasefire Review Agreement of 2 May 2002 (Abuja II). This agreement constituted a breakthrough in the peace process, with the Government and the RUF agreeing to the disarmament of all combatants belonging to the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces, and both parties accepting the need for the government to restore its authority throughout the country (Macqueen, 2002:194).

The general elections of 14 May 2002 represented a major step forward in Sierra Leone's quest for sustainable peace and development. Sierra Leoneans turned out in large numbers to vote in peaceful elections and approximately 2,3 million voters registered to cast their ballots at about 5 000 polling stations. The elections did not result in a change of government, but the active participation of members of the RUF signalled a commitment to both peace and the democratisation process. One of the outstanding features of the 2002 elections was the level of public engagement and the overall peaceful nature of the campaign process. By the end of 2004, UNAMSIL disarmed some 75 000 former combatants, facilitated significant improvements to infrastructure, expanded state authority and has almost rebuilt the national police force to its target size of 9 500 officers. Although public confidence in the police and armed forces remained low, it was generally felt that the overall security situation in Sierra Leone had improved (Molukanele et al, 2004:42).

### **5.5. Results of the UNAMSIL intervention**

The intervention in Sierra Leone must be viewed against the more integrative and holistic approach to peacekeeping that has been accepted by the UN since the early 1990's. This relates to programmes that addressed humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons, the consolidation of civil authority, the promotion of human rights and good governance, as well as the restoration of the legal system. Significant contributions were made by the international community, (EU, UK and the USA), who invested and provided practical aid in several of these programmes. For example: the USA's total humanitarian and emergency contribution in the 2002 fiscal year, including grants to the World Food Programme and other aid agencies, assistance to refugees, programmes to combat HIV/AIDS, and the reintegration of combatant and development programmes, amounted to \$56 million. This supports the broader understanding of the concept of peacebuilding, in that it requires ambitious (and expensive) long-term nation-building efforts by international actors in order to prevent a return to conflict (Neethling, 2005:83).

The successful completion of the DDR processes of former combatants was appreciated as central to establishing peace and stability in Sierra Leone. According to Malan et al (2002:10), the success of the whole intervention process in Sierra Leone therefore hinged on the degree to which warring factions could effectively be disarmed and reintegrated into new security structures. The complexity of this process is compounded by the fact that, whilst disarmament and freedom of movement are primarily military concerns, the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants into society falls in the realm of civilian concerns. In addition, in a country where the formal economy hardly exists, it is very difficult to find employment for former combatants. This again, is exacerbated by the fact that illegal diamond mining remains a lucrative source of income for former combatants on all sides who have relied on the war economy for extended periods of time. However, despite several challenges relating to the DDR process, UNAMSIL reported that 45 449 former combatants have handed over weapons to the authorities between 18 May 2001 and 6 January 2002. On 7 January 2002, UNAMSIL declared that the disarmament of former fighters under the Sierra Leone government's DDR programme had formally ended (Malan et al, 2002:11).

However, much remains to be done in terms of the 'reintegration' of former combatants into the society and the economy of post-conflict Sierra Leone. The UN relies on partners such as the World Bank to assist in completing DDR programmes (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:183–198). Gueli et al (2006:18) argues that



as a result, DDR programmes may not be completed or may not begin at all, without the support of external funding. For example, in June 2001, the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund for DDR in Sierra Leone received less than half of the funds estimated for reintegration programmes. As a result, at the end of the reintegration programme in January 2002, more than a third of ex-combatants failed to receive any assistance. Soon after, these ex-combatants began to pose security problems, mobilise for protests, migrate toward the diamond-producing areas, and to be recruited in these areas to fight in neighbouring Liberia (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:3).

The problems experienced with the coordination of activities between the military and civilian components in terms of their respective roles pertaining to the DDR processes, also impacted on many other fields in terms of the peace process. In this regard, the conversion of the RUF from a fighting force into a political party was identified as key to the attainment of lasting peace in Sierra Leone. However, many scholars were and are still of the opinion that this conversion process was neglected as a result of the over-emphasis that was placed on the establishment and extension of civil political authority throughout Sierra Leone. The issue of civilian control throughout the country was regarded as an all-important benchmark to be achieved before the staging of elections, and the extension of civil authority was at the centre of UNSC resolutions, as well as the mandate and mission statement of UNAMSIL. However, international assistance with this imperative continued to be primarily aimed at the restructuring of the military and the police, with little attention devoted to the broader aspects of civil administration such as health, education and social welfare. It was argued that the transformation of the RUF into a political party is essential, if the political process was indeed deemed to take precedence over the military in the peace process. In the event that this process was not successfully conducted, the RUF would have found itself marginalised from the overall political process and this could have resulted in renewed outbreaks of violence.

The conflict in Sierra Leone was a result of poor governance, which ultimately caused the collapse of the formal economy of Sierra Leone, resulting in unemployment, poverty, poor education and a broken-down infrastructure. In the light of the complexity and the extent of the conflict that broke out in Sierra Leone, it is clear that the UN actually had an insurmountable challenge to face in terms of attempting to keep the peace. Despite all the difficulties, the UN finally did help to stabilise the security situation in Sierra Leone. They managed to disarm and demobilise approximately 75 000 combatants – among which counted about 20 000 child soldiers (Mulakazi, 2006:26). The fact that peaceful elections were held in 2002 was truly remarkable. UNAMSIL completed its mandate on 31 December

2005. Several benchmarks were used to measure UNAMSIL's success and these, among others, included security sector reform, the consolidation of state authority, the reintegration of ex-combatants and control over the diamond-mining industry (the so-called 'blood diamonds') that was utilised to finance the belligerents (Mulakazi, 2006:26).

However, despite these positive developments – the question remains: can this peace be sustained? The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) in Sierra Leone achieved much in addressing the social and psychological damage that had been experienced and has been cited as one of the most outstanding features from a peacebuilding perspective (Neethling, 2005:87). The TRC in Sierra Leone was fashioned on similar commissions in Chile, Guatemala and South Africa. The intention with the TRC was to investigate the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations that occurred in Sierra Leone, as well as to help restore the human dignity of victims, as well as promote national reconciliation. In addition to the TRC, a Special UN Court for Sierra Leone was established to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. This special court and the TRC both played a critical role in building institutions that the citizens could trust, however, justice remains one of the acute problems facing Sierra Leone, especially for rural residents (Malan et al, 2002:11). To establish the judiciary in Sierra Leone would entail a process of judicial reform as an adjunct to the Special Court and the TRC.

A great challenge to the peace in Sierra Leone is that of pervasive poverty. It has recently been classified as the world's poorest country. Sierra Leone still faces the challenge of large numbers of unemployed youth, inadequate capacity in state institutions and extreme poverty levels with 68% of the population still living under the poverty line. In terms of economic growth, Solomon Berewa, the Vice-President of Sierra Leone pointed out that, based on the successes achieved with the UNAMSIL deployment, the economy had been opened up and that macro-economic stability had been achieved. He added that the programmes provided by the Bretton Woods Institutions had boosted the economy and that they had achieved an economic growth rate of over 7% (Berewa, 2006). However, there is still very little foreign investment that is required to bolster the fledgling economy and the economy is still primarily structured on a gigantic informal economy. Thousands of youths are unemployed – which is a threatening situation – given the large numbers of child soldiers that were part of the conflict. This threat should be viewed against the worldwide phenomenon that there is a close relationship between a high number of youths between the ages of 15 to 29 years, and a high prevalence of violence or armed conflict. In addition, the morale of most of the defence force members in

Sierra Leone was low – due to very low standards of living. This is a very dangerous situation in that it is exactly the defence force that should be the guardian of the fragile peace (Neethling, 2005:25).

Ultimately, the intervention in Sierra Leone has been dubbed a qualified success, due to the support of the international community, the UN and the leadership of UNAMSIL who stayed the course, despite several setbacks on the road to recovery. After the disastrous encounter with the RUF in May 2000, several changes were made and UNAMSIL was better led than at any other time since its inception. Analysts report that it was specifically the contributions of the Pakistani brigade and the Russian air wing that provided the mission with a powerful deterrent capacity (Neethling, 2002:43). The UNSG commented that UNAMSIL played a meaningful role in helping Sierra Leone to move towards the 2002 election process and furthermore reported that the disarmament process and the deployment of UNAMSIL had created a relatively more secure environment in general, and had afforded the people of Sierra Leone the opportunity to move past conflict towards national reconciliation and recovery, as well as building sustainable institutions (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:11–12).

The importance of the intervention in Sierra Leone is to be found in the fact that the UN deployed about 14 000 peacekeepers to Sierra Leone in 2004 to a country with a population of 5,7 million. In contrast, the UN had deployed only about 10 000 peacekeepers to the DRC – a country that is territorially much larger than Sierra Leone, but also a country with a population at least ten times as large as that of Sierra Leone (Bell, 2005:1). Many scholars commented that the UN deployment in Sierra Leone heralded the ‘UN’s return to Africa’ after many of the key role-players in the West had withdrawn their attentions and resources from Africa in the aftermath of the disastrous interventions in Somalia and Rwanda during the early 1990’s. Overall, the UNAMSIL deployment achieved many successes, among which the all-important milestones achieved in regularising the diamond industry, which had fuelled the conflict for many years (Bell, 2005:1-2). In November 2005, UNAMSIL hosted an International Music Festival to mark the ‘end of the successful UN mission in West Africa’, which brought peace and stability to a country that had been engulfed in one of the most brutal wars in the international community (Bell, 2005:1).

There are still many challenges to be overcome in Sierra Leone. One of the primary areas for development is on the political terrain, because, although significant inroads have been made in terms of state authority throughout much of the country, the capacity of recently established security, administrative and judicial structures remains severely limited and suffers from shortfalls in logistics, infrastructure and

qualified personnel ((UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:6). Many role-players have expressed the opinion that the post-conflict political situation in Sierra Leone is the same as what it was at the beginning of the war in 1991. As a result, there are still many who fear that there could be a return to the *status quo ante bellum* that could foster renewed instability (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:10). There are also similar concerns to the very effect that the success that was achieved with UNAMSIL's peacekeeping operations might have created unreasonable political and economic expectations that could in fact, develop into a new source of popular discontent.

Despite many successes that were achieved by UNAMSIL in ensuring general security, several minor, but significant challenges persist in this area. The RSLAF acknowledged that it was unprepared to assume responsibility for Sierra Leone's external security when UNAMSIL departed. In terms of the reconstruction of infrastructure, many construction initiatives fell victim to building delays and significant budget shortfalls. The RSLAF also suffered from a severely depleted transport fleet, as well as wholly insufficient communications equipment. In order to address these shortages, the government had petitioned UNAMSIL to donate some of its equipment when it liquidated. In addition to the lack of resources, the RSLAF also continually suffered from disciplinary and moral problems. As a result, the UNAMSIL withdrawal process had to be approached with the utmost care, as a significant sector of the population had little confidence in the capacity of the RSLAF to continually secure the peace. This problem was addressed by the deployment of a small UN follow-on force, intended as a short-term solution and backstop for the state security organs in Sierra Leone (Molukanele et al, 2004:43).

In order to ensure sustained peace and development in Sierra Leone, it will require the continued international and regional support for the fostering of good governance practices and long-term economic development (Malan et al, 2002:12). The UN must continue with its peacebuilding programmes in post-conflict Sierra Leone. This realisation is based on experiences gained that proved that sustainable peace must be coupled to active developmental initiatives – the basis of the concept of DPMs. These initiatives are not short-term endeavours and require vast funds – funds that are not always readily available, as Africa is often regarded as of lesser strategic value. An important aspect contained in the Brahimi Report is the call for increased financial support, as well as renewed commitment on the part of UN member states. The report cited financial constraints as a factor that seriously impairs the UN's ability to conduct peace operations in a credible, professional manner. However, despite the shortages of funds and resources, the UN and several developmental

organisations continue to do significant work in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Burundi, Liberia and others.

### **5.6. From UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL**

The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established by the UNSC on 31 August 2005, after UNAMSIL completed its mandate on 31 December 2005. The UN established UNIOSIL through Resolution S/RES/1620 (UNSC, 2005). The UNIOSIL office comprises of the Executive Representative and five compartments targeting key areas of the mandate. These compartments include: peace and governance, human rights and the rule of law, civilian police, military, and public information (UNSC, 2005). These components were formed to assist the government of Sierra Leone to consolidate gains already made, as well as to assist in capacity-building for state departments and the designing and implementation of a national action plan for human rights (UNSC, 2005). UNIOSIL is a good example of the adoption of the more integrated approach to peace missions that have been adopted by the UN in the last two decades. This is evident in the appointment of the Executive Secretary-General's Representative as head of the UNDP country office (Mulakazi, 2006:26).

Significant results have been achieved in Sierra Leone since the establishment of UNIOSIL. These include the establishment of stability, the expansion of commercial activities, progress with national reconciliation and the building of a new and professional police force. With regard to an effective police force, UNIOSIL also instituted measures to track widespread corruption to avert situations that might derail the prevailing stability in the country.

Reform of the justice sector has been slow and according to Mulakazi (2006:26), the structural weaknesses continue to pose a great challenge to the consolidation of peace. However, the UN has achieved much in facilitating the training and deployment of magistrates in various districts. This resulted in a reduction in the backlog of cases and the shortening of pre-trial detentions. Some improvements in infrastructure have resulted in the building of courthouses and prisons (Mulakazi, 2006:26).

Despite the many positive developments in Sierra Leone, the country still faces the challenge of very large numbers of unemployed youth, inadequate capacity in state institutions, extreme poverty levels with about 68% of the population living below the poverty line, coupled to an overall fragile security situation (World Bank, 2005). In addition, about 70% of Sierra Leone's population remain illiterate. Illegal

diamond-mining, long the primary source of funds that fuelled the conflict, continues (although on a much smaller scale) and the intermittent encroachment of the armed forces of Guinea on land in the eastern and northern provinces of Sierra Leone pose a great danger to the security of the country (Mulakazi, 2006:27).

The selling of 'blood diamonds' by trans-national criminal networks to support the war economies of fighting factions in Sierra Leone, serves as a good example of the complexities that face peacekeepers. Despite the deployment of the largest-ever UN force to Sierra Leone in March 2001, not one component of the force was responsible for monitoring the trade of conflict diamonds. The selling of these 'blood diamonds' continued, as UN peacekeepers were not mandated to act in this regard. This situation only changed in September 2004, when the UNSC adopted a new resolution that authorised UN personnel to monitor and patrol diamond-mining areas (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:5).

This outcome underscores the realisation that the mere monitoring of the activities of trans-national networks is insufficient to curb resource exploitation and trade. It is quite clear that, in order to effectively curtail resource flows, monitoring and reporting activities should be supported by a commitment to effective enforcement mechanisms (Gueli et al, 2006c:16). This will require not only improved intelligence, but also personnel with the technical expertise to target and capture those that support the functioning of trans-national criminal networks.

Whilst it is of critical importance for the UN to be perceived as legitimate and credible, it is equally important to isolate and marginalise those that are keen on sustaining conflict and smuggling valuable resources (Kaldor, 1999:126). This means that, where applicable, the UN may be required to revise its current deterrent posture in complex peace operations and act in a more forcible manner against those that have neither the political will nor the financial compulsion to end violent conflict. Following the events that took place in the mid-1990's in Bosnia and Sierra Leone in which serious blows were delivered against UN forces by the protagonists in the respective countries, the international community was filled with enthusiasm for the possibility of finally giving the UN a muscular capacity to fulfil its Chapter VII roles in ways that the original drafters of the UN Charter had envisaged (Prins, 2007:7). Gueli et al (2006c:17) argues that: "if the UN is in the business of solving conflict, it is fair to suggest that the UN should act appropriately (hence forcibly) against those who are involved in the business of war". Gueli et al (2006c:17) concludes that one of the most successful developments in terms of UN deployments is the realisation within the UN that early development work in peacekeeping operations can reduce the chances of countries returning to conflict.

In terms of initiating development work as soon as possible, integrating civil-military resources at the earliest possible stages of a mission may seem plausible. However, civilian reconstruction specialists are notably absent in peace missions. This is in part due to the fact that a good number of UN-contributing states, especially the top-ten providers of peacekeepers, have not taken concrete and systematic steps to enhance or establish a cadre of civilians with reconstruction expertise. The absence of a rapidly deployable civilian reconstruction capacity in peace missions has also proved ineffective, because the pace of reconstruction and development is typically slow (as non-military services are often filled by military peacekeepers who lack formal training in this regard). To this end, a number of post-conflict societies have relapsed back into conflict (Gueli et al, 2006b:7).

On 12 October 2006, Solomon Berewa, the Vice-President of Sierra Leone, stated in an address to the UN Peacebuilding Commission, that “there is now peace in the country, democratic elections have already been held with success and all that the country should now do is to get on with the normal business of development” (Berewa, 2006:26). However, he also cautioned that the sustained development of a viable state is dependent on how effectively issues such as poverty and development will be addressed in Sierra Leone. This observation clearly supports the notion proposed by the concept of DPMS, namely that the two issues of ‘security’ and ‘development’ are closely linked, and in order to prevent a country such as Sierra Leone from sliding back into conflict, the two issues should be addressed simultaneously and sustainable peace should be pursued by means of special and specific peacebuilding measures (De Coning, 2004:42). This approach is in line with the general acceptance of the notion that peacebuilding is not an activity that is limited to the post-conflict stage of an intervention, but peacebuilding can also be preventative (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004:3). This supports the broader view that peacebuilding is essentially focused on removing or weakening the factors that sustain conflict and reinforcing factors that build peace (Hitchcock, 2004:38). In addition, coupled to the general consensus that peacebuilding efforts should already be attempted during the earliest indication of potential conflict, the term ‘peacebuilding’ was gradually expanded to refer to integrated approaches to address violent conflict during all phases of the conflict cycle (Tschirgi, 2003:1).

According to Gueli et al (2006c:16) peacebuilding efforts usually only start during the post-conflict phase of a peace-mission – that is following the signing of a cease-fire or comprehensive peace agreement. Moreover, many policy makers still insist that distinguishing between military and civilian activities in peace missions provides them with a clear line, delineating specific roles and responsibilities in

different stages of conflict. This in effect, emphasises a linear or sequential approach to solving conflict situations and is in line with traditional approaches to solving military problems. But, as previously indicated, the UN's record over the past few decades has largely dispelled such traditional ideas and practices: two enduring lessons that the UN has learnt through years of experience in responding to conflict is that speed and momentum do matter in peace missions, and that effective missions require integrated efforts – not separate tracks that do not converge.

The fact that conflict in Africa routinely subsides and returns whilst peacekeepers are deployed, and that the reliance on peacekeeping is constantly increasing, suggest a case of what is termed in systems-thinking as the 'shifting-the-burden archetype'. This archetype reveals that an underlying problem (in this case war economy) generates systems (intractable conflict, resource exploitation) that demand attention. A short-term solution (peacekeeping) is used to correct the problem – with seemingly positive results (ceasefire agreements and peace agreements), but over time it becomes evident that this solution only ameliorates the symptom, while the underlying problem (lack of socio-economic development) is left unaltered. In the long-term, the symptomatic problem resurfaces (in the return to conflict) and there is increased pressure for symptomatic responses (quick fixes). Meanwhile, the underlying problem remains un-addressed, and the side-effects of the symptomatic response (sustaining war economies) make it harder to apply the fundamental solution (peacebuilding) (UN, 2005b:11).

The UN's response to the conflict in Sierra Leone is a good example of the 'shifting-the-burden structure'. Although UN peacekeepers have been deployed for several years since 1999, the underlying causes of the conflict have until now, not been sufficiently addressed (UN, 2005b:11). The UN's initial response to the conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in a scenario of recurrent conflict where achievements were generally short-lived and unsustainable as many of the peacebuilding initiatives were not well-planned and coordinated. Pressure to ameliorate these problems resulted in a gradual increase in the number of military peacekeepers, from 6 000 in October 1999 to 17 500 in March 2001 (UN, 2001:11). However, despite attempts to bolster the UN's peacekeeping capacity, widespread poverty, illiteracy, discrimination against women, corruption, lack of accountability and high levels of unemployment continue to contribute to the level of instability that is still prevalent in Sierra Leone (UN, 2005b:10).

In an attempt to transform itself into an organisation that is indeed able to play a more coordinated role in peacebuilding activities in post-conflict societies, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in December 2005 (Deller,



2006:8). The PBC was established as an inter-governmental body which would convene representatives of the UN's major organs, financing institutions, troop contributors, the governments in question, as well as other role-players in order to improve on the coordination of activities and to effectively marshal resources for post-conflict peacebuilding activities. Sierra Leone and Burundi were the first two cases that were selected for intervention by the PBC. The PBC subsequently convened a meeting on 19 July 2006 during which government officials, representatives of the UN country teams, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made presentations on the status of the peacebuilding efforts in Burundi and Sierra Leone respectively (Deller, 2006:9). The Sierra Leone meeting included Sierra Leone's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr Momodu Koroma, who emphasised the progress that had been made in governmental programmes in governance reform, resource management and accountability, security sector reform including retraining programmes, and national reconciliation including the TRC. Some the challenges that he identified, were youth unemployment, perceptions of corruption, weak infrastructure, implementing poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals (Deller, 2006:10). During July 2006, the PBC organised a meeting between the Global Partnership for Prevention and Armed Conflict, the West African Network for Peacebuilding, the Network on Collaborative Peacebuilding and participants from civil society that represented thematic issues of concern, as well as government representatives. Seven priority areas were identified in relation to the security situation in Sierra Leone (Deller, 2006:10):

- implementation and dissemination of the TRC and the poverty reduction strategy documents;
- building effective partnerships among government, civil society organisations, inter-governmental organisation and donors;
- human resource development: skills training for the youth, and economic empowerment for women;
- gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding;
- strengthening of the capacity of national civil society organisations and public institutions; and
- establishing a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

### **5.7. NGOs and the peace mission**

NGOs found it nearly impossible to fulfil their mission in Sierra Leone during the war of 1990, due to the lack of security (Pratt, 1999). It was only after the UK intervened in the ongoing violence, that the security situation changed significantly

for the better. According to Jackson (2005:110), this intervention should not be underestimated as it demonstrated that a robust and professional military force from a 'lead nation' had the capacity to restore order. "The deployment of UK forces rescued the UN mission and certainly played a significant part in averting a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe in Sierra Leone" (Wilkinson, 2000:8). When the crisis began to sharply worsen in the spring of 2000, many NGOs were outspoken in their support of British forces in Sierra Leone. Oxfam, for instance, stated that: "Oxfam GB welcomes the decision to deploy British troops to Sierra Leone ... it is difficult to imagine how UNAMSIL can succeed, with the required speed, without British troops being available to use force" (Oxfam International, 2000). By every measure, the ability of NGOs to perform humanitarian and relief work, resettlement and repatriation of displaced persons, judicial reconciliation and the strengthening of civil society in Sierra Leone, only significantly improved when the decision was made by the UK to intervene with combat forces. By 2002, the UNHCR announced that fifteen international NGOs, four local NGOs and two UN agencies would work together and coordinate their efforts to reintegrate refugees into society. The United Nations Capital Development Fund began with critically needed micro-financing projects, and *Medicins Sans Frontieres* began to effectively operate again (UNHCR, 2002). With a secure work environment, major private NGOs such as Amnesty International assisted in the effort to revitalise the demolished Sierra Leonean judicial system, along with the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to investigate and prosecute war crimes and the creation of the TRC to help create the conditions for national reconciliation. Local and international NGOs also assisted with the successful effort to hold national elections in Sierra Leone on 14 May 2002 (UNHCR, 2002).

### **5.8. Experience gained from Sierra Leone**

The problems and limitations experienced by members of the UN in Sierra Leone did not come as a surprise. The former UNSG, Kofi Annan, had already appointed a panel of experts to assess and articulate the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping system in March 2000, later known as the Brahimi Report. This investigation was embarked upon after the UNSG published two reports that focused on the UN's failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, as well as an inability to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995 (Neethling, 2002:41).

One of the key findings contained in the Brahimi Report was that the UN was unable to perform the principal mission for which it was created, namely the maintenance of peace. In addition to the identification of technical problems that hampered the organisational ability of the UN to perform tasks in the field of conflict prevention,

peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the Brahimi panellists, based on numerous occasions during the 1990s, found that no amount of good intentions could substitute for the fundamental ability to project a credible force. The events in Sierra Leone and Bosnia highlighted the difficulties that the UN had experienced in establishing peacekeeping missions where there was not true peace to keep. Hayes (2000: 3) points out that the deployment of a force under a Chapter VI self-defence mandate in such circumstances had been acknowledged as both unsuccessful and damaging to the credibility of the UN. Many were of the opinion that the insertion of more troops into Sierra Leone would rescue the failing mission, but an increase in UN forces merely provided for a wider range of potential hostages. Hayes (2000:3) emphasises that a change in mandate – without the commensurate upgrading of weaponry, training, and command and control to act upon it – raised false expectations and heightened the likelihood of a humiliation akin to Srebrenica or Rwanda. Many scholars hold the opinion that it was the credibility of the force that explains the British success and UN difficulties in Sierra Leone. Ultimately, the crisis in Sierra Leone initiated a serious call for change as well as a stronger commitment to the UN peacekeeping system on the part of member states.

The experience of NGOs in Sierra Leone emphasises the links between effective military intervention and the NGOs' and other role-players' abilities to successfully provide humanitarian assistance. What is clear, is that the nature and scope of security threats faced by NGOs has profoundly changed the manner in which humanitarian aid and human rights communities do their business – now and in the future. In order for many NGOs to perform their missions, collaboration with military forces in helping them create a viable security environment is a given (Jackson, 2005:113). To this effect, the concept of DPMs provides a practical solution for the synchronisation of military and civilian efforts. The experience in Sierra Leone underlined the fact that military and civilian actors cannot act on separate tracks, but that the key to successful peace interventions is to be found in the effective coordination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. In addition to the above, the events that transpired in Sierra Leone gave impetus to the growing international awareness that peacebuilding should be an essential part of any multi-national peacekeeping undertaking in Africa (Neethling, 2005:92). This implies that a long-term process is required and that it entails full-spectrum planning for peace enforcement and nation-building. Nation-building will to a great extent, be dependent on the progress with the establishment of infrastructure. Infrastructure is important – it provides the basis for human capital, the provision of state goods and services, and enables the creation and functioning of public and private institutions (Gueli, 2007:29). Gueli (2007:29) points out that, without access to proper infrastructure and basic services, the disillusioned and the disempowered are more

likely to support ‘generous’ warlords than internationally brokered peace agreements, which in some cases, tend to offer little but starvation and sometimes – a wage.

It is imperative that challenges regarding the justice and local government sectors be effectively addressed in order to ensure sustainable peace and development for Sierra Leone. The devolution of authority to district or town level remains a serious challenge and according to the UNSG, this devolution is necessary to reconnect the central government with rural communities and to promote socio-economic development and broader community participation. It is also essential to develop a vibrant private sector in order to transform the economy and create employment opportunities. In order to facilitate this, it is essential that the security sector be strengthened so that the armed forces can perform their tasks effectively. The establishment of an effective judiciary is essential and special attention should be paid to the development of a culture that promotes respect for human rights (Ki-moon, 2007a:7–9).

In addition to the above, one of the most crucial aspects for achieving lasting peace and development is the requirement to effectively address the relationship between peace and development in the shortest time possible. Collier (2006:9) explains that the only reliable way to create the conditions that can maintain peace and allow it to prosper, rather than to collapse back into the conflict trap, is to encourage economic growth. The role of the military in such a tactic is to create and protect the conditions within which the developmental organisations and agents can perform their work. This important requirement emphasises the notion that economic recovery cannot simply be dealt with in a post-conflict reconstruction phase. Solomon (2001:246) contends that: “economic reconstruction should be viewed as a conflict preventative measure and should occur in all phases”. This emphasises the realisation that one cannot separate peacemaking from the processes of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Solomon (2001:247) argues that these processes should therefore be viewed as parallel processes that are complementary to one another, and if approached in a holistic manner, can contribute to sustainable peace. The more holistic understanding of peace, dovetails with the work of Ohlsson (1995:5) who distinguished between two notions of peace – namely negative and positive peace. Whereas negative peace exists where there is a mere absence of war, positive peace is more embracing and holistic, and also includes issues such as prospects for social development. In terms of the latter, the concept of DPMs calls for the rapid build-up of civilian and military assets in peace missions, and at the same time, the force mix should contain a fair amount of capability to kick-start reconstruction and development.

According to DFA (2007:10), the peace process in Sierra Leone represents a successful case study for integrated peace missions. The restoration of democratically elected government after elections in 2002 as well as in 2007, bears witness to strong national and international efforts to resolve the conflict. In its quest to build a sustainable peace, Sierra Leone managed to overcome political as well as military challenges by involving key stakeholders such as political actors, civil society, rebel groups and ECOMOG, among others.

Sierra Leone's constitution provides for the rule of law and the protection of human rights. It empowers the parliament to enforce democratic accountability and oversight. The partnerships between the government and the international donors refurbished the physical infrastructure of the courts throughout the country. Strategic departments such as the police, correctional services and justice were strengthened to ensure a safe and secure environment in containing civil unrest, domestic violence and economic crimes. Security sector reform in Sierra Leone also ultimately managed to bring security forces under civilian oversight (DFA, 2007:11).

Civil society played a central role in the establishment of democracy in Sierra Leone by embarking on a campaign for good governance. It created awareness and consciousness among the citizens to maximise their participation in directing and shaping state affairs in peacebuilding. This critical formation played a significant role in the re-establishment of multiparty democratic government. There was also a robust campaign toward the education of the youth as long-term investment in capacity-building for the country's future development and the institutionalisation of good governance. This would also contribute to the notion of local ownership of the country's progress.

## **5.9. Conclusions**

On 7 May 2007, the UNSG, Ban Ki-moon, stated that Sierra Leone continued to make progress in the peace consolidation process. The registration of voters for the July 2007 general elections commenced on 26 February 2007 and was completed on 18 March 2007. About 91% of eligible voters were registered. The elections that followed, took place in a democratic manner. Thus, general positive developments have strengthened the prospects for long-term peace. However, the security situation in Sierra Leone remains fragile, as the high rates of unemployment and negative public perceptions about the lack and slow pace of improvement of the

living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the population, remain the key threats to the country's fragile stability (Ki-moon, 2007a:1-3).

In light of the above, some questions remain: has the conflict finally ended in Sierra Leone? Is there a likelihood of a return to hostilities in the future? Not being an ethnic conflict, Sierra Leone is at least not facing simmering tension between rival ethnic groups. There is no victorious group seizing the spoils of losing groups suffering the consequences – both sides were the same family of Sierra Leoneans. However, there is a great difference between pacification and peace – absence of war is not the same as absence of pain, trauma and physical destruction. These still haunt the psychological and geographical landscape. One of the primary causes of the conflict, widespread unemployment of the younger generations of Sierra Leoneans that lead to their alienation from the rest of society, remains a serious challenge to long-term peace and prosperity.

Ultimately, experience in Sierra Leone has yet again demonstrated that peacekeeping in Africa involves entry into volatile, high risk, anarchic environments, where copious quantities of weapons are available. In addition, the destruction of the social cohesion and state infrastructures can remove the support mechanisms required to sustain life, which most often, results in humanitarian crisis. In these circumstances, it is essential that the peace force that is deployed in such complex emergencies be credible in the eyes of the population, the belligerents and the international community. However, the military deployment ultimately forms only a part of the solution: there can be no credible military peace support operations force without the political backing of all the participating nations. Peace support operations forces on their own cannot ensure lasting peace and development in countries where complex emergencies have to be addressed. The relationship between security and development must be clearly understood by all parties concerned, and there must be a long-term commitment by all role-players to contribute to finding lasting peace.

The relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is effectively addressed by the concept of DPMs. The intervention in Sierra Leone indicates that the effective application of the concept of DPMs can very effectively be used to establish the required conditions for sustainable peace and development. In this regard, the PBC succeeded in gaining the support and cooperation of most of the key role-players – a factor that contributed significantly to the development of integrated peacebuilding strategies, as well as in terms of garnering support for peacebuilding activities. The experience in Sierra Leone thus clearly shows that the concept of DPMs can be utilised or applied as a framework to provide feasible solutions in the

establishment of an environment that is conducive to sustainable long-term peace, reconstruction and development.

## **CHAPTER 6: PEACE MISSIONS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

### **6.1. Introduction**

The widespread conflict that resulted in the loss of millions of lives in the DRC during the latter part of the 1990's can be ascribed to several inter-connected elements that have shaped the nature of the conflict in the Great Lakes region for many decades. These elements, according to Katshung (2007:117), include aspects such as competition over natural and economic resources, lack of security, ethnic chauvinism, as well as disruptive actions by belligerent groupings from neighbouring countries that were pursuing their respective interests. This generally applies to all countries in the region, namely Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. In addition, these countries are afflicted by poor governance and political opportunism, which in turn leads to military action being used to resolve essentially social, political and economic problems (Cartier-Bresson, 2003:174).

In order to develop realistic possibilities for conflict resolution and the establishment of sustainable lasting peace in the DRC, it is essential to effectively manage and address concerns regarding resources and security. These two issues are wholly dependent on one another (the security-development nexus) and are key to reconciliation and reconstruction in the DRC, as well as the larger Great Lakes region (Katshung, 2007:118). In the case of the DRC it is essential to keep in mind that the abundance of natural resources which facilitated the continued conflict in the first place, could also act as the key to establishing sustainable peace and security in the long-term, if the resources are managed and exploited to the benefit of all the inhabitants of the DRC, as well as for the economic development of the region as a whole.

The establishment of lasting peace in the DRC depends on a few crucial aspects. The first is the rebuilding of state and governmental institutions and ensuring that the political transition is effectively translated from the highest political levels, to the restoration of peace at local or 'grassroots' levels, i.e. the sovereignty of the transitional government should thus be established over the entire territory, and not be limited to major towns and cities such as Kinshasa (Rogier, 2004:255). The second critical requirement is that of the re-building and re-structuring of a competitive and free market economy that will benefit not only the DRC, but also the region as a whole. Bi-lateral relations between the DRC and its neighbours should thus be normalised. This is especially important in the eastern DRC, as the DRC transitional government needs the co-operation or at least the abstention of



neighbouring states, in order to establish its authority over the full territory of the country (Rogier, 2004:267).

The peace intervention in the DRC was chosen as a case study to determine the feasibility of successfully implementing the concept of DPMs in Africa, as the intervention addressed peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues and activities simultaneously. This intervention was, as was the intervention in Sierra Leone, also conducted in accordance with the new approach to UN peace missions that was adopted in the early 1990's in which peacebuilding is brought 'closer' to peacekeeping – thus effectively addressing the 'reconstruction gap' which is so often presented as the cause or the reason for the relapse into violence in states that have been plagued by intra-state conflicts.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the approach to and nature of the intervention in the DRC, as well as to assess the nature of and impact of international and regional responses to the crises. The analysis also addresses the course of events that led up to the respective interventions and include an analysis of the experiences gained from these interventions that could be used to inform future peace missions – specifically in terms of the feasibility and requirements for successfully implementing the concept of DPMs during peace interventions on the African continent.

## **6.2. The background to the conflict in the DRC**

The conflict in the DRC should be understood in terms of the factors that shaped the environment in which widespread violence eventually broke out. These factors include the transfer of conventional weapon systems, small arms and landmine-systems from countries such as Bulgaria, the USA, UK, France, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the actions of the country's armed forces and rogue rebel groups, starvation and territorial displacement of the peoples of the DRC. The problems were exacerbated by the invasion of regional African states and the problem of African and non-African mercenaries and private security firms operating in the DRC (Siler, 2004:xxix). The violence that broke out in the DRC in 1996 had its roots in the civil war that broke out in Burundi in 1993, which was followed by the 1994 Rwandan genocide between the Hutus and Tutsis. Both these conflicts resulted in large numbers of refugees fleeing to neighbouring DRC. However, even before the Rwandan conflict spread to the DRC, significant numbers of both the Tutsis and the Hutus had been residing in the DRC for a considerable period of time. Rwanda, citing the need not only to protect its own citizens from attack by the

Hutus, but also to protect the Tutsi Congolese, launched incursions into the eastern DRC in 1996 (Katshung, 2007:118).

Large-scale violence broke out in the DRC in 1996 when the Rwandan-backed rebel group, the *Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL) and its leader, Laurent Kabila deposed the dying dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, and established control over large parts of the country. According to Marks et al (2007:68), the proximate cause of the war in the DRC, the third largest country on the African continent, was the result of the spillover effects of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which had led to the displacement of millions of refugees in Zaïre's eastern border region, as well as the reappearance and settling of the genocide perpetrators within those border areas. He then concludes that it was ultimately the total collapse of the Zairian state mechanisms that triggered the outbreak of widespread violence in the DRC (Marks et al, 2007:68). The violence had a devastating effect on the more than 50 million inhabitants and much of the country suffered from ongoing fighting among the belligerent groupings. However, the genocide in Rwanda, the refugees and displaced people, as well as the presence of the genocide perpetrators only served as 'triggers' that caused the underlying dissent and dissatisfaction with the government of Zaïre to spill over into widespread violence.

The violence that broke out in 1996 is not a new phenomenon to the troubled state. Since the DRC (formerly known as Zaïre) gained independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, it has been plagued by continued outbreaks of violence over a period of more than forty years. According to Mangu (2004:31), "the DRC has reflected the full range of African problems, from colonial domination and exploitation to corruption, as well as authoritarian rule, ethnic conflicts, military regimes and mismanagement". The causes of the violence that broke out in the DRC during the period 1998 to 2000 were thus complex and not only confined to the borders of the DRC, as it not only involved belligerents from the DRC, but also involved armed forces from several other African countries. This is why the DRC conflict has been called the first African 'world war', because by 1999 it involved six or seven foreign states and a large number of rebel factions in the DRC itself. There was at that time great risk that the conflict could escalate into a conventional inter-state African war (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:48). Fortunately, the conflict did not develop into a conventional war, and most of the violence was contained within the borders of the DRC. The conflict ultimately resulted in the death of more than 3,3 million people, mostly from disease and hunger (Marks et al, 2007:68).

When the war broke out in the DRC in 1996, Rwanda and Uganda formed an alliance with the Congolese armed resistance movement under the leadership of Kabila. This

‘triple K’-alliance (Kampala-Kinshasa-Kigali) dissolved in 1998 as a result of security concerns that were noted by Uganda and Rwanda (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:48). On the one hand, Uganda claimed that it was compelled to stop insurgents from attacking Uganda through southern Sudan and the eastern DRC. The Ugandan government specifically referred to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and members of the Allied Democratic Forces in this regard. On the other hand, Rwanda invoked the ‘right to self-defence’ against the border-incursions into its territory by the DRC-based Hutu militias. In reaction to these growing hostilities, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe justified their military interventions in the DRC under the banner of attempting to secure the unity of a SADC member state. Chad also provided a small number of troops at the request of the DRC government (Katshung, 2007:118).

### **6.3. The road to war**

The former leader of the DRC, President Mobutu was supported by the West for many years. This attitude was dictated by a formula that shaped USA and Western foreign policy towards Zaire for many years, namely that of ‘Mobutu or Chaos’ (Schatzberg:1991). As a result, the West essentially accepted the dictatorial nature of Mobutu’s regime and in this regard, the USA and France facilitated Mobutu’s attempts to hijack political change by maintaining that Mobutu, as president, was a legitimate part of the transition process, rather than an impediment to it (Mangu, 2004:31). It was only after Mobutu became terminally ill and unable to serve his Western patrons that the West resolved to find a successor for him.

Laurent-Desire Kabila was identified as the new leader and gained support for a rebellion against Mobutu. Kabila had, for many years, been leading and orchestrating a rebellion against Mobutu from his stronghold in the South Kivu mountains. Kabila was finally brought to power by a coalition of foreign troops, led by Rwanda and Uganda. Armed forces from Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia also assisted in bringing Kabila to power. This ‘First Congolese War’ (1996–1997) thus originated as a foreign invasion of Zaire by its eastern neighbours – with the blessing of the Western countries (Mangu, 2004:31).

After seven months of a virtually unchallenged march through the then Zaire, Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces (AFDL), took over control of the government. Kabila proclaimed himself as president and unilaterally renamed Zaire as the DRC. After a year in power, Kabila requested that all the foreign troops return to their countries of origin. However, Rwanda and Uganda refused to leave, and invaded the DRC on 2 August 1998 (Mangu, 2004:31).

The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) was created in August 1998 by some of Kabila's former comrades in the AFDL, who accused Kabila of authoritarianism, corruption, mismanagement, tribalism and nepotism. Several foreign countries, primarily Rwanda and Uganda, backed this grouping. Another opposition group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) who also opposed Kabila's rule, later joined the RCD. After some time, the RCD split into the RCD (Goma), the main rebel group, the RCD-National (RCD-N) and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML). These new groupings were essentially born out of tensions and conflicting interest between Rwanda and Uganda. Uganda had realised that Rwanda was in command of the RCD and it saw the need to encourage the creation of other groupings that could fall under Ugandan influence and control. The conflict in the DRC also involved several other foreign rebel groups allegedly based in the DRC and launching attacks against their respective governments (Mangu, 2004:32). It was evident that the causes of the conflict in the DRC were multi-dimensional with both regional and domestic aspects, which had become intermingled.

At the climax of the conflict, at least seven other African states had deployed regular troops in the DRC. These included Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Chad who lent support to President Kabila and on the other side, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi who backed the rebels. The first group of countries motivated their participation in the conflict as assisting the government of the DRC against foreign aggression. They argued that the intervention was justified in terms of international law on the use of forces as a type of 'collective self-defence'. The other group, including Rwanda, Uganda and Chad motivated their presence in the DRC with the argument that the rebel groups were attacking them from within the DRC and that they were attempting to disarm them. In addition, the presence of foreign troops included other motivations. The DRC's lucrative natural resources, including gold, diamonds, timber, copper and coltan resources, also provided several states in the region – Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia – with an incentive for military intervention (Katshung, 2007:118). The clamour for these resources resulted in numerous conflicts between Rwandan and Ugandan troops in Kisangani and the Eastern Province of the DRC (Breytenbach et al, 1999:33). According to Macqueen (2002:89), as was the case in other African conflicts of the late 1990s from Angola to Liberia, ideological issues, so far as they ever had any importance, were soon overshadowed by the pursuit of spoils in the form of portable and exploitable resources. In the DRC, as elsewhere, diamonds became both the engine and an objective of the conflict and were sought as a prize by both the indigenous and the foreign forces involved in the war. As a result of the complex and varied mix of motivations for partaking in the military intervention, the conflict in the DRC thus became Africa's most complex major conflict.

Many of the role-players in the peace process in the DRC ascribe the causes for the conflict to the illegal exploitation as the main cause of the problems. To this effect, the UN's *Report of the Panel of Experts in the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the DRC* (UN, 2001) makes it explicit that it is the exploitation of resources that fuelled conflict and perpetuated instability in the DRC. This is also, according to Kabemba (2006:154) the perspective that informed the mediation process in the DRC. However, to merely place the blame for the violence in the DRC at the door of the abundance of resources, would exclude the pivotal role that the Congolese leadership had played in perpetuating the violence. This reasoning has left the Congolese leadership, to a great extent, indifferent to the suffering of their people, for they are able to claim that responsibility for the DRC's dismal condition lies with external actors who illegally exploit the resources of the country and perpetuate human rights abuses. Consequently, "the failure of the state is a product of external manipulation" (Kabemba, 2006:154). Therefore, indirectly, this contention suggests that the causes for the conflict are external and that solutions to the conflict in the DRC should be based on effectively addressing these external causes. If it is true that the undemocratic nature of politics in the DRC is an outcome of external manipulation, the individual leaders of the Congo would not have to take responsibility for poor leadership.

However, analysts of African politics point to mal-governance and the poverty of leadership as major factors that contributed to the manifest crisis of the continent since independence. The assessment that the DRC is a prisoner of its abundant mineral resources is misleading and an over-simplification of the causes for the continued violence. The fact that a country is rich in commodities does not mean it is bound to become a dysfunctional state that would sink into conflict and poverty. Kabemba (2006:155) argues that the absence of democratic and good governance in the management of the state sustains the predatory nature of the state itself and this is the main problem in the DRC. Former president, Mobutu, neglected to build state institutions, including the army and Rwanda and Uganda used the weakness of the state to overthrow him. Almost 40% of national revenues accrued to Mobutu and his cronies, while the average Zairian earned less than \$190 per annum. Ultimately, Mobutu caused the country to become a dysfunctional state that was prone to conflict because of poor leadership. The lack of state administrative and organisational capacity, in both the civilian and military fields, exacerbated the sad state of affairs. Ultimately, it was the internal weaknesses that opened the windows for external actors to exploit the countries' resources in the manner that it occurred in the DRC. Kabemba (2006:156) concludes: "if war was an extension of politics (as described by 19<sup>th</sup> century German military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz), then in

the DRC, was is an extension of economics”. It is clear that, unless the state is rebuilt in the DRC, that there is no hope for the future, despite the newly found nationalism that the Congolese have shown against all efforts to balkanise their country (Kabemba, 2006:156).

In a bid to broker a peace in the DRC, the international community convened several round-table negotiation sessions and signed several peace agreements with the belligerents. The UNSC made regular statements of concern, but primarily left the peacemaking with the regional agencies concerned, namely the former OAU and SADC. The crisis and its timing were immensely challenging to the UN Secretariat and the UNSC. The situation in the DRC was immensely complex from a peacekeeping point of view and there was clearly no peace to keep, therefore an inter-positional force would have been irrelevant at that time. Even an enforcement action would have presented the UNSC with a major conundrum as to what should be enforced (Macqueen, 2002:89). However, after many discussions, the UNSC indicated its readiness to consider the active involvement of the UN, in co-ordination with the OAU to assist in the implementation of an effective cease-fire agreement in April 1999 (UN, 1999). This decision by the UNSC was followed by the signing of several agreements by the relevant role-players. The first significant peace agreements ended in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the holding of political negotiations, known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

#### **6.4. Negotiations to end the violence and transition to a stable state**

The international community undertook many diplomatic initiatives in a bid to broker a peace in the DRC. A number of agreements were signed by the parties involved and approximately 23 initiatives, aimed at ending the hostilities and addressing the concerns of neighbouring countries, mainly Rwanda and Uganda, as the conflict in the DRC has regional dimensions (Dindelo, 2006:47). The first, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, was negotiated within the framework of the South African Development Community (SADC) and signed by the Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Angola's Minister of Defence on 10 July 1999.

The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted in agreements over two primary initiatives, namely the United Nations Organisation Mission to the Congo or *Mission de la Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo* (MONUC) and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Malan and Porto, 2004:v). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement primarily dealt with the ceasefire, the date of its entry into force, its meaning and implications for the parties to the Agreement and the security concerns for the DRC and its

neighbouring countries (Mangu, 2004:32). Mangu (2004:32) also emphasises the fact that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement addressed much more than the ceasefire itself, and that it included many aspects regarding post-conflict peacebuilding aspects as well. The significance of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement can be found in the fact that regional states themselves, for the first time, agreed upon a framework for the region's political reconstruction in Sub-Saharan Africa (Wolpe, 2000:27). However, despite the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Congolese failed to implement it. President Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard in 2001, and as was the case with the Belgian and Mobutu governments before him (Kabemba, 2006:158).

During a meeting that took place in Gaborone, Botswana in August 2001, the Congolese parties agreed that Inter-Congolese Dialogue was set to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in October 2001. It finally took place at Sun City in South Africa, from February to April 2002 and in April 2003 (Mangu, 2004:33). The purpose of the Dialogue was to establish an agreement on a power-sharing formula. The negotiations were to be all inclusive and under the supervision of Sir Ketumile Masire, the SADC-appointed mediator, but from 9 April 2002 they were partly taken over by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. The first phase of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue finished on 18 April 2002, with a partial agreement signed by one of two major rebel movements, the MLC, and the Kabila government. Despite the late intervention by President Mbeki, the Rwanda-backed *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma* (RCD-Goma) and a coalition of civil society groups refused to sign this agreement, partly as a result of heavy pressure from the Kabila government, but also because of disagreements over the arrangements for power-sharing during the transitional phase (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:49).

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 was followed by the Pretoria Agreement that was agreed upon in July 2002. In accordance with this agreement, a programme and timetable for implementation was agreed upon and Rwandan delegates agreed to withdraw their troops from the DRC (Dindelo, 2006:47). The Pretoria Agreement was followed by the Luanda Agreement, which was signed in September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda. This agreement addressed the security concerns of neighbouring countries referred to in the Preamble and Article 2 of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. It stipulated the arrangements for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the DRC, establishing the Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri to govern the district with the assistance of MONUC and the acceptance by the DRC for Uganda to remain on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori until the parties put in place security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda's security. The general situation in the DRC improved in 2002 when a large part of the foreign intervention ended when Rwanda,

Uganda and Angola withdrew their forces from the country. The situation became politically more manageable for the UN, despite that fact that foreign influence, especially Rwandan, continued to be exercised through local factions (Macqueen, 2002:232).

According to Kabemba (2006:158), little attention has been paid to the issue of justice in the DRC and this has exacerbated much of the violence that continued to flare up in parts of the DRC. The mainstream justice system remained weak and corrupt and the establishment of a TRC was supposed to be the conduit for the development and implementation of effective transitional justice policies in the DRC, but this commission did not become operational. The same can be said of the Anti-Corruption Commission and Human Rights Commission. These problems and setbacks limited the transitional government's ability to deal with past and increasing new human rights abuses (Kabemba, 2006:158).

In addition to the above, the human security situation in the DRC posed huge challenges of its own. In August 2003, after months of clashes in the Ituri district in the Kivu and Maniema provinces, over 3,4 million persons were estimate to be displaced. North Kivu and Ituri alone represented 2 million displaced people, whilst over 350 000 Congolese refugees fled to Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia or Tanzania and approximately 250 000 foreigners from six neighbouring countries had sought asylum in the DRC. The transitional government and the international community had to find practical solutions to address the issues effectively (Malan and Porto, 2004:6).

The transitional government was a crucial tool to bridge the violent divide that has plagued the DRC, but its functioning was severely impeded by elements that have shown continued reluctance to give up power. Rwanda and the DRC have often been antagonists (Swart, 2005:15). There seemed to be a clear need for greater UN peacekeeping presence and greater commitment to disarm the Interahamwe militia, a Hutu paramilitary organisation that settled in the eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It was thus essential to diffuse the tensions between the Rwandan and DRC governments. According to Bischoff (2005:10), the resources required to disarm the rebels would have had to come from outside Africa and the only way in which this could be attained, was to use the UN and the AU to maintain the international community's focus on the Great Lakes region as a whole, as well as on the geo-economic situation of the DRC in particular.

According to Mandrup-Jorgensen (2007:50), the DDR process in the DRC was identified by most of the parties as central to getting the DRC on the road to peace



and stability. In a report by the UNSG (Annan, 2001:16), it was stated that DDR and the resettlement of armed groups would be key to moving towards lasting peace in the DRC. The report stated that the main problems would be to remove any need for foreign troops to remain in the east of the country, immeasurably improve the security and quality of economic life for the area's inhabitants, and neutralise a dangerous source of conflict and instability in the region (Annan, 2001:16). The DDR process in the DRC is very complex and it was estimated that it would involve 300 000 combatants. Progress with the DDR process was slower than initially anticipated and the fact that there has been continued instability in especially the eastern DRC has meant that the combatants have been reluctant to hand in their weapons (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:51).

Despite the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement that was aimed at finally bringing peace to the DRC, the security situation deteriorated into an almost never-ending saga of delays in the implementation of crucial agreements, vicious incidents of conflict that borders on another outbreak of war, as well as continued tensions among key role-players who were supposed to lead the region into a new era of peace and prosperity (Mangu, 2004:36). During 2004, two successive coups attempts occurred in the capital, Kinshasa, and the fall of Bukavu to renegade troops left most Congolese convinced that the transition process in the DRC was rapidly deteriorating. Accusations that the transitional government had not managed to consolidate itself proved to be true (Swart, 2005:15).

Despite these impediments, progress was eventually made towards establishing a representative and democratically elected government for the DRC. In December 2005, the process of registering 25 million out of an eligible 28 million voters was completed. A new constitution was also adopted after a national referendum. In two rounds of elections that took place in July and October 2006, Congolese voters chose their leadership for the first time since independence in 1960. The election was declared free and fair by all international electoral observer missions, including those from the USA, Europe and South Africa (Swing, 2007:2).

The election process was a very important milestone for the peace process in the DRC. However, it is essential to bear in mind that the election process was merely the start of a long-term process on the road to societal transformation. According to Kabemba (2006:153), many describe the current government in the DRC as 'juridical fiction'. This is because the government had not extended its power base much further than beyond the borders of the capital, Kinshasa. The question remains how to restore the DRC as a functioning state, given the extent of state destruction that has taken place, and the continued presence of opposing forces

both inside and outside the DRC. Kabemba (2006:153) points to the possibility that the government could fail in its attempts to establish an effective state (from the highest to the lowest levels), if it should perpetuate the kleptocratic patterns of the past. This state of affairs could enable a governing elite to engage in the consumption of resources through illegal and corrupt means without accountability, without regard for social and human security issues, and without respect for human rights. As a result, one of the greatest internal challenges in terms of the creation of an environment that would be conducive to societal transformation, is the legitimisation of institutions from the highest to the lowest ('grassroots') governmental levels.

Societal transformation will only be achieved in the DRC by inculcating respect for state institutions and the rule of law amongst the people of the DRC, as well as by effectively addressing human rights issues. Transition and state building in the DRC should firstly be about people, and presupposes a move away from one period to a new one that is vastly different from the past. A transition enables a society to proceed in a different way from the past, because of the injection of new ideas and appearance of new leadership with sound values. While much of the negotiation processes regarding the DRC was indeed focused on introducing new ideas of negotiation and inclusiveness, it failed to effectively address accountability and to provide for the emplacement of a new political class that would be able to respond to the challenges of state building (Kabemba, 2006:156). It concentrated on the requirements of the main belligerents, whose aim it was to protect their own individual interests by ensuring access to resources, rather than emphasising the requirements for the building of a new state. The problem in the DRC since independence is not an argument about political ends, but rather a confusion as to the means to reach those ends. In other words, even though belligerents, non-armed opposition and civil society have all taken part in the negotiations, it is still not clear how they intend to create a climate within which their efforts toward democracy will be sustained in the long term (Kabemba, 2006:159). This supports the notion that, although it was essential to include the belligerents in finding lasting solutions to the conflict in the DRC, their inclusion should not have been the focus of the negotiation processes – too little emphasis was placed on the important issues of state-building.

## **6.5. MONUC deployment**

The UN's first deployment to the Congo in 1960 was quick and militarily aggressive. However, compared to the latter, the deployment of MONUC was initially slow and piecemeal and it took several years before the deployment was upgraded and restructured to the scale of a true Chapter VII mission. MONUC was

established by the UNSC Resolution 1279 (30 November 1999) which transformed the UN Liaison Personnel in the DRC into a UN mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter with an appropriate mandate and responsibility (Molukanele et al, 2004:44).

MONUC was also established after the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement in Zambia between Angola, the DRC, Rwanda, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe in July 1999. The agreement included provision for (Molukanele et al, 2004:44):

- the normalisation of the situation in the DRC;
- the holding of a national dialogue;
- addressing security concerns;
- developing mechanism for the disarmament of armed groups; and
- the establishment of the Joint Military Commission.

Despite the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the establishment of the Transitional Government, the initial progress of key provisions of the agreements were slow, particularly with regard to the legislative agenda, extension of state administration, military integration, DDR and preparations for elections. The regional dimension of the conflict meant that former rebel groups continued to hold on to regional bases which impacted on the government's authority over the entire territory. This situation placed MONUC personnel, as well as civilians under continual threat of attack. Providing security for civilians in this tense situation remained a challenge.

The UN deployed about 2 400 members in May 2000 in order to monitor the adherence to the Lusaka Agreement, as well as to investigate any violations of the ceasefire (UN, 2002:2). Military observer teams were deployed to the entire length of the ceasefire line, which essentially split the country in half. The ceasefire line effectively separated the government-controlled area in the west of the country from the resource-rich areas under the control of Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the eastern parts of the country (Annan, 1999c:3). The UN's interposition in the DRC diminished the threat of government attack on the Uganda and Rwandan forces and the exploitation of resources was effectively left in the hands of the Ugandans and the Rwandans (UN, 2001:146).

In September 2004, the UNSC strengthened MONUC with an additional 5 900 soldiers and the force then reached 16 700, making it the largest UN mission with an estimated budget of \$900 million. Following the slow progress with the DDR process, many international role-players voiced their opinion that forcible

disarmament would be the only solution, as the Hutu rebels would never give up their weapons voluntarily. This notion was not only supported by the South African government, but also by the AU PSC. In a communiqué after the January 2005 meeting in Gabon, the AU stated that it preferred forceful disarmament of the estimated 10 000 Hutu rebels operating in the eastern DRC, if needed by an AU force (Reuters, 2005). However, in February 2005, in response to an attack on UN peacekeepers (nine of whom were killed), MONUC altered its strategy and attacked a militia compound in the northern Ituri province, killing an estimated 60 local militia members. This has proved to be the turning point in the UN's approach to disarmament in the DRC, especially in the Ituri province (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:52).

In essence, the MONUC deployment thus made it easier for Rwandan and Ugandan forces to smuggle raw materials out of the DRC and to re-export these commodities into the global market. Unsurprisingly, Uganda exported ten times more gold ore in 2001 than it ever did since its involvement in the conflict in 1998 (Renner, 2002:28). In the same year, Rwanda's coltan production (mostly of Congolese origin) soared from 147 tonnes in 1999 to 1 300 in 2001 (World Bank, 2005). This implies that interposition by UN peacekeepers might even sustain the functioning of war economies. Gueli et al (2006c:16) points out that other research conducted on determining the factors that may affect the recurrence of war also alludes to the fact that partitioning warring parties may lead to a greater likelihood of a new war occurring and shortening the duration of peace (Walter, 2002:20). The UN's problem of being unable to break the link between commodities and conflict is further compounded by the lack of effective mechanisms to challenge transitional criminal networks.

It is a well-know fact that trans-national criminal networks help warring parties to trade commodities with international buyers to acquire the supplies that are needed to sustain their war-efforts. Yet, current UN mandates merely allow UN personnel to monitor and report on the smuggling of resources and the flow of arms and UN forces are not mandated to take decisive action, based on the information that they obtain by collecting information on trans-national criminal networks (Gueli et al, 2006c:16).

The illegal exploitation of the DRC's mineral resources remains a constant feature in the discussions about the war in general and especially in the eastern parts of the country (Katshung, 2007:119). In reaction to the reports of pillaging of resources by the foreign forces, the UNSC mandated an independent panel to investigate these allegations. In its reports, the UN Panel of Experts named senior Ugandan and

Rwandese armed forces officers and senior governments officials and their families who were allegedly responsible for the illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural resources. In its final report in October 2003, the UN Panel of Experts largely documented the nexus of economic exploitation, arms trafficking and armed conflict, indicating that the illegal exploitation of resources remains one of the main sources of funding groups involved in perpetuating the conflict. The Panel of Experts also listed companies based in Belgium, China, France, Germany, Israel, Spain, the UK and USA that were allegedly involved in the illegal arms trade in the DRC (UN, 2001:357).

Regional actors who took part in the intervention in the DRC have been accused of 'foreign adventurism' with regard to the Congolese territory, as well as its natural resources. The argument is that, whilst the regional parties to the conflict might initially have been motivated by regional security concerns, their continued presence in the DRC can be attributed primarily by the economic gains derived from the DRC (Katshung, 2007:119). In a report by the UNSC (2002), it was reported that criminal groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as the government of the DRC, have benefited from the conflict. This, according to Katshung (2007:120), is critical to the process, as these 'groups' will not disband voluntarily as they have built up a 'self-financing war economy' that is centred on mineral exploitation. As a result, the initial rationale for the military intervention in the DRC by neighbouring states became self-enforcing, and the localised conflicts became regional. As such, the conflict within and among the countries of the Great Lakes region requires regionally based and targeted solutions, along with the cooperation of other, relevant neighbouring states (Katshung, 2007:120).

In terms of a new approach to UN Complex Peace Missions, one of the innovations that emerged out of the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peacekeeping during the MONUC operation is that of 'collaborative offensive operations'. MONUC operated alongside and in support of the integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC), in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups. Some of these collaborative operations had the desired effect in that larger numbers of the belligerents entered into the DDR process, if compared to earlier UN missions. However, according to De Coning (2006:5), these operations have also raised various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges. The most serious concerns related to the unintended consequences generated by these UN-directed and supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of the FARDC troops on members of the population where they have been deployed,

and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a result.

Another example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the traditional security and development divide is the way in which protection is emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peacekeeping community. As a result, several UN peace operations (Burundi, Haiti, Côte D'Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan) have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence (Holt, 2006:2). Civilian protection has thus become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short-to-medium term.

## **6.6. Experience gained from the DRC**

It is widely accepted that a strong, sustainable, independent and diverse private sector and market economy should be established and developed in order to establish sustainable peace. However, in many countries, the private sector only exists because of the opportunities presented and made available by government, thus making it difficult to operate a business outside the provisions of government. In the case of the DRC, there is no effective government system in which this private sector could function. In addition, good commercial, financial and physical infrastructure is required for an independent and diverse private sector to emerge and this requirement remains absent in most African states (Gounden, 2005:12). In this regard, the private sector in the DRC is not sustainable, independent or diverse. The commercial, financial and physical infrastructure is very weak in the DRC, thus making it very difficult for the private sector to operate effectively. In addition, as a result of the ongoing conflict that had continued for several years, the regulatory environment is weak, making foreign direct investment a high-risk business. This severely impedes on the potential investments and as a result, the opportunities to expand and strengthen the economy of the DRC are greatly reduced. It is also important to bear in mind that the situation regarding the demand for the DRC's rich natural resources has changed significantly during the past few decades. The exploitation of timber, copper, gold, coltan and uranium was historically driven by Western interests, but these resources have now become of limited strategic interest to the West and the DRC has largely become a country of small and medium size businesses with little global strategic value (Malan and Porto, 2004:5).

Some analysts argue that this lack of strategic interest in the DRC's resources goes a long way in explaining why the international response to their illegal exploitation has failed to provide adequate answers to the problem. However, while there might

be a lack of interest in the natural resources on the part of the West, these resources are still regarded as being of strategic value to the DRC and its neighbouring countries (Malan and Porto, 2004:5).

Swing (2007:2) argues that that one of the most important lessons to be learned from the long peace process in the DRC is that process is all-important and that: “a credible, effective process is key to meeting peacekeeping challenges”. He identifies five elements essential to a successful process (Swing, 2007:2):

- An international legal framework. In the case of the DRC, this includes inter alia, five major peace agreements since 1999, several other regional accords, more than 35 UNSC resolutions and 24 reports by the UNSG to the UNSC, the International Great Lakes Pact on Security, Stability, Peace and Development and very importantly, a mandate that is appropriate to the crisis.
- Implementing mechanisms. Several mechanisms were instituted in order to implement the peace agreements. These include, MONUC, the International Committee to Accompany the Transition, the Tripartite Commission Plus, Joint Verification Commission and Joint Verification Teams, the Eminent Persons Group, etc.
- Financial resources. Commensurate with the mandate, some \$5 billion was invested in the Congolese Peace Process and MONUC is (at the time of writing) funded at \$1 billion per annum and funding for elections amounting to \$495 million.
- Regional support. Although the conflict in the DRC was of an intra-state nature, it had significant regional ramifications. Neighbouring countries could play an important role on the road to peace, for instance, by denying re-supply routes and safe havens to belligerents, and on leveraging pressure on belligerents to abandon military action in favour of negotiations.
- Popular determination. Most important to the success of the entire peace process, is the will of the people – to be free and to elect their leaders freely. According to Swing (2007:3), it is this popular thirst for change that was the main driving force in the Congolese electoral process. He also points out that the elections in the DRC were the largest that the UN has ever supported: the largest country (the size of Western Europe); the largest electorate (25 million); and the largest challenge (no roads, no identity cards, no recent census, no multi-party elections in 40 years). Swing points out that, in fact, the UN has never undertaken anything quite on the scale of the Congolese elections.

From the above, it is clear that the processes involved in modern peacekeeping operations are extremely complex and that each of the individual processes and systems are intricately linked to each other. In order to effectively address all these inter-related process, it is essential to establish a common framework in terms of processes for all the role-players involved. It is in this regard that the concept of DPMs offers, at planning level, a useful construct for integrated planning processes that facilitates peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding processes. The concept of DPMs, in terms of integrated planning processes, is based on the adoption of an integrated approach, based on effective co-operation between various states, government departments and civil society organisations. The above-mentioned processes, as identified by Swing (2007:2), relate to a wide variety of issues that should be understood and implemented in terms of their respective inter-relationships and this analysis is in line with the philosophy of the concept of DPMs, which is founded on the notion that peacebuilding should be brought 'closer' to peacekeeping in a bid to minimise the chances of a return to violence in conflict-ridden states.

The experiences gained from the peace missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the DRC and elsewhere clearly indicate that peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN, which was essentially limited to the monitoring of ceasefire agreements. In addition, modern peace missions have underlined the growing importance of the role of regional organisations and alliances during peace missions. The UN has become increasingly overburdened and as a result, regional organisations are increasingly being required to play their part in establishing sustainable peace and development in their respective regions. This is especially true as far as post-conflict reconstruction processes are concerned.

#### **6.7. The role of regional organisations**

The UN Charter Article 52 embeds reliance upon regional organisations and agencies as a means of ensuring peace and security so long as those agencies' actions remain consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. In the light of the serious setbacks suffered by the UN in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Sierra Leone, certain parts of the international community became reluctant to assume the military and financial responsibilities associated with peacekeeping operations in Africa during the 1990s (Neethling, 2003:88). This reluctance had a harsh impact upon Africa and it effectively compelled regional organisations in Africa to assume greater responsibilities in the peacekeeping domain. Regional security organisations reacted to these challenges in a number of ways; some organisations have expanded, whilst others have ceased to exist. As a result, African multi-lateral interventions



have developed a momentum of their own in the 1990s and have increasingly leaned towards some type of peace enforcement. The former OAU, for instance, sanctioned the intervention in Liberia by ECOWAS. This arguably set the trend for increasing acceptance of the role to be played by regional organisations, as did the ceding of UN authority in Bosnia to NATO. However, political and operational problems continue to impede on the successful execution of many of the operations launched by regional organisations. Therefore, according to Neethling (2003:88), a key issue regarding peace missions in Africa is the need to achieve greater consistency and more cohesiveness with regard to third-party interventions in African conflicts.

It is important to bear in mind that UN multi-lateral peace operations are best undertaken in close collaboration with regional and sub-regional organisations. This was successfully demonstrated in the peace process in Haiti where the UN furnished the peacekeeping force and the Organisation of American States (OAS) provided the human rights mission personnel, with substantial UN financing. In the same vein, as far as the DRC is concerned, the UN invested heavily in terms of personnel, aircraft and financing, but the process remained quintessentially African. The principal regional partners, the AU, SADC and the South Africa played pivotal roles in the peace process.

The role of regional partners in finding lasting solutions to intra-state conflicts that often boils over into neighbouring countries is crucial. In the Great Lakes region, as in many African countries, the violent conflict has become the 'normal' state of affairs. Control of economic resources has therefore become an important factor in motivating and sustaining armed conflicts – often in what has become known as 'war economies'. According to Katshung (2007:120), complex political economies, which often hide behind the outward symbols of statehood and national sovereignty, have been rooted in the pursuance of conflict. The challenge therefore, is to transform regional and national political 'parasite' economies that rely on violent conflict into healthy systems based on political participation, social and economic inclusion, respect for human rights and the rule of law. In terms of ensuring security, ignoring the tensions and misunderstandings about Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda will have far-reaching implications for the stability and socio-economic development of the region as a whole, because resources will be diverted from human and economic development to warfare.

The DRC and Great Lakes region is rich in the natural resources that are at stake for many actors in the conflict. However, just as the natural resources could be the source of continued conflict, it also harbours the potential for post-conflict rehabilitation and development. Countries should therefore limit the exploitation of

such resources for the purposes of merely funding conflict. They should seek furthermore to identify and promote the means by which such resources can be safeguarded and managed in a way what will reduce conflict and ensure benefit to the population. Furthermore, there is a need to develop institutions and frameworks for the integration and transformation of the informal economy to a formal economy, government by a reasonable rule of law, transparency and efficiency, without marginalising local and regional actors.

Several initiatives have been embarked upon to address the conflict in the DRC. This includes the signing of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region. This protocol was signed during the Second International Conference of the Great Lakes Region in Nairobi during the period 14–15 December 2006. The countries who signed the protocol included Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. At the heart of the Conference is the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region that is the approbation, re-imaging and realisation of the Doctrine of Manifest Destiny in an African context (Church and Jowell, 2007:19). The protocol should be seen as working with the AU's Peace and Security Commission and supported by both the ASF effort and the Conflict Early Warning System. The protocol is reinforced by seven projects (Church and Jowell, 2007:20):

- joint security management of common borders;
- disarmament and repatriation of all armed groups in the eastern DRC;
- disarmament of armed nomadic pastoralists and the promotion of sustainable development in specific areas;
- development of border zones and promotion of human security;
- de-mining in the Great Lakes region;
- coordination of activities and reinforcements of capacities in the sub-region to fight illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and
- fighting trans-national crime and terrorism.

In terms of governance and inter-state relations, the protocol provides for several democracy and good governance projects that include:

- a regional centre for democracy, good governance, human rights and civic education;
- a regional initiative for the prevention and the curbing of war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against genocide, and for the fight against impunity;
- a regional initiative against illegal exploitation of natural resources; and

- the establishment of a regional information and communication council.

In terms of economic growth and infrastructure development protocols, provision has been made for economic development projects that address (Church and Jowell, 2007:25):

- the establishment of a regional micro-finance support facility;
- trans-border development basins;
- a regional project on food security;
- the revival of an economic community of the Great Lakes countries and specialised institutions; and
- regional mechanisms for certification of natural resources.

From the above, it is clear that the various projects that form part of the planning processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than viewing each project as a separate process with its own time lines and desired end states. This approach is in line with the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of the concept of DPMs, as it supports a systems-thinking approach that essentially entails that the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are executed simultaneously, rather than adopting a phased and linear approach to problem-solving.

## **6.8. Sustaining and building the peace in the DRC**

Many challenges must still be addressed in order to establish lasting peace in the DRC. This includes the establishment of a capable, responsible army and civilian police force, justice reform, local elections and an end to impunity and corruption. The creation of a republican army in the DRC remains a *sine qua non* for long-term peace in the DRC as there is no way in which the DRC, as vast as it is, can survive without a strong and capable army to protect its borders (Kabemba, 2006:160). Progress to these issues is wholly dependent on the measure of support by UN member states to sustain their commitment in the DRC over a significantly long period. This support is specifically important in responding to the immediate requirements of the 'post-electoral' DRC. However, most often, donors tend to reduce their support after successful elections – exactly the opposite of what is required to establish lasting peace. Elections constitute the all-important bridge between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and continuity of support is vital (Swing, 2007:4).

In terms of establishing sustainable peace and security in the DRC a 'sustainment strategy' is more important than and 'exit strategy'. In order to effect this change, the UN will have to change its approach to peace missions. In this regard, Swing (2007:4) points out that the UK's ten-year commitment to help Sierra Leone to build a new army, reflects such a realistic appreciation of the importance of remaining engaged if peace is to become enduring. A similar approach should thus be adopted in the DRC.

The formal economy of the DRC and its vast natural resources must be developed in order to benefit its long-suffering people to ensure longer-term growth and stability. The DRC has an estimated 10% of the world's hydroelectric potential and more than 50% of Africa's remaining rainforests, and it also has vast mineral resources (Swing, 2007:4). These resources must be efficiently exploited to serve as the building-blocks for the establishment of a competitive market economy in the DRC. However, despite the abundance of natural resources, there is no infrastructure to maximise the exploitation thereof to ensure sustained development. This reconstruction of the infrastructure in the DRC will entail, inter alia, the rehabilitation and building of infrastructure, including roads (145 000 km of roads of which no more than 2 500 km are asphalt); the reconstruction of the health system (40 % of health infrastructure has been destroyed in Masisi, north Kivu); the supply of clean water (only 45% of the people have access to safe drinking water, and in some rural areas, this is as low as 3%) and sanitation; and the provision of education (4 out of 10 children are not in school) and 400 000 displaced children have no access to education) (Kabemba, 2006:163).

The DRC suffers from serious humanitarian security issues. The displacement of masses of people prevents communities from engaging in stabilisation activities to feed themselves. Oxfam International (2001) estimates that at least 37% of the population (approximately 18,5 million) have no access to any kind of formal healthcare, while 16 million people have critical food needs. There are only 2 056 doctors for a population of over 50 million – and of these, 930 are in Kinshasa. Severe malnutrition rates among children under five years old have reached 30% in some areas and the national maternal mortality rate is 1 837 per 100 000 live births, one of the worst in the world (Kabemba, 2006:163).

Swing (2007:4) points out that in the light of the complex nature of multi-lateral peace missions, it is clear the changed nature of intra-state conflicts demands new skills – notably in terms of peacekeeping and nation-building capacity. The decisions that have to be taken by peacekeepers in terms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become so intricate that it has given rise to the urgings of neo-

conservative writers such as Edward Luttwak, that we should “give war a chance” to resolve intra-state conflicts, rather than engage in dangerous and expensive and ultimately futile peacekeeping efforts (Luttwak, 1999:36). Swing (2007:4) emphasises that, in terms of modern intra-state wars, the resources that are made available for a peace mission, should match the mandate and that a viable process is key to successful peacekeeping. This requires, inter alia, an international legal framework, and implementing mechanism, and adequate finances and popular support. Regional organisations have a pivotal role to play in establishing lasting peace and although conflicts share some generic characteristics, each mission is in fact *sui generis*. Also, there should be a realisation that peacekeeping’s ‘exit strategy’ consists of electoral-legitimated state institutions and sufficient in-country post-electoral capacity to protect citizens and borders without UN peacekeepers. The post-electoral period is critical to durable peace, requiring sustained engagement and addressing the requirement that peacekeeping needs to be reflected commensurately in member states’ budgets and the UN structure as a permanent global concern.

The debate on the role of local, national and international actors in conflict resolution and post-conflict strategies in Africa will continue. It is indisputable that, for any conflict resolution strategy to work, the various opposing forces must have confidence in the various mediation strategies and particularly those individuals and institutions that are involved in the security and development processes. There is a new realisation in Africa that, while the role of external actors is indeed laudable, Africa will increasingly have to rely on its own initiatives and resources to provide long-term solutions to its problems within the frameworks of its sub-regional groupings, as well as the AU and the UN (Nhema and Zeleza, 2008:3).

## **6.9. Conclusions**

In terms of finding lasting peace in the DRC, it is very evident that reconstruction and reconciliation initiatives should not be limited to the DRC alone, but that the problems should be addressed in the region as a whole, as the reconciliation process in one country, the DRC, is strongly linked to the status of human security in its neighbouring countries. Therefore, any durable solution to the issue of insecurity in the DRC, must have a regional character – emphasising a systems-thinking approach to peace mission problem solving-techniques – which is at the heart of the DPMs concept.

Although there are a great number of challenges to be addressed in order to establish long-term peace in the DRC, one of the greatest is to establish respect for the rule of

law. In this regard, not only the DRC, but also all the countries in the Great Lakes region should work to establish effective judiciaries for the rule of law. This implies the promotion of the concept of democratic governance and respect for human rights, as well as creating effective and independent courts and tribunals. Furthermore, in order to build sustainable peace, countries in the region should also work on political cohabitation and border security. In this regard, in order to improve border security, it is essential that the human resource capacity of the security sector in every country in the region should be enhanced. Ultimately, it is essential that the countries in the region promote peaceful coexistence among themselves by respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of their neighbours.

It is evident from the intervention in the DRC, as was the case in Sierra Leone, that peacekeeping in the 21<sup>st</sup> century differs vastly from the guidelines and prescriptions of the 1950s. The experience of intervention in the brutal and ever-shifting anarchy in many parts in Africa, emphasises the fact that the traditional ideas pertaining to peacekeeping as a formalised interposition between opposing states, was a thing of the past. Modern peacekeepers are expected to constantly consider the interests and intentions of actors in a far broader international region than in the physical area of operations in which they are expected to operate. The complexities and implications of decisions that have to be taken by peacekeepers have become so immense that it has given rise to the urgings of neo-conservative writers such as Edward Luttwak, that we should “give war a chance” to resolve intra-state conflicts, rather than engage in dangerous and expensive and ultimately futile peacekeeping efforts (Luttwak, 1999:36).

However, despite all its shortcomings and the fact that peacekeeping might not have solved all the problems of Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone or the DRC, it is difficult to argue convincingly that it has aggravated them. Between the opposite points of action and non-action, there is a space in which lives have been saved, aid has been distributed and peacemaking opportunities have been facilitated and implemented (Macqueen, 2002:233). At worst, the interventions have proved that these countries have not been totally isolated and abandoned by the international community and that the actions were launched on the part of people who would otherwise be wholly bereft of any psychological or material support.

What is evident, from the peacekeeping efforts in the DRC and Sierra Leone is that military activities can prove ineffective if continued for too long and if not complemented with real economic growth and upliftment (Gueli, 2007:28). The concept of DPMs therefore attempts to provide a workable solution to this dilemma

in that it attempts to couple peacekeeping activities to development activities, namely baseline infrastructure, water, transport and governmental institutions. However, the notion of incorporating the establishment of infrastructure into what was previously understood as the 'military peacekeeping space' has significant implications on how the military component of peace operations should conceptualise, plan and implement their contributions to the overall mission. On a conceptual level, it requires an understanding of the importance of utilising development as both a 'pre-war' and 'post-war' strategy that aims at both the prevention and cure of the underlying causes of the conflict (Gueli, 2007:28). This is the essence of the philosophical baseline of the concept of DPMs – that peace missions should not only be focused on the process of peacekeeping, but that it should indeed be fused with peacebuilding processes as well. On a planning level, it implies synergising infrastructure and development planning with military planning – essentially 'integrated planning', which is at the basis of the current UN Integrated Mission Planning Process.

The concept of DPMs thus provides a framework that could replace existing ad hoc institutions for and approaches to peace missions by providing governments with a permanent capacity that is endowed with sufficient authority to bring all the relevant public and private entities (including the military) together in order to effectively address all the issues and challenges related to complex peace missions – before, during and after crises arise. The DPMs approach is focused on fusing security and development efforts throughout the course of a mission and on addressing the security-development nexus in an inter-related and contextually relevant way. In the case of the peace mission in the DRC, it was evident from the start that the military component involved, could not ensure lasting peace and development. The solutions that were presented during the various peace negotiations, were always based on an integrative approach – aimed at not only addressing short-term problems relating to the conflict, but aimed at finding long-term solutions that would ensure sustained peace and development. The military activities in the DRC were always coupled to development initiatives that would complement real economic growth and upliftment. Peacekeeping activities in the DRC were always coupled to peacebuilding activities. This approach is in accordance with the philosophical essence of the concept of DPMs in that peacekeeping activities are coupled to developmental activities.

The experience in the DRC thus proved that the concept of DPMs can indeed provide decision-makers and role-players with a more holistic planning approach to solving intra-state conflicts, and that, if applied effectively, could provide innovative solutions to ensure lasting peace and development. However, the experience in the

DRC also emphasised the fact that several issues pertaining to the operationalisation of DPMs should be addressed, especially in regard to political will, funds and resource-capacity, before the concept of DPMs can be successfully applied. Furthermore, it is essential that each peace mission be approached in a unique and individual manner, as DPMs do not provide us with a 'winning recipe' or 'one-size-fits-all' solution to intra-state wars. However, the concept of DPMs does provide a useful construct for planning integrated complex peace missions.



## CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### 7.1. Summary

The purpose of this study was to theoretically establish and practically assess whether the concept of DPMs is indeed a useful construct to pursue sustainable levels of human security through a combination of intervention action, reconstruction and development initiatives. To facilitate this study, the following research question was formulated: *Is the concept of DPMs practical and feasible in the African context?*

The concept of DPMs is premised on the problem statement that many (traditional) peacekeeping interventions in the past were unable to work towards sustainable political and economic development. To this end, DPMs are aimed at providing a practical and feasible alternative that could be successfully implemented in the African context.

In order to assess the feasibility of the DPMs concept, the study was conceptually demarcated or redundant to the inter-relationship between DPMs and the security-development nexus in terms of sustainable political and economic development. The study was furthermore geographically confined to the intervention in Kosovo as an international case study, and the cases of Sierra Leone and the DRC respectively in terms of peace missions in Africa. As far as the temporal demarcation is concerned, the study was confined to peace missions and military interventions since January 1990 until June 2008. Some pertinent factors that predate 1990, such as the background to the conflicts as discussed in the respective case studies, have been included since these factors have direct bearing on the nature of peace missions and how the relevant missions have evolved.

The study was executed in a historical-descriptive and analytical manner, based on a literature study and analysis of factual data sources. The concept and principles of DPM's, as presented by Gueli et al, was applied as departure point for the research and the components of the analytical framework were deductively linked. Case studies that are relevant to the topic were analysed as part of the assessment. The primary unit of analysis was countries in which peace missions have been conducted since 1990 and in which the peacekeeping mandates included peacebuilding initiatives. The level of analysis was predominantly state-centric, although other relevant international, continental and regional factors and role-players were also

considered. Primary sources utilised were mostly policy documents from the UN, the AU and the CSIR.

The significance of the study is that the conclusions reached could be used to inform government officials, military personnel as well as humanitarian organisations and civilian organisations involved in peace missions in the African continent. The answers to the research question provide possible answers to address the complex issues pertaining to peace missions in Africa. The research also addressed the relationship between the political needs/demands and the military role, and provided indications as to how DPMs can be utilised during peace missions to achieve desired objectives and end states in order to facilitate sustained development and security on the African continent.

In view of the above, the study commenced by analysing the evolution of the concept of 'human security'. The term 'human security' was initially focused on development, but recent history has prompted a broader, more holistic understanding of the concept. The research revealed how the initial concept of human security was primarily focused on development and covered seven aspects, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security, but that it shifted to focus also on the human costs of violent conflict. The research indicated how security of the individual is therefore no longer defined exclusively within the realms of states and national security. In this context, individuals and communities are considered not only as bystanders and collateral victims of conflict, but as core participants in protection strategies and post-conflict peacebuilding. The research also focused on the concept of human security as defined by the Commission on Human Security as the protection of the fundamental freedoms that are the essence of life and which includes protecting people from severe and pervasive threats and situations, as well as creating the political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity.

The research also focused on the security-development nexus. The link between security and development is highlighted by the continued violent conflict in many of the world's poorest states, and it has become widely accepted that contemporary armed conflicts require sustained efforts that address not only the military dimensions of conflicts, but also the political, humanitarian, economic and social dimensions of conflicts. In general, there has been, for some years, a growing concern with the necessity of linking security and development in order to achieve meaningful and lasting peace. However, it was only in the late 1990's that a clear and more

‘politicised’ agenda emerged, which bore the promise of and integration between development and security policy.

The study further evaluated the inter-relationship between the current understanding of the concept of peacebuilding and the newly defined concept of DPMs. The research revealed how the concept of DPMs was presented as a practical or functional South African concept to effectively address human security and development in Africa. The concept of DPMs is in line with the contemporary approach to UN Complex Peace Missions, which are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine security, political, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase. The research further revealed that the concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for civil-military operations that bridge the traditional ‘gap’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention and resolution. In response to the limited successes achieved with the traditional approach to UN peace missions in Africa, DPMs are presented as an alternative (African) solution or paradigm that aims to ensure that future peace operations on the continent are implemented in an effective and sustainable manner. This ultimately implies that the planning processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding should be integrated with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is implemented in a phased and linear fashion. It ultimately implies the adoption of a systems-thinking approach to address the inter-related problems experienced by war-torn states during complex emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding simultaneously. The research proved that the cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to replace existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in governments with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private entities (including the military) on board and under control when a crisis emerges. This would facilitate a greater depth of planning and coordination between the military and civilian components of a mission.

The study then moved its focus to three case studies, in which the peace missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC were analysed in terms of how the concept of DPMs was operationalised during the peace interventions:

- The research pertaining to the intervention in Kosovo emphasised the fact that the significance of the military component’s role in the peace process in Kosovo is to be found in the fact that the reconstruction phase commenced immediately after Operation Allied Force was concluded and the fact that the military component (KFOR) and the civilian component

(UNMIK) were deployed simultaneously and that these components worked in unison in order to set the scene for sustained peace and development – thus effectively implementing the key success factors of DPMs by effectively addressing the reconstruction gap that often leads to a resumption of conflict if peacebuilding activities are not rolled-out in time. Ultimately, the peace process in Kosovo clearly shows that international peacekeeping has moved beyond the traditional peacekeeping role of the UN. It also bears testimony to the growing importance of regional organisations and alliances in international peace initiatives in the post-Cold War era. Most importantly, the research indicated that complex emergencies require multi-faceted responses and it implies acceptance of the fact that the military is but one of the participants in any particular peace process. As a result, it proved that, in addition to the essential roles to be performed by international and regional security organisations, international and local NGOs have tasks to perform that are as important as those performed by the military component during humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, the intervention in Kosovo bears testimony to the realisation that modern peace missions require an integrated systems-approach in order to effectively address the inter-related issues that caused the conflict in the first place, and that the capability and the willingness to act need to be matched with adequate instruments. Most importantly, the peace process in Kosovo emphasises the fact that complex peace missions call for the rapid and simultaneous deployment of peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding components.

- The research on the peace mission in Sierra Leone demonstrated that peacekeeping in Africa involves entry into volatile, high risk, anarchic environments, where copious quantities of weapons are available. The peace mission in Sierra Leone clearly indicated that a robust approach to peace missions is required in modern complex emergencies. In addition to the collapse of security mechanisms, the destruction of the social cohesion and state infrastructures can remove the support mechanisms required to sustain life, which most often, results in humanitarian crisis. In these circumstances, it is essential that the peace force that is deployed in such complex emergencies has credibility in the eyes of the population, the belligerents and the international community. However, the military deployment ultimately forms only a part of the solution: there can be no credible military peace support operations force without the political backing of all the participating nations, as well as the commitment to long-term sustainable reconstruction and development.

- The research on the peace mission in the DRC indicated that traditional intervention approaches fall short in countries where complex emergencies are the order of the day. It is evident from the intervention in the DRC, as was the case in Sierra Leone, that peacekeeping in the 21<sup>st</sup> century differs vastly from the guidelines and prescriptions of the 1950s. The experience of intervention in the brutal and ever-shifting anarchy of those parts in Africa in the 1990s and 2000s, the ideas of peacekeeping as a formalised interposition between opposing states appear to belong to a distant historical era. The relationship between security and development must be clearly understood by all parties concerned, and ultimately, there must be a long-term commitment by all role-players to contribute to finding lasting peace. What is evident from the peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo, the DRC and Sierra Leone is that military activities can prove ineffective if continued for too long and if not complemented with real economic growth and upliftment. The research indicated how the concept of DPMs offers a workable solution to this dilemma in that it attempts to couple peacekeeping activities to development activities, namely baseline infrastructure, water, transport and governmental institutions. However, the research also revealed that the notion of incorporating the establishment of infrastructure into what was previously understood as the ‘military peacekeeping space’ has significant implications on how the military component of peace operations should conceptualise, plan and implement their contributions to the overall mission. On a conceptual level, it requires an understanding of the importance of utilising development as both a ‘pre-war’ and ‘post-war’ strategy that aims at both the prevention and cure of the underlying causes of the conflict. Finally, the research proved that, on a planning level, it implies synergising infrastructure and development planning with military planning – essentially ‘integrated planning’ which is at the basis of the current UN Integrated Mission Planning Process.

The fact that the study is based on only three case studies poses some problems for the purpose of making generalised conclusions in regard to the application of the concept of DPMs, but the reason for the limited number of case studies is based on the fact that they represent the first few cases in which peacekeeping mandates combined security, political, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions with the intention of combining peacekeeping activities with peacebuilding initiatives.

## 7.2. Conclusions

In relation to the research question, three subsidiary questions were posed:

- How appropriate is the concept of DPMs specifically to the African context?
- Are there generic or common elements that will be applicable to all peace missions in the international community in general and Africa in particular?
- Can the implementation of DPMs provide innovative solutions to the challenges of human security, the security-development nexus and peacebuilding on the continent?

The following conclusions can finally be articulated in the context of the research question and subsidiary questions.

### *How appropriate is the concept of DPMs specifically to the African context?*

The concept of DPMs was presented to the South African Parliament in 2004 as a 'home-grown' solution to promote long-term sustainable security and development on the African continent. The research conducted indicated that the concept is in fact, not unique to South Africa, but that it follows the current international approach to peace missions in that the mandates of most of these interventions include and address peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding activities. Importantly, the concept of DPMs emphasises the notion that the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development.

Most or many of the conflicts on the African continent can ultimately be ascribed to the struggle to gain control over resources, coupled to the absence of good governance, effective institutions and sustainable development initiatives. The concept of DPMs is aimed at directly addressing the causes of the many intra-state wars in Africa, by not only providing short-term peace and security, but also providing long-term solutions to the conflict by establishing the foundations for sustainable peace and development. In terms of conflicts in Africa, DPMs are aimed at bringing peacekeeping closer to development – all in a bid to minimise the chances of a return to violence – a phenomenon very prevalent in Africa, where peace mission only have a 50% chance of success. History has proved that in more than 60% of interventions, belligerents return to the use of violence within five years after the peacekeepers have left the country. DPMs aim at providing a strategy to quickly make the transition from the military's peacemaking and peacekeeping

mission to the longer-term peacebuilding mission of IGOs and NGOs. DPMs therefore offers a useful framework for the process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities immediately after military operations so that security can dynamically reinforce and influence the effectiveness of development (i.e. the one activity must be applied without losing sight of the other). On a continent where individual states, as well as regional organisations, have limited resources for sustained development, especially in countries that were plagued by intra-state wars for decades, the concept of DPMs thus offers a useful framework for more effective peace interventions. However, in order for the concept to be effectively operationalised, very large amounts of funds and resources will have to be made available – and in the case of Africa, this implies employing donor support from developed countries. History has shown that the developed world is, in fact, more willing to provide funds and resources, rather than peacekeepers, to peace missions in Africa. However, the success of DPMs in Africa will ultimately remain dependent on the participation of and cooperation by the participants to the conflict. Furthermore, the concept of DPMs is a useful construct in the facilitation and operationalisation of the concepts of the African Renaissance and NEPAD, which are based on the need for lasting peace and sustainable development on the African continent.

***Are there generic or common elements that will be applicable to all peace missions in the international community in general and Africa in particular?***

The concept of DPMs is based on the integration of the planning processes of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, with the aim of mutually supporting each other, rather than viewing each concept as an intermediate end state that is implemented in a phased and sequential fashion. The concept of DPMs is presented as a theoretical framework to effectively address the challenges that are related to human security, by adopting an integrated approach, based on effective co-operation between various states, government departments and civil society organisations as required. The new policy frameworks on the African continent consider this type of approach as essential, and despite some practical impediments, there is general and growing appreciation of the linkages between security, co-operation and development as suggested by the human security paradigm followed by most of the role-players involved in peace missions. It ultimately implies the adoption of a systems-thinking approach to address the inter-related problems experienced by war-torn states during complex emergencies by executing the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding simultaneously. This implies and supports the internationally accepted approach to peace missions that is based on the notion that security can no longer be regarded as a precursor for development, and that there is a need to

efficiently link security and development as twin imperatives through integrated policies and programmes from the start of peace operations, as security can only achieve permanent benefit if early and well-placed socio-economic resources are implemented within reasonable time. This more integrated approach in the planning of peace missions has been formalised in the UN IMPP, as well as in the AU's Draft Policy for Integrated Mission Planning. This implies that the concept of DPMs is not only relevant to peace missions in Africa, but that it is applicable to all peace missions, as it provides a holistic framework for laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development.

It is not possible to determine exact time scales for the duration of developmental assistance and peacebuilding as building blocks for DPMs, as the duration of development initiatives will depend on the nature of each individual crisis. However, experience has shown that the window between military action and development work, the 'reconstruction gap', is very narrow and that the first few weeks after a ceasefire agreement are perhaps the most critical period for establishing a sustainable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers.

Of utmost importance, is the fact that the various stake-holders and role players involved in a mission, must plan and work together under a common strategic framework to ensure that combined security and developmental efforts are started as soon as possible, and that these efforts form part of a larger framework for long-term developments and reconstruction. In this regard, regional organisations have a vital role to play, as they provide a sort of nexus between the UN and the AU, IGOs and NGOs, as well as the respective civil society organisations involved in peace missions. Although many of the objectives and end states of the peace missions in the three case studies have not been achieved as yet, the integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities can be described as qualified successes as the conflict situations in all three cases have not deteriorated to the same levels as to what they were prior to the peace missions.

***Can the implementation of DPMs provide innovative solutions to the challenges of human security, the security-development nexus and peacebuilding on the continent?***

The DPMs approach is to replace existing ad hoc institutions and approaches in government with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private entities (including the military) on board and under control when a crisis emerges, with a view to facilitating a greater depth of planning and coordination between the military and civilian components of a mission. The



DPMs approach is focused on fusing security and development efforts throughout the course of a mission and on addressing the security-development nexus in an inter-related and contextually relevant way.

However, the concept of DPMs should not be viewed in terms of a set procedure that can be used as a panacea or type of 'universal band aid' for all intra-state wars. There is no 'one-size-fits-all' or 'winning recipe' solution to peace missions. Furthermore, the active involvement of civil society in peace missions and post-conflict activities is a crucial component for the development of democracies, and is one of the most essential elements for making the transition from conflict into the post-conflict state and consolidating peaceful politics. Weak or failed states should take time to consolidate and build their own institutions and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents, rather than rushing the process by accepting and implementing the continuing largely Western dictated formulas for functional and open societies. The aim should therefore be to analyse the environment in which the peace mission is to take place in great sociological detail in seeking to get as near as possible to the viewpoints of local actors, especially in terms of what the local role-players understand about and could expect from the peacekeepers in their midst.

It can therefore be concluded that the concept of DPMs does indeed provide a more holistic approach to solving intra-state conflicts, and that, if applied appropriately, could provide innovative solutions towards ensuring lasting peace and development. However, several issues pertaining to the operationalisation of developmental peace missions should be addressed, especially in regard to political will, funds and resource-capacity, before the concept of DPMs can successfully be applied in Africa and elsewhere. DPMs, in terms of its conceptual basis, is indeed a feasible ideal for peace missions, as it is based on and in line with the approved current UN and AU integrated planning processes. However, in terms of its practical utility in Africa – it currently remains an ambitious construct – especially given the limited capacity and resources of the AU and regional organisations. In the final analysis, the success of DPMs will be determined by the will and commitment of all the relevant role-players involved in finding a lasting solution to intra-state conflicts – the concept itself cannot provide sustainable peace and development.

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